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Abstract
Many public research and technology organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria have been
considered ineffective in improving the socioeconomic status of their citizens. Effective
management of RTOs will improve research activities, such as development of new
technologies and processes, which are crucial for national development and wealth
creation. Since boards are the organ of governance in public RTOs in Nigeria, their
impact should be enhanced. Several studies have examined the role of public governing
boards, but the perceptions of stakeholders regarding their impact on RTOs in Nigeria has
yet to be studied. The agency and stewardship theories served as frameworks to examine
effect of boards on public RTOs’ outcomes in Nigeria. Data were obtained from semi
structured interviews with 16 respondents from 6 public RTOs in the Federal Ministry of
Science and Technology in Nigeria. Secondary data were obtained from public
documents. Findings revealed that the impact of public RTO boards in Nigeria was not
recognized and not deemed important for Nigeria’s welfare. Although professional and
empowered boards were found to be beneficial to public RTOs in Nigeria, the RTO
boards’ disregard for best governance practices diminished their impact and relevance. A
recommendation from the study is for a governance structure suitable for RTOs and an
international monitoring and evaluation process to enhance good governance practices in
RTOs. It is hoped that the outcome of this research will be used by leaders and
policymakers to create governance reforms in Nigerian RTOs, improve public RTO
outcomes, promote infrastructural and economic development in Nigeria, and wellness of
Nigerian citizens.

Public Boards’ Impact on Effectiveness of Nigeria’s Research and Technology
Organizations
by
Olayinka A. Komolafe

MPA, University of Ado-Ekiti, 2002
MIR, Obafemi Awolowo University, 1999
BA (ED), University of Ilorin, 1989

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
May 2020

Dedication
I dedicate this study to God Almighty who saved my soul and bestowed upon me
the grace and strength to start and complete this work despite all challenges. I also
dedicate this work to my parents, Samuel and Eunice Aribisala for sowing the initial seed
in me and for their invaluable encouragement and support all through the process.
Finally, I dedicate this work to my dear husband, Brigadier (Rtd) Joe Komolafe for his
unflinching support and determination to see me complete this program. You stood by me
all through. I am grateful always for you all.

Acknowledgments
I sincerely appreciate and thank my mentor and Committee Chairman, Dr. Mark
Gordon for believing in me and for his patience and encouragement. I acknowledge Dr. G
for his commitment to making me a credible scholar and for reviewing my dissertation in
a timely and professional manner. He put himself out and was always ready to offer
useful advice anytime I got stuck. Your commitment to seeing me graduate has paid off
and I will be eternal grateful. I thank Dr. Gary Kelsey, my Committee member, who
actually recommended my Chair to me because his hands were full then. But he
eventually became my second committee member and contributed immensely to the
completion of this work. Your recommendation then is worth more than gold now. I
thank my husband and children, Joe, Ayomide, and Olumide, without whose support and
considerate acceptance of my Walden deadlines, I would not have been able to
concentrate on this program. I thank my dissertation editor, Dr. Niyi Taiwo, for the
painstaking attention he paid to the editing of this work. I thank my bosses, Engineer Dr.
Olugbenga Olusunle and Engineer Professor M. S. Haruna for their support and
encouragement during this programme. I equally acknowledge the opportunity given to
me by the late Professor Olusegun Oyeleke Adewoye to enroll for this programme. I will
never forget you.

Table of Contents
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study....................................................................................1
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
Statement of the Problem ...............................................................................................3
Research Questions ........................................................................................................4
Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................................4
Research Design.............................................................................................................5
Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................6
Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................7
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................8
Assumptions, Limitations, Scope, and Delimitations ..................................................10
Assumptions.......................................................................................................... 10
Limitations ............................................................................................................ 10
Scope and Delimitations ....................................................................................... 11
Definitions of Terms ....................................................................................................12
Possible Types and Sources of Data ............................................................................14
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................15
Summary ......................................................................................................................16
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................17
Introduction ..................................................................................................................17
i

Overview of Global Governance Practices and Theories ............................................18
Governance ........................................................................................................... 18
Governance Best Practices .................................................................................... 21
Principles of Good Corporate Governance ........................................................... 23
Theories of Governance ........................................................................................ 28
The Public Sector .........................................................................................................33
Characteristics of the Public Sector ...................................................................... 34
Governance in the Public Sector ........................................................................... 36
The Governing Board of Public Organizations ...........................................................38
Role of Boards of Public Organizations ............................................................... 43
Role of Public Board Chair and Members ............................................................ 46
Competing Priorities of Public Boards ................................................................. 47
Determinants of Boards’ Impact on Organizational Effectiveness....................... 49
Trends in the Management of RTOs in Nigeria...........................................................50
Challenges of Corporate Governance in Nigeria .........................................................53
Measuring Board Effectiveness ...................................................................................56
Models for Measuring Board Effectiveness ......................................................... 57
The Gap in Literature ...................................................................................................58
Summary ......................................................................................................................59
Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................60
Introduction ..................................................................................................................60
Description of the Research Design .............................................................................60
ii

Population and Sample ................................................................................................63
Sampling Process .........................................................................................................64
Role of the Researcher .................................................................................................66
Data Collection Procedures..........................................................................................68
Interview Technique ....................................................................................................68
Interview Questions .....................................................................................................71
Gaining the Confidence of the Participants .................................................................71
Document Examination ...............................................................................................72
Data Security and Storage............................................................................................72
Strategy for Data Analysis and Interpretation .............................................................73
Coding Strategy .................................................................................................... 75
Data Interpretation ................................................................................................ 76
Quality Issue ................................................................................................................76
IRB Approval ...............................................................................................................78
Ethical Issues ...............................................................................................................78
Summary ......................................................................................................................80
Chapter 4: Results ..............................................................................................................82
Introduction ..................................................................................................................82
Research Setting...........................................................................................................83
Demographics ..............................................................................................................84
Data Collection ............................................................................................................88
Data Analysis ...............................................................................................................92
iii

Evidence of Trustworthiness......................................................................................102
Credibility ........................................................................................................... 103
Transferability ..................................................................................................... 104
Dependability ...................................................................................................... 104
Confirmability ..................................................................................................... 105
Study Results .............................................................................................................106
Thematic Categories ..................................................................................................106
Thematic Category 1: Working Relationship with Public RTO Boards in
Nigeria..................................................................................................... 106
Thematic Category 2: Importance of Public RTO Boards in Nigeria ................ 109
Thematic Category 3: Criticisms Against Boards’ Performance ........................ 118
Thematic Category 4: Improving Board Performance........................................ 131
Thematic Category 5: Hindrances of Public RTO Effectiveness ....................... 137
Thematic Category 6: Improving RTO Effectiveness ........................................ 141
Summary of Findings .......................................................................................... 144
Summary ....................................................................................................................145
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ..........................................148
Introduction ................................................................................................................148
Interpretation of Findings ..........................................................................................149
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ1 ......................................................................149
Lack of Formal and Distinct Governance Codes for RTOs ................................ 151
Lack of Standardized Best Practices to Regulate Board Activities .................... 153
iv

Political Interference ........................................................................................... 155
Inadequate Funding to Support Board Activities and Processes ........................ 156
Nonprofessional Boards ...................................................................................... 158
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ2 ......................................................................159
Policy Formulation and Strategic Planning ........................................................ 159
Monitoring and Evaluation ................................................................................. 161
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ3 ......................................................................162
Unclear Roles of Boards ..................................................................................... 163
Political Interference ........................................................................................... 164
Board Accountability .......................................................................................... 165
Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................166
Recommendations ......................................................................................................168
Implications for Positive Social Change ....................................................................176
Conclusion .................................................................................................................181
References ........................................................................................................................182
Appendix A: Introductory Letter 1 ..................................................................................240
Appendix B: Introductory Letter 2 ..................................................................................242
Appendix C: Interviewer Guide .......................................................................................244
Appendix D: Certificate of Completion of NIH Training ...............................................249

v

List of Tables
Table 1. Summary of Participants’ Demographic Characteristics .................................... 85
Table 2. Summary of Respondents’ Ethnic Characteristics.............................................. 86
Table 3. Summary of Respondents’ Religious Characteristics ......................................... 87
Table 4. Summary of Participants’ Gender Distribution .................................................. 88
Table 5. Summary of Research Questions and Associated Interview Questions ............. 91
Table 6. Summary of Research Movement to Final Coding Categories .......................... 97
Table 7. Overview of Themes and their Links to the Study’s Research Questions........ 102
Table 8. Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Response Regarding Importance
of Public RTO Boards in Nigeria............................................................................ 117
Table 9. Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Response Regarding Importance
of Public RTO Boards in Nigeria............................................................................ 118

vi

List of Figures
Figure 1. Ethnic spread of respondents .............................................................................87
Figure 2. Distribution of study’s research questions and associated interview Questions 92
Figure 3. Summary of linkage of RQ1 to coding categories .............................................95
Figure 4. Summary of linkage of RQ2 to coding categories .............................................96
Figure 5. Summary of linkage of RQ3 to coding categories .............................................96
Figure 6. Proposed monitoring and evaluation/oversight structure for public RTOs in
Nigeria .............................................................................................................172
Figure 7. RTO impact assessment chart ..........................................................................174
Figure 8. Percentage budgetary allocation for S&T Ministry in Nigeria budget between
2007 and 2012 .................................................................................................175

vii

1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Nigeria has been struggling to attain global relevance in technological
development since its independence in 1960, and despite its obvious large status in
Africa, the country is still far behind in terms of economic development. The country has
dropped from being the third fastest growing world economy in 2014/2015 after China
and Qatar (Elias, 2016) to 15th with a real GDP of -1.7 in 2016 and projected gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of 0.6% in 2017 (International Monetary Fund [IMF],
2016), its worst since democracy stabilized in 1999 (Jerven, 2015). Despite many
government-owned organizations which were established purposely to help Nigeria
overcome its many developmental problems through research and development activities,
the nation is fraught with decaying public infrastructure and low capital growth. Nigeria
is ranked 152 out of 188 and has a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.514 (United
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). Nigeria also ranked 36 out of 54
African countries assessed for good governance, according to the Ibrahim Index of
African Governance (IIAG) ranking.
The nation’s earnings are gradually reducing because of the last global recession
which ended in 2009 (Fapohunda, 2013) and the Nigerian recession which began in 2016
and lasted for a year. Public funds are being channeled towards developing research and
technological organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria as a means of stimulating economic
growth. The Nigerian government is thus focusing on other factors that could make
Nigeria’s public RTOs more profitable and advantageous to economic growth, apart from
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employee competences and expertise. One such determinant of performance is the way
these organizations are being administered. Following the near-collapse of the global
banking sector with financial scandals of entities like Enron and Worldcom in the US and
Parmalat in Europe, strict and uniform regulation of corporate practices has become
necessary. As a consequence, nations have responded by passing regulatory laws and
developing governance principles to guide public governance.
Good governance principles are designed primarily to support boards and assist
them with isolating and establishing best practices for organizational effectiveness.
According to the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2013), good governance
is premised on adherence to principles of integrity, openness and stakeholder
engagement, transparent reporting processes, effective risk management, and capacity
development. These principles stand as terms of reference for governing entities and are
similar to one another when compared across organizations in the public sector.
Since the Enron scandal in 2001, some major Nigerian public corporations have
also suffered major setbacks which resulted in collapses of their organizations as a
consequence of agency issues and poor governance structures. Banks were the worst hit
and the banking sector suffered a massive restructuring (Chinaedu, 2011). The
restructuring was aimed at repositioning the banking sector (Ezeoha, 2011). The
necessity for more effective boards has become more apparent so that value delivery can
be guaranteed for stakeholders (Pradhan, Afshan, & Chhetri, 2011). Nigerian public RTO
boards need reliable information that will enable them to understand factors preventing
the effectiveness of their organizations and therefore prevent the collapse of the sector.

3
This study therefore focused on discovering the perceptions of chief executives and
public board members about good governance practices in public RTOs in Nigeria so that
good and ethical practices could be suggested for improving the performance of those
organizations and achieving goals set for them.
Statement of the Problem
Science and technology (S&T) drives socioeconomic development (Bamiro,
Mikailu, Obiaga, & Nyagba, 2008; Cavdar & Aydin, 2015) and are applied by most
governments to promote economic and infrastructural development, especially when
combined with research and development (Wu & Zou, 2012). Despite having embraced
research and development (R&D) in its quest for economic and infrastructural
development, Nigeria was still ranked 127 out of 144 competitive economies in the world
(Schwab, 2014). This poor ranking may have been due to lack of key R&D inputs and
weak institutions which resulted in Nigeria’s low GDP (Siyanbola et al., 2011, p. 3).
According to Wu and Zou (2012), R&D activities can influence economic development,
when researchers combine innovative and managerial skills with technical expertise. This
feat was accomplished in China (Wu & Zou, 2012). Berle and Means (1932) said that an
effective governing board guarantees the effectiveness of public organizations and
protection of stakeholders’ interests. Effective boards have been proven to have a
significant impact on organizational performance and are thus able to enhance promotion
of R&D investments. No study has been able to link effective boards with the
performance and development of a solid institutional framework involving public RTOs
in a developing economy like Nigeria. This gap has limited the understanding of policy
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makers about how to build solid governance structures in order to make public RTOs
more functional. This study, therefore, intends to fill this gap in understanding by
focusing specifically on the perceptions of stakeholders in the R&D sector in Nigeria
regarding the role of governing boards in terms of improving the performance of public
organizations in this sector and setting priorities for the nation’s future.
Research Questions
This study seeks to answer the following questions:
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D
sector?
RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these
organizations?
Conceptual Framework
Since the intent of this study was to discover how governing boards could
improve the management of organizations to enable them to respond to increasing
societal demands, the conceptual framework used for this study was the agency theory.
This theory came into public and academic awareness in the 1930s through the ideas
shared by Berle & Means (1932), where they analyzed that separation of ownership from
control in public organizations would result in governance problems. The principle in the
agency theory involves the relationship between the principal, in this case the boards
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which represent the stakeholders, and the agents, who are the who are the executives
tasked with running the organizations. tasked with running the organizations. This
principal-agent structure sometimes results in disputes because the interest of the
principal, who often delegates decision making powers to the agent, may not be captured
in the activities of the agent. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory
perspective is useful in understanding such issues that are associated with the principalagent structure. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the agency theory could be
applied to eliminate opportunistic behaviors which arise from conflicts of interest in the
governance of public organizations. Raelin and Bondy (2013) recommended that boards
should be appointed to manage governance conflicts and serve the interest of the
principal (stakeholder). Sharpe (2012) asserted that the theory had exerted great influence
in regulating board-organizations relationships thereby reducing principal-agent issues in
organizations. Therefore, no study on corporate governance (CG) is complete without
reference to the agency approach because the theory increases understanding of the
principal-agent relationship. The agency theory has been widely used in such studies to
understand the behavior of governing boards and how these have aided the development
of board practices in organizations. It also helped to determine the method of inquiry for
this study.
Research Design
This study is qualitative by design because it sought an understanding of a case
being studied based on the perceptions of participants. Creswell (2007) recommended the
qualitative design for studies that required in-depth exploration in order to better
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understand the lived experiences of the participants. The data for this study were obtained
from personal semi-structured interviews with 16 respondents from six public RTOs. The
respondents were comprised of seven former chief executive officers (FCEOs) of public
RTOs in Nigeria, four present chief executive officers (PCEOs), and five former board
members (FBMs). All respondents were purposively selected. Secondary data were
obtained from existing official documents and mandates using the qualitative data
collection approach. The data were analyzed to determine themes that emerged, and
these were used to address the research questions. The themes that emerged were
compared with existing data and records and triangulated for validity. An appropriate
evidence-based conclusion was drawn from the findings to address the research problem.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the governance role
played by successive board members in determining the effectiveness of public RTOs in
Nigeria. This role was understood from the perspective of CEOs and FBMs. This study
also sought to describe exceptional CG practices of public RTO boards in Nigeria that
would be appropriate for public RTOs in Nigeria. This study explored the importance of
good governance practices in terms of RTOs’ effectiveness in the Nigerian public sector
by interviewing CEOs of selected public RTOs as well as past and present board
members. The purpose of this was to gain in-depth knowledge about the importance of
public RTO boards and the effects of decisions, risks, policies, and activities of those
boards before 2016. Highly effective RTOs are required in Nigeria to develop the
infrastructure of the country. Therefore, the intent of this study was to offer reliable
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information to researchers and practitioners regarding governance behaviors that
enhanced organizational performance of public RTOs. Through this study, valuable
recommendations which will enhance governance of public RTOs and lead to
technological advancement of Nigeria will be made available. When boards are
performing well, their organizations will be effective and their immediate society will
feel their impact. This study will inspire discussions amongst policymakers and
researchers regarding improving governing boards’ performance in Nigeria’s public
organizations.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study is qualitative using an interpretive case-study approach.
This approach was selected because it relies on the experiences of participants within
their social contexts and since this dissertation had to do with the perceptions of
governance issues in public RTOs, it was an appropriate research paradigm to use. With
the application of the qualitative approach, therefore, I strove to understand the
governance behaviors of public RTOs through the perceptions of governing bodies. The
qualitative approach was more appropriate in this study compared to a quantitative or
mixed methods approach because a quantitative approach would involve establishing a
link between effective boards and performance of public RTOs in Nigeria and could not
have probed deeper into meanings given to phenomena according to participants.
Quantitative methods often involve establishing cause and effect relationships among
variables using empirical data, while the mixed methods approach combines both
qualitative and quantitative approaches and still involves statistical deduction of the
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phenomenon rather than induction (Creswell, 2012, 2009). This allowed an in-depth
analysis of data collected from methods such as interviews, observations, and secondary
sources to gain a deeper understanding of the case.
Background of the Study
Governments establish public organizations purposely to offer public services
(Bowman, 2016). Public RTOs in Nigeria should strengthen the rapid industrialization of
the country and increase the social satisfaction of the citizens through their activities.
However, these realities are not visible (Siyanbola et al., 2011) because these
organizations are performing below expectations (Muanya, 2019). Despite the apparent
failures of these public RTOs to deliver expected outcomes, the Nigerian government has
yet to initiate intuitive and decisive strategies to tackle emerging challenges in the sector.
Unless more attention is paid to governance of these organizations, they will continue to
waste public funds, and this will further impoverish the nation. CG has thus become
imperative to ensure that organizations achieve the mandates which were designed for
them by the government. Good governance also creates an enabling environment for
foreign investment, thereby promoting economic growth (Aina, 2013). The role and
importance of public governing boards was thus one of the important considerations in
this study.
The agency theory was selected as the foundation for this study. The agency
theory involves the separation of ownership from direct control and running of
organizations in order to enhance efficiency (Berle & Means, 1932; Raelin & Bondy,
2013). This recommendation was, however, discovered to have led to the pursuit of self-
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interests by executives, especially in Nigeria where corruption is endemic in public
service (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). Agency problems must be eliminated before
they waste the efforts and investments of shareholders.
Achebe (1998) said leaders must be more ethical for the economy of Nigeria to
grow. Many corporate failures experienced in Nigeria have been attributed to poor
institutional frameworks and governance behavior of leaders (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015).
This underscored the importance of adherence to the principles of good governance as a
panacea for agency issues and ineffectiveness in organizations. Siyanbola et al. (2011)
encouraged improved funding of RTOs in order to improve performance, but Kaplan,
Samuels, and Cohen (2015) said that if public boards supervised CEOs more,
organizations would become more effective. Palmberg (2015) focused on Swedish firms’
performance under independent boards and concluded that independent boards were able
to positively influence the financial performance of Swedish organizations by monitoring
the activities of executives.
Additionally, many studies have been conducted regarding CG issues in
developing countries involving annual reports of organizations, information about
popular standards of governance principles such as board composition, qualification,
separation of ownership, and risk management posture of boards. However, this study
involved perceptions of respondents concerning the impact of public boards, and these
were obtained through personal interviews and questionnaires. Other secondary data were
only used to corroborate the primary data. The findings are expected to improve public
board effectiveness, thereby resulting in high-performing organizations and
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infrastructural development in Nigeria. More details about these issues appear in Chapter
2.
Assumptions, Limitations, Scope, and Delimitations
Assumptions
According to Rouleau-Carroll (2014), assumptions are things believed to be
certain based on speculations by the researcher, but have not been sufficiently proven.
There were several assumptions in this study. One assumption was that there would be no
objections from the Ministry of Science and Technology about interviewing participants
or accessing existing documents in the RTOs. The second assumption was that the
criteria for including participants in this study were appropriate for the sample such that
all participants have had the same experience with boards. My third assumption was the
participants in this study would be honest and offer valid information needed to answer
the research questions. My fourth and last assumption in this study was that the
participants would consent to participate in this research because of their interest in
improving the effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria rather than their personal
motives and interests.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study was the absence of prior studies on governance
in public RTOs in Nigeria. This limited the study because there was little foundation
upon which an understanding of my research could be based except for the studies on
governance that involved organizations in other sectors in the country, like the banking
sector. A major limitation of this study was the fact that the data obtained from the
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interviews and questionnaires could not be verified since they were opinions and
perceptions of participants. There was, therefore, the possibility of respondents’ bias. I,
however, overcame this limitation by independently triangulating the data in order to
ascertain the validity of the data obtained from the respondents. By triangulating data, the
information obtained can be compared and verified for consistency.
Scope and Delimitations
This study was limited to RTOs in the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Science and
Technology. In addition, participants were limited to serving managing directors (MDs)/
CEOs of selected parastatals and agencies in the RTO sector, former chief executives of
these parastatals, as well as former members of public governing boards in the
parastatals. Samples were drawn from board members who had served before public
boards were dissolved in Nigeria in 2015 by the president.
Since one study cannot adequately cover every aspect of governance, this study
was restricted to governance in Nigerian public organizations (with emphasis on RTOs)
from the perspective of those involved or who have been involved in governance. The
study included participants’ perceptions through interviews to gain rich information from
their experiences.
Delimitations are those issues that can be manipulated by the researcher in the
study (Rouleau-Carroll, 2014). The choice of only MDs and board members as
participants in this study rather than including directors and other government officials
was deliberate. The choice was informed by my belief that the selected participants were
directly involved in the governance of these organizations. I also deliberately restricted
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the search area to Nigeria because ethical practices in governance were still in the infancy
stage in the country. Governance in Nigeria thus needed reliable studies that could assist
practices to thrive and achieve desired impacts.
Definitions of Terms
Uncommon terms used in a study should be defined to give readers an
understanding of their meanings. Uncommon terms used in this study include:
Agency problems: These are problems associated with incompatibilities in
management and shareholders’ interests which lead to conflicts (Boshkoska, 2015).
Asian Tigers: This refers to the four Asian countries (Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Korea & Taiwan) which, though lacking in natural resources, transformed their
economies between the mid-60s and 1990s through growth and development strategies
that made them international trading hubs (Hai, Tsui, & Zhang, 2013).
Code of Ethics: This is a spelled-out statement detailing expected behavior of
employees in an organization or profession.
Conflict of Interest: This is a crisis situation that arises when the separate goals
and needs of owners of organizations and managers are at variance with one another
(Tafel-Viia & Alas, 2015).
Corporate Governance: This refers to the measures put in place by organizations
to eliminate agency problems and guarantee returns on shareholders’ investments (Akbar,
2015).

13
Ethical behavior: These are desirable and right actions or decisions that are
required of individuals in conformity with organizational values and beliefs and in
demonstration of commitment to moral rules.
Organizational Effectiveness: This refers to the ability of an organization to
efficiently achieve planned outcomes that lead to competitive advantage (Zoogah, Peng,
& Woldu, 2015).
Oversight functions: These are governance functions that include the review and
monitoring of federal organizations, their activities, and the implementation of strategic
policies (Kaplan, Samuels, & Cohen, 2015).
Ownership dispersal: This involves the separation of ownership from
organizational control (Berle & Means, 2012).
Parastatals: These are autonomous public organizations or agencies that are
owned by government and were established to serve some specific and specialized
purposes.
Public boards: These are the governing boards of public and not for profit
organizations.
Public sector: These are government-owned organizations, institutions, or
industries set up to provide services specific to the public (United Nations [UN], 2007).
Risk management: This is the series of actions employed to minimize potential
threats to organizational goals by identifying and maximizing opportunities (Drennan,
McConnell, & Stark, 2014).
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Shareholders: These are the persons categorized as owners of an organization
either through investment of stocks in the company or family inheritance (Sur, Lvina, &
Magnan, 2013).
Stakeholders: These are persons who have stake in the performance or output of
an organization and whom the organization is obligated to satisfy or serve (Harrison &
Wicks, 2013; Phillips, 2003).
Triangulation: This is a research method which aims at ensuring data validity by
gathering data from multiple sources in a single study (Creswell, 2009).
Value delivery: This means making products or services available to clients at
minimum cost and maximum quality such that reliable performance is guaranteed
(Lindgreen, Hingley, Grant, & Morgan, 2012).
Possible Types and Sources of Data
Data for this study were obtained from multiple existing sources. These sources
include surveys on boards’ activities in public organizations in Nigeria, and secondary
sources such as government records that explain the characteristics and performance of
public organizations in Nigeria. This enabled the triangulation of data and enhanced the
quality of the study. Other sources of data include documentary review of laws that spelt
out the mandates of governing boards and public organizations, internet sources (for data
on public organizations involved in R&D in Nigeria), and annual reports of such public
organizations. The third source of data for this study were the interviews with MDs,
former CEOs, and board members of public RTOs.
The three data sources were combined as a means of gaining different
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perspectives from participants, official records, personal interpretations, and direct
experiences with the research institutions.
Significance of the Study
Research organizations in Nigeria are increasingly faced with the need to develop
financial capabilities. This would enable them to run independent of government and
would be a great relief to these organizations, given Nigeria’s present economic
downturn. Government grants to these R&D organizations were not sufficiently
meaningful or regular enough to sustain their growth, development, and activities, so
knowledge gained from this research will be valuable to local and international
researchers in the field of governance, managers of RTOs, policymakers, and
practitioners who are interested in learning how to improve issues associated with boards
and organizational performance. Through this study, they will have access to data that
will reveal how corporate boards in the research sector can influence organizational
performance.
Since one of the aims of CG is to pursue shareholders’ value, this research
provides a framework for the development of management strategies and a performance
assessment chart to ensure these boards behave in ways that ensure their organizations
will satisfy stakeholders’ needs and conform to global governance practices. Thus, with
the knowledge obtained from this study, boards in the research sector will be able to
improve their worth to their organizations. Efficient boards will influence their
organizations to be effective. The economy and personal worth of individuals in Nigeria
will thus be improved because the efficiency of the research sector will proliferate
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technology in the country.
Summary
Studies are often conducted to confirm existing theories or affect changes and
improvement. Chapter 1 discussed the background and problem statement of this study.
The role to be played by me was also clearly stated so that actions to be taken were
clearly defined from the beginning of the study. This chapter also explained the extent of
the inquiry in this research. Because governance is a broad topic, the inquiry was limited
to public RTOs in Nigeria and their boards. Research questions were formulated to assist
me in proffering recommendations to eliminate or reduce the identified problem of
organizational performance.
Some of the limitations to this study included absence of prior studies on
governance in public RTOs in Nigeria and the possibility of respondents’ bias. I
employed the use of triangulation to mitigate some of these perceived limitations. My
major assumption in this study was that the inclusion criteria for my samples were
adequate enough to select the appropriate participants.
The literature that is pertinent to this study is reviewed in Chapter 2. Various
concepts that are related to governance, governance principles, the Nigerian public sector,
and public boards are objectively and extensively examined. The intent of the study was
to determine the importance of good governance in attaining organizational effectiveness
and national development. Chapter 2 concludes with a review of literature on research
methods.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The appointment of public governing boards is backed by acts of legislation in
most countries (Leisner, 2005). Public board members are appointed through political
selection and their activities are determined by the mandates specified in their bylaws
(Osamwonyi & Tafamel, 2013). These boards are sometimes called boards of trustees,
governing boards, or boards of governors, and they can perform executive or supervisory
functions.
Boards have been receiving attention since the global financial crises in Asia and
Europe. It is common knowledge that these financial crises were exacerbated by the poor
quality of corporate management practices, which resulted in bad investment decisions
and caused the near-collapse of the world’s finances. This suggested that boards were
essential to the financial survival of organizations. CG thus involves more than daily
routine decision-making in organizations, but also involves developing strategic plans
that will enhance organizations’ value and stimulate and sustain growth. According to
Aina (2013), investors are more attracted to countries that are guided by strategic
governance practices, because they are assured that efforts are in place by governments of
such countries, to prevent corporate failures.
With growing concerns by governments regarding how organizations could be
more effective and considering the widespread clamor by practitioners and scholars for
more understanding of the role of boards beyond their legalistic functions, this research is
timely in providing possible solutions. This study, therefore, tracked the approaches of
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boards of public RTOs towards addressing the development needs of Nigeria and also
focused on the increasingly vital roles of these public RTOs towards achieving lasting
economic stability for Nigeria.
This chapter discusses previous research that addressed the effectiveness of
corporate boards’ activities in organizations. This helped to identify gaps between the
theories on management of public RTOs and actual practice. This literature review
involves an overview of global governance practices and theories, the governing board of
public organizations, trends in the development of technological RTOs, measurement of
boards’ impact on organizational effectiveness, conceptual framework and methods, gap
in literature, and a conclusion.
A review of the literature regarding corporate boards of RTO public organizations
was done with a critical evaluation of the management of the technological R&D industry
in Nigeria. This included an analysis of the impact of R&D and technological
development on the Nigerian economy as well as the role of effective organizational
leadership on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. This is followed by literature on methods
which previous research employed to measure the impact of boards on the effectiveness
of public organizations, with particular emphasis on public RTOs.
Overview of Global Governance Practices and Theories
Governance
Cornforth (2003) said governance was “the systems by which organizations are
directed, controlled and accountable” (p. 17). Huther and Shah (2005) said that
governance was an attempt by governments to effectively manage their resources through
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defined institutions, while Aina (2013) viewed governance as the activities of boards that
prevent collapse of organizations. Fukuyuma (2013) suggested that the quality of
governance in states should be measured by the output, procedures, and capacities of
such governing entities. Governance can be explained as governments’ efforts to manage
public organizations through appointed actors to ensure organizational and ultimately
state wellbeing. CG is therefore not about the day-to-day operational management of the
company for managers and executives but involves the overall strategic plan to move
both the organization and country forward. Governance involves the execution of
deliberate and defined actions which are intended to guarantee that stakeholders’
expectations are met. According to the OECD (2015), CG is also not an end but a means
to achieve “economic efficiency, sustainable growth, and financial stability” (p. 9), which
will promote improved financial investments and economic growth.
There is growing interest in governance practices by governments who are
interested in gaining economic competitive advantage. In order to boost efficiency of
public organizations, owners require a dependable monitoring framework such as boards
to ensure that their businesses are run transparently and efficiently.
According to Akingunola et al. (2013), globalization and its attendant
innovations, especially in information and communication technologies (ICT), ensure
that businesses can be transacted beyond geographical boundaries. For such businesses to
survive in an increasingly changing global economic terrain, they must engage in
internationally acceptable best practices. Governments have, therefore, remained
committed to creating work environment that would encourage governance best practices
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(Tagotra, 2016). According to Abor (2007), effective governance structures positively
influence firm performance and growth. Abor arrived at this conclusion from studying
how having effective capital structures positively influenced decisions of listed firms in
Ghana. Olubukunola (2013) asserted that good governance drastically reduces conflicts
of interests in public organization.
Another reason why democratic governments have growing interest in
governance is because of the global financial crisis which resulted in the collapse of giant
corporations in Europe and Asia such as Johnson Matheys Bank (JMB), Bank of Credit
and Commerce International, Enron Incorporation, as well as Ahold and Parmalat in
Europe (Akingunola, Adekunle, & Adedipe, 2013; Nadler & Nadler, 2006; Yip, 2015).
These business failures resulted in the lack of faith in boards (Elias, 2016; Yip, 2015) and
prompted the formulation of laws to regulate CG. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Law of
2002, an act which protects consumers by eliminating conflict of interests and ensuring
accounting reforms in public organizations was one of such laws. These laws guided CG
and stressed the importance of transparent systems of operation.
Governance of public organizations is important to Nigeria’s wellbeing. This
informed the many steps taken to develop codes of governance practices in the country so
that organizations could be responsibly and transparently administered and corporate
failures could be prevented. Aina and Adejugbe (2015) said that a review and update of
existing governance codes would be beneficial to public organizatons because it would
ensure that the best practices in governance are applied to Nigeria’s public sector.
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Governance Best Practices
Larcker and Tayan (2011) said that it was difficult to identify business practices
that produced good governance in public organizations. The need to regulate increasing
trade partnerships between multinationals and conglomerates in developed and
developing economies has increased the clamor for a global standard for good
governance in the corporate world (Robertson, Diyab, & Al-Kahtani, 2013). According to
Cooper and Edgett (2012), the reason for pursuing best practices is to improve
organizational performance and effectiveness because it stimulates innovation.
Researchers and practitioners differ on what governance best practices are. Most
researchers believe that when practitioners use common, good, and appropriate
management practices to improve quality and efficiency of organizations, such
constitutes best practices (Bardach, 2012).
Keehley, Medlin, Longmire, and MacBride (1997) observed that governance is
said to have conformed to best practices when it (a) is effective for an extended period (b)
possesses measurable impact (c) is result oriented (d) is replicable in different
organizations (e) is widely applicable, and (f) is generalizable. These good governance
criteria have however not been fully met by any particular governance strategy (Herman
& Renz, 2008).
Cooper and Edgett (2012) believed that what constitutes best practices were
subject to change once these practices became the acceptable norm in most organizations.
According to Cooper and Edgett, these supposed best practices will eventually be
jettisoned over time by organizations which desire to gain competitive advantage over
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others. Besides, a governance practice that worked in one organization may fail woefully
in another. Governance in countries with emerging markets may be fraught with culturalrelated challenges and this will influence the governance outcome (Robertson, Diyab, &
Al-Kahtani, 2013). As such, governance structures that are widely used in developed
nations may not be applicable in such circumstances.
The IFAC (2013) said that standard governance practices were not static but
dynamic because organizations metamorphosed periodically. Metamorphosis, such as
these, would necessarily require major changes in and renewal of their structures to
conform to current realities. This assertion was further corroborated at the meeting of
G20 Leaders’ Summit when they observed the fact that though governance best practices
in most countries had significantly become more widespread, many were still contending
with various challenges hindering global acceptance of governance practices. Some of
these challenges were identified as the changes in stock investments and trading rules, as
well as entrance of new players into the corporate world, which altered previous
assumptions and necessitated a need to review present practices (OECD, 2015). Herman
and Renz (2008) therefore recommended that rather than obsess about adhering to
common governance practices and procedures to achieve effectiveness, serious
organizations should instead search for those values and goals that defined their
organizations. Herman and Renz further advised these organizations to develop practices
and procedures which were consistent with these values, as well as the expectation of its
operating environment, and shareholders’ interests.
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According to Akingunola et al. (2013), the attitudes and values of people should
determine their governance principle. Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu (2015) confirmed that
African values and traditions influence the effectiveness of organizations in Africa.
Consequently, their ideologies may differ from that of the western world. These
ideological differences may, however, hinder successful market entry and growth of
developed economies. Strange et al. (2009) therefore suggested that these ideologies on
CG must become standardized to prevent global conflicts in strategic, operational
decisions and activities. Having good governance practices in place in the public sector is
therefore essential because it reduces hindrances to market expansion and growth
(Deininger & Feder, 1998; Ozen & Kusku, 2008), promotes accountability and equity,
and also assists developing economies to grow (Kodila-Tedika, Rindermann, &
Christainsen, 2014). In general, organizations that are openly and honestly administered
have incorporated good governance (Sanusi, 2003). Some of the hallmarks of good CG
include honest and transparent transactions, adherence to extant rules and regulations,
and existence of a detailed, precise, and effective reporting system (Larker & Tayan,
2015).
Principles of Good Corporate Governance
Following financial scandals in the US and Europe, the imperative of strict and
uniform regulation of corporate practices has become glaring. As a consequence, nations
responded to this by passing regulatory laws and developing governance principles to
guide public governance. These regulatory laws clearly state rules of governance and
consequences to be faced by organizations that violated those rules.
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Good governance principles were designed primarily to support boards and assist
them with identifying and establishing best practices for organizational effectiveness.
According to the IFAC (2013), good governance is premised on adherence to certain
principles, which more or less stand as terms of reference for governing entities and are
similar to one another when compared across organizations in the public sector.
Good governance can be determined by how reliable, accountable, and
predictable a management process is (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2012; World Bank, 1992).
The more reliable an organizational process, the more trust and business it attracts and
the more prosperous that organization will become. Organizations are well-governed
when their performance yields predictably positive results over time and when they are
found accountable and reliable enough to safeguard the economies of their countries from
instability and failure (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016; Tricker, 2015). These
performance indices often result in the growth and development of the home countries of
such organizations. In other words, when public organizations are effective, reliable and
accountable, they contribute to the wealth of their countries (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2014).
Ott (2010) proved a strong correlation between the happiness of an average citizen in 130
nations and the quality of governance practices in those nations. Ott thereafter concluded
that the happiness of nations is dependent upon good governance. He also suggested that
good governance was one of the conditions that must be met by developing countries to
grow (Ott, 2010). Rindermann, Kodila-Tedika, and Christainsen (2015) supported this
suggestion so long as these governance principles occasioned changes in economic
structures and performances.
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The earliest forms of governance principles were the UK Cadbury Report of
1992, which introduced independent non-executive directors and shaped CG practice
globally, as well as the principles of CG developed in 1997 by the US Business
Roundtable (Tricker, 2015). According to Haxhi and Aguilera (2015), the Cadbury Code
has been replicated in several countries and more than ninety nations have also developed
governance codes for listed companies in line with the recommendations of the Cadbury
Report.
Globalization opened up new markets, and the need to expand trade into these
emerging markets prompted developed economies to seek the development of global
governance best practices to regulate the conduct of international business. This spurred
the transnational OECD to develop a set of working principles on CG in 1999. This
document was revised and ratified in 2004 and all members of the OECD adopted the
policies as acceptable governance guidelines in their nations. These principles were
eventually updated and endorsed in 2015.
The OECD governance principles are six in number with sub-principles. They
were initially developed as a means of creating a global platform for equitable and fair
treatment of investors and stakeholders (OECD, 2015). The six OECD governance
principles stated: (a) The rights of shareholders, (b) The equitable treatment of
shareholders, (c) The role of stakeholders, (d) Disclosure and transparency, and (e) The
responsibilities of the board (OECD, 2004).
However, non-OECD members’ countries, especially developing countries, may
not have existing OECD governance policies and strategies in place (Young et al., 2006)
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especially because these principles were primarily designed for the economies of
developed countries (Robertson, Diyab, & Al-Kahtani, 2013) and may not be culturally
sensitive to the needs of emerging economies. Therefore, their perception of truly
acceptable governance practices may not be consistent with that of their counterparts in
the western world. Peng (2003) asserted that though developing economies may seem to
share and establish standard governance attributes in their organizations, they still
grappled with cultural governance challenges and ownership ideologies. These challenges
and ideologies greatly influenced their strategies and decisions.
Regulatory frameworks have been instituted in nations to ensure market and trade
efficiency and also enforce adherence to governance codes. Robertson et al. (2013)
observed that when nations enact regulatory governance laws that conform to global
principles, the way organizations conduct their business activities will improve. The US,
for instance, has a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the
governance of listed companies while its Nigerian counterpart does the same. In 2003,
following some unethical activities of some unscrupulous CEOs, the Nigerian SEC
authorized a Committee; led by Atedo Peterside, to develop codes that would reform
governance practice in Nigeria. Thus, the 2003 SEC Code on CG came into existence in
Nigeria and was subsequently revised in 2011 to conform to international best practices.
Only 40% of publicly quoted firms on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) were found to
have developed governance codes ethics for their business practice (Wilson, 2006).
Another regulatory framework in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied Matters Act
(CAMA) of 1990, which provides legal guidelines for monitoring compliance,
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disclosures, and penalties and financial report processes in organizations (ROSC, 2004).
Other codes in Nigeria include the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code to regulate
financial institutions and systems, the 2008 Nigerian Pension Commission (PENCOM)
Code, and the 2009 National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code. With these
codes, institutions such as the SEC, CBN, and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)
were empowered as regulatory bodies to ensure and enforce adherence to these
governance codes. Many of these codes were fashioned after the OECD governance
principles (Wilson, 2006).
Developing codes or principles of governance is however not the ultimate; efforts
must be in place to ensure compliance with governance best practices. Sometimes also,
adherence to identified governance standards does not necessarily result in good
governance. According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), Enron complied with governance
structures prescribed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) yet the organization still
collapsed because of other issues bordering on ethics and misrepresentation of accounts.
These sabotaged Enron’s wellbeing. If leaders ignore governance practices, laws and
regulations, they should be penalized for non-conformity so that they will learn to behave
responsibly and ethically. Only then can projected outcomes be guaranteed. Haxhi and
Aguilera (2015) observed that though the SOX Act of 2002 was a response to correct
governance failures such as that of Enron, it has not achieved desirable levels of
effectiveness in the governance of organizations. However, it has made corporate leaders
less reckless because of the penalties approved by the law against errant leaders.
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Theories of Governance
The conceptual foundations upon which this study was based were the agency and
stewardship theories. The agency theory is commonly used to explain modern
governance practices and according to Sharpe (2012), it has helped to define, determine,
and regulate boards’ best practices in organizations. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the
agency theory offers “ a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on
problems of cooperative efforts” (p. 72) that arise between the principal and an agent,
both of whom need to work together for the good of the organization but who also have
to contend with their different interests and opinions on how to accomplish tasks.
Accordingly, Jensen (1983) suggested that the elimination of opportunistic behaviors,
engendered by conflicts of interest in the governance of organizations, was possible
through the application of the agency theory.
While Raelin and Bondy (2013) reconsidered the usefulness of the agency theory
to determination of good governance, Adegbite (2015) proposed consideration of an
African context to global theories of good CG because of certain peculiarities of
developed countries, which may not be present in developing countries such as Nigeria
and may thus make application of institutionalized global theories ineffective in such
developing countries. To corroborate this, Minichilli et al. (2012) submitted that boards
performed and operated differently in different contexts while Okeahalam and Akinboade
(2003) offered proof by analyzing CG in Africa through the lens of separation of
ownership from management. The authors provided useful suggestions on methodologies
that could be used to assess the challenges and peculiarities of governance in Africa.
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The agency theory assumes that shareholders are the principal in an organization
while the CEO and management are agents who expectedly pursue self-centered goals
that will guarantee their job security and entitlements. It is assumed that these agents may
not necessarily be routing for the shareholders’ interests (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois
& Jegers, 2016). According to Eisenhardt (1989), this attitude of agents may render them
uncontrollable. As a consequence, proponents of the agency theory recommended that
shareholders must take responsible actions that would ensure that managers only pursued
actions that could be verified and which would yield maximum profit to shareholders.
The principals, therefore, require an entity, such as boards, to monitor and control the
activities of these agents so that their excesses and opportunistic behaviors are curbed and
shareholders’ satisfaction is guaranteed (Cornforth, 2003). With boards of directors
acting in the interest of shareholders, the organization’s responsibility to the society and
individuals would be limited to that which is required for long-term growth of the
organization, managers would be forced to comply with organization’s goals and
procedures, and shareholders’ profit-making agenda would be assured (Hung, 1998;
Waldman & Siegel, 2008). This implies that management is fiducially accountable to
maximize profit for the principal (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).
The principals’ need to control agents’ activities is one of the points of divergence
between the agency and stewardship theories. For instance, while the agency theorists
assumed that managers were not committed to organizational goals or owners’ interests
but would always act subversively to achieve their personal goals, the stewardship theory
believed that both the owners and managers were stakeholders in the organization (Davis,
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Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The stewardship theorists
thus believed that both principals and agents had the interest of the organization at heart
(Muth & Donaldson, 1998). They also believe that boards should not be used as
monitoring or controlling agents in organizations but should rather collaborate with
managers within the organization (Cornforth, 2003).
According to the stewardship theory of governance, the issue of trust is sacrosanct
and if managers are well motivated, they would identify with the organization’s goals and
effectively respond to opportunities that would advance these goals and yield enough
profit to satisfy the needs of the owners (Davis et al., 1997; Deci, 1972). To the
stewardship researcher, the negative portrayal of the manager as a self-seeking
opportunist in the agency’s theory of governance is impractical. Studies on governance
therefore need to consider and respect the managers’ need for self-actualization. These
studies should also understand that managers are committed to considering other groups
of external stakeholders because they could be affected by the actions of the manager
(Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013; Waldman & Galvin, 2008). Besides, according to Van
Puyvelde et al. (2016), it is irrational to blank out the reasons behind the behavior of
managers as this action could demotivate and reduce their performance and consequently
that of the organization. These researchers were able to prove that unless managerial
objectives were understood and aligned with the organizational goals set by owners or
shareholders, the desired performance might be elusive. Whereas Perrow (1986) observed
that agency theory could not be used to analyze governance in organizations, Eisenhardt
(1989) believed that agency theory contributed greatly to the development of perspectives
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in organizations because it related to relationships and management of self-interests in the
workplace. Though the agency theory has valid views on organizational structure and
control, its partial view could be complimented by other equally relevant theories and
perspectives that will give a broader overview of organizational complexities. Hirsch,
Michaels, and Friedman (1987) said that research into organizations would yield more
realistic views when multiple theories are combined, as this will strengthen
organizational research.
The agency theory has also failed to account for institutional differences in
countries that are less developed. So, the issues of ownership dispersal and competition
amongst businesses may not be operable in a country like Nigeria, which has an
indigenous market set-up (Adegbite, 2015). These criticisms of the agency theory have
led to divergent opinions on its importance to the study of governance. Perrow (1986), for
instance, viewed the scope of the agency theory as being too narrow to interpret human
behavior in organizations because it was more concerned with profit maximization than
responsible leadership. Davidson (1990) condemned its negative portrayal of CEOs and
management as corrupt and self-centered in organizational economics. The sharp
criticisms have thus reduced the importance placed on the agency theory as a traditional
basis for the study of boards’ dynamics. These criticisms also suggest the need for a new
perspective to explain the many roles of boards in organizations aside acting as
controlling agents. In response, Pless, Maak, and Waldman (2012) recommended the
integrator leadership model which advocated that managers could be more accountable
by “actively integrating, goals across constituent or stakeholder groups” (p. 58).
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Donaldson and Preston (1995); Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004); and Scherer et al.
(2013) believed that the narrow scope of the agency theory could be widened with an
increase in stakeholder groups as this would guarantee the survival of the organization on
the long run.
Other theorists (Barney, 1990; Jones, 1995) have suggested that rather than
enforce economic control over agents as proposed by the agency theorists, a more
cooperative model of interaction would engender more trust and ensure a mutually
beneficial relationship within the organization. This implies that the agency theory would
be more efficient when combined with other theories to bring completeness to the study
of governance. This view was supported by Van Puyvelde et al. (2016), who observed
after their study of the managerial choices of executives of public and nonprofit nursing
homes in Belgium, that certain situations may warrant that boards would both control and
collaborate with managers in their organizations. Hyndman and McDonnell (2009)
however cautioned against leaning towards either end of the two extremes because it
would either reduce motivation of managers or increase their opportunistic behaviors.
Van Puyvelde et al. (2016) conducted a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to determine
whether managers preferred using control or collaboration tools to administer selected
nursing homes in Belgium. They discovered that board members sometimes combined
the controlling and collaborative methods in their relationship with managers of the
homes.
Other scholarly studies have also recommended combining both agency and
stewardship theories in analyzing governance in organizations. For instance, Jobome
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(2006) discovered that internal controls did not threaten managers in non-profit
organizations because they received adequate remuneration and incentives. Van Puyvelde
et al. (2016) found that the agency and stewardship theories could be combined to
develop a governance framework for Not-for-Profit schools. Marvel and Marvel (2009)
also corroborated this position when they successfully examined local governments’
reward and management practices from the agency and stewardship angle. These
experiments and conclusions lend credence to the possibility of a successful combination
of the agency and stewardship theories to investigate governance issues.
The Public Sector
The public sector refers to the arm of a nation’s business which is charged with
the provision of essential goods and services for the general public which the private
sector may not easily provide at a reasonable and affordable cost (Broadbent & Guthrie,
1992). The public sector comprises companies, organizations, higher institutions, and
RTOs established by federal, state, and local governments for the sole purpose of
ensuring that these goods and services are provided and equitably distributed efficiently
and effectively (Anyim, Elegbede, & Gbajumo-Sheriff, 2011; Ball, Grubnic, & Birchall,
2014; Karazijiene, 2015). This means that the services provided by these organizations
are expected to be accessible to all members of the society, irrespective of status or
income. Public organizations are thus created to meet public needs through the provision
and proliferation of these goods and services (Baruch & Ramalho, 2006). Public sector
companies can be monetary, educational, welfare, health, or security organizations,
which provide basic public services on behalf of governments.
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The act of providing services for the public began in the 19th Century when
municipal governments in developed countries like Britain provided good road, water,
healthcare, and electricity services for their citizens (Ashton & Young, 2013). This was
mainly a political agenda because leaders secure their people’s interests and votes when
they engage in sustainable welfare practices and institutionalize these practices through
acts of legislation. Masses often assess the quality of political decisions made by their
leaders through the public services that are provided (Rothstein, 2010). Given the
increasing quantum of services being provided therefore, governments have become the
largest employer of labor in most countries, especially the US and Nigeria (Anyim et al.,
2011; Naff, Riccucci, & Freyss, 2013). Thus, the language of most governments has
changed from “government” to “governance” (Naff, et al., 2013, p. xv). These facts
underscore the importance of the public sector to society and explain the increased
attention being paid to it.
Characteristics of the Public Sector
The major goal of the public sector is to achieve public wellness so that political
and economic objectives may be fulfilled (Laegreid & Christensen, 2013). To fit into this
role, the public sector has typical features that distinguish it from other entities. It must be
noted however that public organizations differ one from another in terms of their roles
and structure but they nevertheless all share similar features.
In the first instance, the public sector is not profit-oriented but is more focused on
outcomes. IFAC (2013) posited that this was the reason more attention was paid to equity
and fairness in the provision of social services rather than profit generation. Raelin and
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Bondy (2013) mentioned that owners of organizations ought to “be given the duty to seek
out societal expectations and protect societal rights actively. . . before striving to
maximize their firm’s value” (p. 427). Consequently, public organizations are more
responsive to political rather than economic pressures. Public services can either be
jointly or directly provided by governments or private investors and such public services
include electricity, education, healthcare, peacekeeping and law enforcement, housing,
transportation, and other social services (Christensen, Olesen, & Kjaer, 2005).
In general, the services provided by the public sector are usually specialized in
nature, and so public sector organizations operate in environments almost devoid of
competition (Choi & Chandler, 2015). Because public sector organizations have a
monopoly over the services they provide, private players are rarely involved. Where such
players are found, their services are expensive. This is simply because while the costs of
production by public organizations are borne by the government, private investors have
to spread their cost unto consumers to bear. Citizens, therefore, have no other option but
to depend on these public services.
Because most of their services are highly subsidized, public organizations are thus
not under pressure to make profit or generate funds (Quah, 2010). The funds being
released by the government to fund these organizations may thus be insufficient to
sustain them, and this could, in one way or the other, affect value. Appropriate
performance evaluation is therefore difficult to undertake because of the lack of
competition. Therefore, it is imperative for stakeholders to monitor, through CG, the
effective delivery of these outcomes. Public organizations lack a competitive pressure,
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which prevents them from appropriately evaluating their current performance, and this
can lead to their underestimating the need for, impact, and value of innovating.
Inappropriately evaluating performance and insufficiently assessing the value and costs
of a change can lead to both excessive exploration and exploitation.
A wide range of economic, cultural, and political considerations also influence the
public sector, and these factors combine to place demands on organizations in these
sectors. These factors eventually affect the governance, performance, and outcomes of
the public organizations. This is largely because they are creations of government, and
they are required to implement policies of the government.
National, state, local governments, and agencies often partially fund public
organizations through the taxes paid by citizens and from other earnings of government
(Rainey, 2009). Because organizations depend on governments for survival, they are
sometimes used to achieve political goals (Cordella & Willcocks, 2010). Choi and
Chandler (2015), however, posited that public organizations could be pressured to
perform if enough political, rather than economic, pressure was exerted. Governments,
therefore, have the administrative and legal powers to determine the operational
procedures and expected output of public entities. This they exercised through their
insistence on adherence to formal rules, regulations, and constitutional provisions. Public
organizations are thus accountable to the people through their elected leaders.
Governance in the Public Sector
All organizations, whether public or private, need to be administered to achieve
projected outcomes. CG came into the business subconscious in the 80s as a control
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measure to mitigate agency costs and achieve economic efficiency (Aziri, 2014; Larcker
& Tayan, 2011; Tricker, 2015). According to Bolton, Becht, and Roell (2002), the clamor
for CG practices began, following the emergence of privatization of companies in some
nations like the UK, so that “shareholder democracy” could be offered to shareholders.
The introduction of the European integrated world market through the European Union
(EU) has further fueled the agitation for common governance practices (Aziri, 2014).
Although there is no specific definition of public sector governance, its
application varies according to nations, values, and goals. However, since governance has
been universally agreed to be the execution of a set of principles targeted at achieving
stakeholders’ defined outcomes, public sector governance can, therefore, be understood
as the application of power and governance practices in the public sector, albeit with
adherence to international or local frameworks. It refers to the relationship and
interactions between boards, managers, and stakeholders and is not another term for the
management of public organizations.
The ultimate aim of good governance in the public sector can be viewed from
both the shareholders and stakeholders’ expectations. While shareholders expect to
maximize gains and values, stakeholders believe in the obligation of public organizations
to deliver improved services that would reduce unemployment and increase the standard
of living for the masses (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). Because of these two points of view,
CG can, therefore, be said to be effective when the decision-making process of managers
goes beyond ensuring shareholders’ gains to improving community gains. Public entities
are consequently said to practice good governance that would serve all interests when
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they exhibit a commitment to integrity, act in the interest of the public and within the rule
of law, and fulfill stakeholders defined and established goals (IFAC, 2013).
The Governing Board of Public Organizations
Governments thrive and grow when their public sector is reliable (Public Sector
Commission, 2017) and this reliability is developed over time from the consistently
credible and reliable structures that have been put in place to safeguard the economy and
promote investments in the economy (Bartels, Napolitano, & Tissi, 2014). Viable and
dependable public boards are an integral part of such reliable structures (Adams et al.,
2010). This enabling environment attracts investments and, consequently, development.
Public boards are, therefore, the eyes and ears of government in public organizations and
their positions in public organizations are often held in trust.
It has been established that the provision of public services is unreliable in
developing nations and it is safe to assume that this situation could be linked to
governance failures in these countries (Collier & Venables, 2016; Hove, Ngwerume &
Muchemwa, 2013; Kwon & Kim, 2014; World Bank, 1992). Effective governing boards
are therefore critical to the survival of public organizations. This explains the reason they
are more preferred in most public quoted or government-owned companies and in most
developed and developing economies. Empirical research has confirmed that effective
boards are commonly known to have a significant impact on the performance of their
organizations (Brown, 2005; Herman & Renz, 2008; Mwenja, 2009; Okike, 2007) and
they equally make R&D investments of RTOs more rewarding (Hillier et al., 2011). As
such, Aina (2013) concluded that for organizations to be continually successful, they
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need to be managed by boards that are effective and who do not shy away from taking
strategic decisions. The quality of boards will determine their effectiveness and the
ensuing success of their organizations.
Certain conditions determine the impact of boards. According to Oxelheim,
Gregorič, Randøy, and Thomsen (2013), the efficient constitution of boards enables them
to perform their oversight functions effectively. The leadership structure of public boards
is critical to organizational performance (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Dalton &
Dalton, 2010; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Ujunwa, 2012). Krause and Semadeni (2013)
recommended that separating board chair and CEO roles can stimulate organizational
performance while Monks and Minow (2008) considered the separation of offices as a
governance best practice.
Board structure has implications on outcomes and particular attention should be
paid to determining which structure would be appropriate for organizations so that
stakeholders’ expectations can be met (Pindado et al., 2015). Although IFAC (2013)
insisted that there was no generic board structure which, when applied at all times,
guaranteed organizational success, it has been discovered that specific board
compositions are more viable in comparison with others. For instance, it is proven, from
the agency point of view, that monitoring and controlling of management activities is
more effective with independent boards because they will be more objective in their
assessment of executives’ performance since they are not financially dependent upon the
organizations or CEOs (Cheng & Courtenay 2006). This enhances the separation of
powers between the executive and non-executive members, minimizes conflicts of
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interests, and promotes good governance (IFAC, 2013). Miletkov, Poulsen, and Wintoki
(2014) thus advocated board independence because they discovered through their study
that independent boards practiced good governance and attracted more foreign investors
thereby leading to economic development. According to Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and
Stratling (2014), shareholders’ and stakeholders’ needs are easily met when boards are
independent. The SOX legislation of 2002 offered legal backing to board independence
and other studies, such as those conducted by Dahya and McConnell (2007) and
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), advocated independence for outside board members to
guarantee performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009), Ahern and Dittmar (2012), and Liu
et al. (2014) suggested that gender diversity of boards enhanced board and organizational
performance and growth. Joseph, Ocasio, and Mcdonnell (2014) said that the CEO-only
board structure (where the CEO is the only representative of the organization on the
board) enhanced CEO performance because it gave them job security that was immune to
threats from internal contenders’ who were eyeing their positions. This inadvertently
encouraged commitment.
If public boards are to perform their oversight functions effectively, they must be
well constituted. According to Ujunwa (2012), the educational and professional
qualifications of board members and CEOs indicate the quality of such boards and their
adherence to good governance principles. In essence, a responsible board should have
respectable qualifications and competences, else, effective governance and positive
outcomes will be unrealistic (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). When
board members lack this important basic quality, they easily exhibit poor governance
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behaviors that could increase the cost of operation and ultimately reduce performance
(Sanda et al., 2011).
Boards leadership structure can be unitary or two-tiered (Belot, Ginglinger,
Slovin, & Sushka, 2014;). The choice of board structure is dependent upon the level of
government that exercises control over the entity (Boone et al., 2007) and the operational
mandate of the organization (Pindado et al., 2015). While some boards are comprised of a
mix of independent and non-independent directors who oversee managers, other boards
solely consist of independent and non-executive members and their roles are thus
separated from that of the executive (Khan & Awan, 2012; Palmberg, 2015). Fama and
Jensen (1983) openly opposed CEO duality because they believed it would erode the
powers of the board to monitor the activities of management effectively and will
consequently escalate agency cost. But Sridharam and Marsinko (1997), from their study,
focused on the Paper and Forest Resources Industry, discovered that CEO duality might
not be averse to organizational performance if the leader is dynamic and strong and this
may actually reduce agency and administrative costs.
Khan and Awan (2012) however recommended that boards be composed of
dependent and independent directors to have a mix of skills and improve their
performance. He assumed that the autonomous structure of the board would encourage
boards to exert control, as needed, thereby encouraging board independence and
eliminating performance issues. Board independence alone does not, however, guarantee
organizational effectiveness (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). The 1992 Cadbury Report also
supported the separation of powers in governance such that one person does not occupy
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the office of CEO and board chair at the same time. Charan (1998) however believed that
the separation of powers would critically worsen conflict of interest issues in governance.
According to Aina (2013), a good board must be diverse in composition in terms
of the skills and experience needed to function and take unbiased decisions. Aina also
said that the size of a good board must be manageable. Leisner (2005) and Jhunjhunwala
(2012) observed that members of public boards were notable for the diversity in their
composition because they often represented different constituencies. As a consequence,
they face pressures from these constituencies. Public governing boards thus have to be
innovative to surmount these pressures and strategically project their organizations’
goals. Aina (2013) confirmed this feature of board diversity by citing Principle A3 of the
Combined Code states in England. This Principle insists that executive directors and nonexecutive directors must be equally represented on boards so that minorities or single
individuals would not easily hijack board decision.
Therefore, a balance of experience, skill, and knowledge is needed to keep board
decisions professional and in the interest of all stakeholders. A typical public board is
made up of a board chair that oversees the board affairs and takes responsibilities for
boards’ decisions, and board members whose responsibilities include supporting the
board chair to chart strategic policies, paths, and priorities for the organization.
Membership of boards in Nigeria cannot be less than five and they are mainly composed
of executive and non-executive directors following the provisions of the SEC code (Aina,
2013).
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Board size also matters in achieving organizational goals. Boards that are smaller
in size enjoy excellent communication among each other and are thus able to
communicate efficiently with CEOs and effectively coordinate their activities (Dey,
2008). Also, small boards can leverage their skills and expertise to make informed
decisions effortlessly (Guest, 2008). The monitoring abilities of small boards could,
however, be hindered if the organization is large and the tasks to be accomplished are
much (John & Senbet, 1998). Ch`en and Al-Najjar (2012) however, concluded, from
their study of Chinese firms, that the size of an organization informed the structure of its
board while the regulations in nations mostly informed board independence. Ujunwa
(2012) also discovered that in Nigeria, board gender increased only as board size
increased. Another board feature that influences board performance is the incentives that
members and employees have access to (Fapohunda, 2013; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Role of Boards of Public Organizations
Boards do not perform the same function as managers or CEOs in organizations.
The business of CEOs is to run the organization and pursue its strategic goals and
policies while boards are responsible for giving CEOs focus and as well as monitor them
to be able to achieve those goals efficiently and effectively (Tricker, 2015). In the opinion
of Charan (1998), boards are monitoring bodies who “help management prevent
problems, seize opportunities, and make the corporation perform better than it otherwise
would” (p. 5). According to Tihanyi, Graffin, and George (2014), boards’ activities and
values definition explain CG in detail. According to Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, and
Carney (2012) also, boards are important CG tools needed to overcome agency issues in
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listed companies. A more efficient management system is required for organizations to be
more profitably administered and responsive to societal needs. One determinant of such
an efficient management system in organizations is an effective board and most nations
of the world have adopted them as an instrument of CG. Boards are good governance
determinants in organizations.
Board functions are basic in principle, across organizations. The effective
execution of these functions is however determined by some factors which boards have to
contend with, such as board members’ age, organizational dynamics, CEO duality,
gender, and educational qualifications of members (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Berger,
Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Carter et al., 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998;
Sanda, Garba, & Mikailu, 2011; Sridharan & Marsinko, 1997; Ujunwa, 2012). Larcker
and Tayan (2011) suggested that irrespective of the uncontrollable factors of market
efficiency and society’s values, which could affect governance structures, boards can
develop additional methods to enforce control in organizations. Charan (1998) suggested
that boards could add value to shareholders through the creation of competitive
advantage, rather than just protect existing shareholder value.
Berle and Means (1932) said that the role of governing boards includes ensuring
that public organizations are accountable, effective, and operate in ways that would
protect the interest of stakeholders. The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) code of CG concurred with this opinion by stating that boards were supposed to
assume responsibility for the efficient and effective management of their organizations in
accordance with best governance practices and organizational goals (SEC, 2016). This
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makes them vital organizational monitors. Aina (2013) remarked that boards were
important management organs that were responsible for adopting good governance
policies and practices in organizations. Because boards are responsible for strategic
decision making in public organizations, Hung (1998) viewed them as the connector
between the organization and its operating environment.
Board roles vary and are dependent on national perception (Li, 1994; Ujunwa,
2012). However, generally speaking, boards are expected to set the organization’s
strategic goals, ensure that management activities are geared in pursuit of those goals to
ensure long-term relevance of organizations (Cornforth, 2003). Boards’ roles can also be
divided into making policies, formation of strategies to actualize the policies, and
oversight functions. One of their important responsibilities is also that they must be able
to give periodic performance reports to shareholders to account for their activities and the
performance of their organizations (The Cadbury Report, 1992). This is an important
responsibility because it serves to check board excesses and prevent unnecessary risks
that could endanger the organization.
Public boards can provide strategic direction, oversee, and guarantee effective
service delivery in their organizations through the quality of financial and other decisions
they make. These decisions, Nadler (2006) identified as corporate strategies, which were
essential to board engagement. Through their activities, public boards champion the
organization’s goals and protect investors’ interests by strengthening relationships and
building on the strengths of the organizations. Generally, public boards must guarantee
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good governance by taking adequate steps to establish correct structures and processes
and ensuring the reliability of such structures in the public sector (PSC, 2014).
Apart from risk management, other governance responsibilities of public boards
include monitoring of CEOs and their compliance with regulatory provisions, provision
of information that is necessary for organizational operations, and establishment of
external linkages for operational efficiency (Monks & Minow, 2004). Optimal board
performance is however only obtainable through diligent pursuit of clearly defined and
mutually acceptable strategic goals rather than personal policies (Ujunwa, 2012). Boards
also need access to and diffusion of trustworthy information, without which they may be
unable to meaningfully give strategic direction to organizations (IFAC, 2013; Ujunwa,
2012).
Role of Public Board Chair and Members
The board chair coordinates the activities of the board and keeps it focused on its
strategic goals so that the board could be adjudged as trustworthy and reliable (PSC,
2014). The chair, therefore, needs to be conversant with public business activities and
stakeholders’ interests.
Other roles of the board chair include serving as intermediary between the CEO
and the relevant government stakeholders (in this case, the owners) in the delivery of
corporate plans and goals (Tricker, 2015; Withers & Fitza, 2017), demonstrating
exemplary leadership in the decision-making process (van Essen, van Oosterhout, &
Carney, 2012), ensuring cordiality with CEOs (Adegbite, 2015), risk management
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(Abdul-Aziz, 2013; Tricker, 2015) and, preparation of firm’s annual reports in
conjunction with CEOs.
Public board members are expected to be conversant with their oversight
responsibilities and conform to their legal authorities. They ought to have more than a
passing knowledge of the dynamics of the public sector and the imperative of
accountability and public interest. Members are also expected to offer necessary support
to the chair, pursue the achievement of the firm’s strategic goals, and maintain civility
and cordiality with other members and CEOs (PSC, 2014). They are expected to refrain
from disloyalty, self-interest, and financial recklessness, which are behaviors linked to
bad governance (Sanda et al., 2011; Ujunwa, 2012).
Competing Priorities of Public Boards
Governments throughout the world have multiple priorities and they depend on
public boards to effectively manage competing organizational priorities. The dynamic
nature of organizations and their external environment often necessitates a periodic
review of operating strategies and organizational priorities so that the long-term goals of
these organizations can be attainable.
Organizations often contend with external issues such as the dynamism of market
trends, conformity with operational regulations, adherence to legal prescriptions, as well
as ever-evolving technologies. If these issues are not well balanced and countered with
effective strategies, they could affect sustenance of the organizations in the long-run.
Owing to these unpredictable factors in the operational environment of organizations,
boards also have to prioritize their functions and activities. This must be done within the
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limits of limited resources, in accordance with governments’ and stakeholders’
expectations, and the quest for value delivery. These prioritizations require thorough
assessments of the environment to determine the positive risks that could be taken in the
interest of the organizations (Lam, 2014). According to IFAC (2013), risk-taking opens
up opportunities and good governance must necessarily involve risk management so that
expected outcomes can be achieved in a legal, ethical, and effective manner.
Board priorities include risk mitigation, identification of opportunities for
improving organizational performance, achieving a strong financial base, and ensuring
compliance with acceptable standards. According to Mador, Kornas, Simard, and Haroun
(2016), priority setting requires strategic considerations and the process ought to follow
certain guidelines. Carter et al. (2014) also remarked that priorities could only be
effectively determined after due consideration of the cost, impact, equity, and importance
of the activity had been carried out and weighed alongside other competing priorities.
Conflicts on the fair placement of priorities may also arise due to competing public needs
and political influence (Hunter et al., 2016; Weale et al. 2016). Boards, therefore, have to
determine which activity will do the most common good when balanced side by side with
other activities. These considerations must also be weighed against available resources
and political acceptance. Decisions on priorities are therefore dependent on the choices,
which board members consider as critical to their organization’s success.
According to Nuhu (2014), good leadership is important to set priorities in
organizations. He also said that the quality of board composition will determine the
quality of decisions that emanate from the boards rather than their size or structure. It is
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thus important for public boards to leverage on personal and group competencies to set
priorities in the right order so that their activities can be fully optimized and better
aligned to current realities (Ujunwa, 2012).
Determinants of Boards’ Impact on Organizational Effectiveness
According to Morck and Steier (2005), CG influences the financial growth of
organizations and with growing demands for accountability in public organizations,
stakeholders have beamed their searchlight on the management strategies employed by
these organizations. The general assumption, therefore, is that boards cause organizations
to be effective (Jackson & Holland, 2008).
However, Adams et al. (2010) and Veronesi and Keasey (2012) observed that the
actual activity of boards that determine the effectiveness of their organizations has yet
been unconfirmed. According to Aina (2013), an organization’s effectiveness reflects the
quality of the board. A combination of board structure, expertise, and size can determine
performance of organizations. Sanda et al. (2011) discovered that boards that were small
in size were relatively more effective while Morck and Steier (2005) demonstrated that
boards, whose shareholders did not exert ubiquitous influence over them, outperformed
others significantly. Preston and Brown (2004) also linked the emotional dedication and
time put in by board members to their effectiveness in organizations while Brown (2007)
asserted that the competence of board members would determine their performance. All
these differing opinions about board impact led Adams et al. (2010) and Veronesi and
Keasey (2012) to conclude that the definite activity or function of boards that actually
determined the effectiveness of their organization was yet to be detected. Determining
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board impact on organizational effectiveness has been most challenging because
according to Herman and Renz (2008), board effectiveness is a social construct and the
opinion of stakeholders determines what constitutes effectiveness in their organizations.
The writers, therefore, recommended the need to assess non-profits' effectiveness
according to their type so that the results obtained could be credible.
Findings by Herman, Renz, and Heimovics (1997) suggested that boards that
assigned roles to themselves through the use of committees and boards, which had a
thorough process of self-evaluation often performed above average. Recent studies such
as that of Filatotchev and Nakajima (2014) suggested that globalization forced
organizations to be more accountable in their strategies and this drove them to acquire
more skills and competences. These new skills undoubtedly influence the quality and
quantity of their decisions. The effectiveness of RTOs, as summed up by Siyanbola et al.
(2011), is also determined by effective management practices.
Trends in the Management of RTOs in Nigeria
The level of technology that a nation possesses determines the quality and
quantity of its products and consequently, its power and development as a nation
(Siyanbola et al., 2011). The economic growth experienced by the Asian Tigers has been
attributed to the innovations in R&D that resulted in rapid industrialization in these
nations (Igietseme, 2015). Technology, which is an important driver of a nation’s
economy, is borne out of successful research activities carried out by RTOs (Odia &
Omofonmwan, 2013).
RTOs are often empowered by the governments to engage in R&D activities that
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would result in innovations and stimulate future growth. Being that we live in a dynamic
world however, technology undergoes rapid change and innovation. RTOs that desire to
remain competitively relevant must therefore be able to manage these processes of
change (Onuoha, 2012). Ukwuoma, Amade, and Moghalu (2013) confirmed that there
were problems with the diffusion of R&D outcomes. Siyanbola et al. (2011) emphasized
that these problems may not be due to the process of conducting scientific R&D but
rather, ineffective management practices. The scholars observed that effective
management of S&T indicators enhances wealth creation and according to the National
Innovation System (NIS), there must be effective research, development of research
findings, and diffusion of the products before R&D can yield any benefit. To ensure that
S&T achieved this developmental goal for the nation, Siyanbola et al. (2016)
recommended a synergy between policies made and national interest such that
policymakers would develop strategic S&T indicators that could be linked to
developmental priorities of the nation.
In Nigeria, the federal government made efforts to commence economic activities,
which could improve the living standard of the people by initiating R&D activities
formally. This began with the establishment of the National Council for Science and
Technology (NCST) in 1970 for the coordination of activities in basic and applied
research. Other research councils such as the Agricultural Research Council, the
Industrial Research Council, the Medical Research Council, and the Natural Science
Research Council; followed in quick succession. The NCST later metamorphosed into the
Federal Ministry of Science and Technology (FMST) in 1993 and was saddled with the
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responsibility of, among others, translating scientific research into economic
development in Nigeria. The FMST consists of seventeen agencies, fourteen (14) of
which are charged with R&D functions and the remaining three were established to
manage growth and manpower training needs for Nigerian technology. Bamiro et al.
(2008) categorized technological RTOs in Nigeria into research institutes (private and
government agencies) and higher institutions with the capacity to conduct research and
develop products. The activities of these RTOs are expected to result in the development
of new products and further development of existing ones through applied research as is
obtainable in advanced countries, where RTOs midwife governmental innovations
through activities that are adequately funded.
The Nigerian technological R&D sector is however not experiencing much
growth and the dream of the country to attain the status of being one of the foremost
twenty developed nations of the world is gradually becoming a mirage unless very drastic
measures and sound strategic steps are taken so that the results of research activities can
be transformed into economic gains (Siyanbola et al., 2011). According to Onuoha
(2012), the economic development of Nigeria is being threatened by the stifling
environment in which RTOs operate such as inconsistent and unfavorable government
policies on importation, which results in a high cost of production and low patronage of
local products (Abe, 2016). Other challenges faced by public RTOs include poor funding,
a dearth of modern equipment for production, and deterioration of existing ones and these
have rendered the operational environment unsuitable for research (Odia &
Omofonmwan, 2013). The economic recession that was faced by the country between
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2016 and 2018 also paralyzed activities in the RTOs because these challenges became
exacerbated.
Although the crisis and constant instability being experienced in the financial
sector in Nigeria is majorly attributable to poor CG (Akingunola, 2013), performance in
other sectors, such as RTOs, could also be affected by poor governance behaviors.
Challenges of Corporate Governance in Nigeria
According to Creed, Dejordy, & Lok (2011), institutional and cultural issues
influence the practice of good CG in developing countries. These issues then determine
the national perception of the role of public organizations and public boards (Davies,
2005) and may weaken the governance institutions in these countries. This gives rise to
questions on how public organizations can successfully perform under such hostile and
unwholesome conditions (Adegbite, 2015). This situation also discourages the ideals of
self-regulation, market pressures, and legal frameworks for good governance (Yakassai,
2001).
Since Nigeria’s independence, the business practice has been influenced by the
federalist system where governments are in the majority as owners of businesses more
than individuals in an indigenized governance structure, and where ownership dispersal is
just an ideal to be desired (Adegbite, 2015; Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004). Business was
basically centered on oil and the federal government was the main actor in the statecontrolled economy. As a consequence of the immature state of the business sector in the
early years after independence and the obvious absence of governance standards,
Adegbite et al. (2012) observed that corruption grew and later became endemic in most
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public organizations. Corporate failures have been prevalent in the country since then
because Nigeria has been unable to stem the rising tide of corruption and the enforcement
institutions have been considerably weakened (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Wilson (2006)
attributes these rising spate of failures to poor governance. The banking sector has
witnessed more of these corporate failures in the country. In 2009 alone, eight bank
CEOs were sacked for bad governance behavior (Oghojafor, Olayemi, Okonji, & Okolie,
2010). All the board members and management of another bank, SKYE, were summarily
dismissed and replaced in June 2016 because of poor risk and assets management
abilities and because they approved unsecured loans for themselves (Egwuatu, 2016).
Other public corporations that have collapsed include the Nigerian Railways Corporation
(NRC), established in 1955 through a parliamentary act, but collapsed irrevocably in
2002 although operations on some of the routes have resumed; the Nigerian Airways,
established in 1958 but collapsed and ceased to operate in 2003 (Echenim, 2015). NITEL
(made up of Department of Posts and Telecommunications [P&T] and the Nigerian
External Communication Limited [NET]) was birthed in 1985 and commercialized in
1992 (Chidozie, Odunayo, & Olutosin, 2015). All these corporations were owned by the
federal government, which served as the major shareholder. Many of these corporate
failures were ascribed to constant government interference and poor governance
behaviors (Echenim, 2015).
According to Kaufmann et al. (2008), the ability to overcome corruption is one of
the parameters used by the World Bank to determine good governance. But
unfortunately, the Transparency International’s ranking of corruption in 2013 placed
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Nigeria in the 144th position out 177 countries thereby confirming Nigeria as one of the
foremost corrupt nations of the world (Adegbite, 2015). This ranking implied that Nigeria
lacked good governance. Ujunwa (2012) confirmed that “business culture in Nigeria is
among the worst in the world” (p. 656). According to Ujunwa, this observation was
largely due to political interference, inconsistent government policies, corruption, and
lack of legal frameworks to enforce good governance principles.
According to the World Bank's Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC), effective CG is assessed by the ability of institutions to self-regulate, comply
with, and enforce acceptable governance standards (Okike, 2007). The absence of this
capability has been confirmed by Adegbite (2012) since the Nigerian corporate world is
noted for corruption in its governance mechanisms, which proves the institutional
deficiencies in Nigeria. According to Sanda et al. (2011), countries with weak business
cultures, such as Nigeria, often found such weaknesses an encouragement to appoint
public boards for reasons other than good governance of government-controlled
organizations. This situation, according to Sanda et al., gave leverage to such boards to
act with impunity and in pursuit of self-interests. As a consequence of these poor
governance behaviors, governance structures are destroyed and organizational
effectiveness, as well as shareholders’ interests, is compromised (Ponnu, 2008).
According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), governance structures are often
influenced by cultures and values. Because Nigeria cherishes the family values and
traditions, it is not unusual for private owners and family members to retain control over
boards and also manage the companies (Adegbite et al., 2013; Lin, 2004). CEO duality is
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thus prevalent in Nigeria’s private governance structure because most thriving private
organizations are family-owned, except for companies owned by foreigners. However,
the board structure of most public organizations in Nigeria is patterned after the BritishAmerican system but with local outlook. While attempts are being made to incorporate
global governance principles such as were prescribed by the Cadbury Report and OECD
by appointing governing boards over public entities to standardized governance, the
impact of boards are yet to be fully recognized and appreciated. Reasons adduced to this
conclusion included continual evidences of corporate failure in the country.
Measuring Board Effectiveness
Most public organizations are continually employing measures that can help
evaluate their performance. The simple reason for this is to determine their effectiveness
and prove the same to the stakeholders (Light, 2002). Although Gordon (2000) posited
that there were no standard performance measuring designs for nonprofits, up until the
era of corporate failure, there have been acceptable measurement for determining board
performance. But with the devastating collapse of business and financial empires, these
governance measures have become grossly inadequate because of their perceived
shortcomings such as source bias which distorted the research (Meier & O’Toole, 2013).
Anderson (2012) therefore recommended that more attention be paid to outcomes rather
than performance. Performance measurement is dynamic and changes constantly as a
result of advances in technology and globalization and these changes influence
governance structures and practices (Bititci et al., 2011).
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Models for Measuring Board Effectiveness
Several factors have inhibited the successful measurement of board impact on
organizational effectiveness. These factors include the perception of organizations and
owners on what effectiveness means for their respective organizations (Chen & AlNajjar, 2012). The successful measurement of board impact is often impaired by board
diversity, unnecessary board interference, and the absence of a consistent standard best
practice, which could stand as a yardstick for determining performance (Gordon, 2000).
Most studies employed the quantitative methods of inquiry, such as surveys and
questionnaires to assess boards (Gordon, 2000) while some relied on less reliable tools
like self-assessment and program evaluation (Babbie, 2004; McNamara, 2003). One of
the ways by which managers could be measured; according to Coetzee, Viviers, & Visser
(2006), is by using scales such as the Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC) developed by
Antonovsky (1987) to measure certain traits in an individual that can contribute to his
performance. Some other governance measurement tools include the Policy Governance
Model (PGM), the Cooperative Board Model, and the Advisory Board Model (Gordon,
2000).
The qualitative research design was used to conduct inquiries in this study. A few
researches have adopted the qualitative approach, such as narrative inquiry, to measure
board impact on organizational performance. For instance, LeBlanc and Gillies (2010)
combined the interview approach with the observation of board members at meetings and
compared their findings with their perceptions drawn from observing board members at
meetings. This is termed categorizing and labeling. Through this approach, it is possible

58
to determine effective board members by their behaviors (Jauncey & Moseley-Greatwich,
2000). According to Leisner (2005), qualitative data collection methods, such as face-toface interviews or focus group interview, enable the researcher gather authentic
information. Leisner further explained that through this means, the interviewer would be
able to explain the purpose and nature of the study. According to him, the interviewer
would also be able to obtain more information from participants’ tones and expression
better than when the questions are written and impersonally administered. Creswell
(2013) further corroborated this position.
The Gap in Literature
Public boards are very important to the strategic planning and growth of their
organizations. These roles are becoming increasingly important given the importance of
public organizations to societal and economic growth and boards. Consequently, boards
are required to be more dynamic and strategic in their activities to improve their
organization’s effectiveness and relevance.
In spite of the consensus by most researchers on the importance of boards, little
research exists to connect specific board roles to effectiveness of public RTOs. It is
necessary to isolate board characteristics that are responsible for decisions in public
organizations so that it would be easier to determine RTO boards’ effectiveness. This
study, therefore, sought to understand board perceptions, through the use of qualitative
methods, to elicit information that would improve understanding of board effectiveness.
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Summary
In this chapter, the importance of good governance to organizational performance
and national development was examined. The effectiveness of organizations can be
measured, and this can help reveal governance effectiveness. Although there seems to be
a consensus on the influence of boards on organizational effectiveness, there is a
divergence of opinions on the actual role of public boards, which determine this impact.
Board size, diversity, and commitments have been considered as central to public board
effectiveness though these have been proven to have little effect on their own. It was
assumed that public boards that engaged in best CG practices and openly complied with
governance norms performed better than most organizations in other categories. Boards
of RTOs are no exception as the organizations are expected to be at the forefront of
technological development. Engaging in governance best practices is therefore critical for
their performance and organizational competitiveness.
In the face of global competition amongst organizations, the success and
effectiveness of organizations depend largely on the performance of boards. There is thus
a need to develop a measurement model that would advance knowledge about RTO
boards’ impact and also offer performance improvement strategies for these boards. The
perceptions of participants served as this model. In Chapter 3, the methods that were
employed to explore the connection between good governance and Nigerian public
RTOs’ performance were discussed.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The impact of public boards on organizational performance is not a new
phenomenon. Board characteristics obviously determine their performance. The practice
of good governance has also been shown to be influenced by culture and values, thereby
determining the impact of governance on nations. The perceptions of public boards and
MDs in Nigerian RTOs regarding what they believe to be their impact on these
organizations is, however, necessary for information regarding the performance of public
organizations in the Nigerian technological sector. This chapter outlines the qualitative
method and design used to assist in understanding their experiences. It also provides
profiles of participants and how they were recruited for this study. Additionally, a review
of how ethical protection was ensured, procedures for collecting data, data analysis, and
verification of findings is detailed.
Population samples, research design, sampling processes, unit of analysis, data
collection and analysis procedures, and data sources to measure the perceptions of board
members in determining the impact of governing boards on public entities in Nigeria
shall be discussed in this chapter. The rationale for the choice of these designs and
methods, roles to be played by me, and ethical issues associated with this research are
discussed here. This chapter concludes with credibility and trustworthiness of the study.
Description of the Research Design
The research questions in a study should influence the design. The interpretive
qualitative case study method was used for this research. According to Merriam (2009),
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research that is qualitative in nature is more likely to influence public policies or assist
managers in making informed decisions about social phenomena that occur naturally than
quantitative studies. The qualitative research method is often adopted to make inquiries,
using techniques such as observation and interviews, which do not involve
measurements, frequencies, and experiments. Qualitative research aids the development
of new organizational theories and concepts and the assists with making inferences from
participants’ stories, views, and perceptions.
I used the qualitative approach because this approach is excellent in discovering
new or relatively unknown phenomena. Qualitative research methods are most suitable
for eliciting information and meanings, especially when the exploration of the
phenomena is carried out in the natural environment of respondents (Patton, 2002). This
method provides insight into the world of the participant as they live in it. In addition to
this, qualitative approaches are easier to use in real-life situations. The qualitative
approach is easier because it grants researchers access to complex but pertinent
information which will enhance broader understanding of the researchers and
practitioners about a phenomenon without necessarily going through the process of
quantitative measurements which produce data-driven facts.
Qualitative designs include ethnography, phenomenology, case study, and
grounded theory approaches. These approaches should be selected based on what the
researcher intends to achieve. While ethnographic studies focus on behaviors of groups in
a cultural setting, both grounded theory and case study approaches are best suited to
inquiring into processes and structures. The reason for this suitability is because both case
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study and ethnography approaches are concerned with processes, activities, and natural
environment. While the ethnography method involves studying groups with the intent to
understand their behavior and values and how these evolve or change over a given
period, a case study involves interpreting actions and behaviors of individuals or groups
in a given social context to understand a case or event.
The case study approach is often used for research in social sciences because it is
flexible and offers administrators practical insights into organizational and managerial
behaviors. Its flexibility derives from its ability to explain single or multiple cases using
data obtained from varied sources, thereby making available rich and vast information for
the researcher to describe the phenomenon (Berg, 2009; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Yin
(1994) explained that case studies help the researcher answer how and why questions and
manage situations beyond the control of the researcher. Case studies also assist the
researcher to obtain enough data.
The interpretive design was employed to understand the perceptions of
respondents because the interpretive approach is more suited to analyzing small
organizations than the positivist paradigm. The interpretive research design assists
researchers to interpret social realities within their social settings. With this approach, the
meanings that participants ascribe to phenomena are easy to understand. The interpretivecase study approach enabled me to access enough data from the interviews and to
conduct an in-depth analysis of the data that I obtained.
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Population and Sample
The FMST in Nigeria was the target population for this study. A population is a
complete element or group which can be used to generalize research findings. The target
population is expected to be made up of individuals who possess common characteristics
and these common characteristics must be reflected in the sample. The FMST consists of
RTOs with similar characteristics and mandates geared towards R&D and this made it a
suitable population for this study. Because of the unlikelihood of accessing and
investigating an entire target population, a sample is necessary to simplify the inquiry
while still offering sufficient data needed to make inferences about a phenomenon and
generalize its findings to a population. FMST was selected as the population on the
assumption that the sampling criteria would be met in all organizations that make up the
Ministry and this would thus make the sample representative of the total population.
Patton (2002) observed that there were no stringent rules to be obeyed in
determining sample size. Britten (1995) however argued that the determinants of sample
size should be the depth to be covered and the time available for the researcher while
Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch, Parker, and Watson (1998) said that sample size is
determined by the number of a sample that a single person can successfully cope with
within the available time frame and the resources available. As such, most qualitative
studies have small sample sizes. Dworkin (2012) said that data saturation could be
obtained in qualitative research with a sample size not lower than five or exceeding 50.
Six public RTOs were selected for this study, and these RTOs were selected from
the FMST in Nigeria. There are 17 parastatals under the FMST, and all of them are
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involved in research and development activities and have the same employer (FMST,
2016). This implies that they share similar characteristics and have common interests.
The population sampled included six FBMs, and serving or former MDs (if the selected
organization does not have a sitting MD at the time of data collection). These informants
were selected based on the fact that they had served or are serving in these organizations
before and have been involved in shaping policies and making strategic decisions for the
organizations since their establishment. To further assure the quality of the data to be
obtained, respondents that may not ordinarily have been included in the interview were
considered.
Consequently, I employed this strategy in purposefully selecting the participants
in this study. In all, 16 participants were interviewed and this was intended to ensure that
I reached data saturation in this study. According to O’Reilly and Parker (2012), adequate
information must be obtained to make it easy to replicate a study. So, with this proposed
sample, this study progressed until there was no new information to be obtained.
Sampling Process
This sample was selected through a purposive (purposeful) sampling method.
According to Patton (2002), non-probability sampling techniques, such as purposive
sampling, are ideal for qualitative case study research. Yin (2014) observed that the nonprobability sampling method yields rich data that will provide in-depth information on
the phenomenon being studied. Patton (2002) said that in purposeful sampling, the
researcher purposely selects a population that has the most adequate information for a
detailed study of the central phenomenon. Through purposeful sampling, common
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patterns are easily identified and serve as a lead-in understanding of meanings ascribed to
the phenomenon being investigated (Suri, 2011). I selected participants who knew the
area of my inquiry since this research was designed for trustworthiness.
If the goal is to get in-depth knowledge from the sample, the number of
respondents has to be restricted so that the researcher will not be hindered. According to
Iszatt-White (2011), 10 respondents are an adequate sample size in case studies. I
conducted face-to-face interviews with six MDs and the number of MDs was restricted to
six to represent the RTOs selected for this study. Appointments were booked to ensure
that I had access to interview the FBMs and MDs to adequately explore their opinions
and the meanings they ascribed to the phenomenon under inquiry.
The selection of the six organizations that made up the sample was done in line
with the specific elements that I desired to explore. For instance, some of the RTOs are
into production; some are into R&D while some are purely research-oriented. The focus
of this study was on those RTOs who were involved in R&D. Special attention was thus
paid to ensure inclusion of RTOs, which specialized in R&D and shared common
governance and administrative structures, irrespective of size, location, specializations
and other important considerations. Those who were readily accessible to the researcher
were also included. This is important to credibility and validity. It will also improve data
quality if the sample is representative of the general population.
Since I intended using the purposive sampling approach, I used a survey
instrument before the interviews so that I would be certain to include the appropriate
board members who would be able to provide the needed information from their diverse
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experiences or those who are willing to participate in the interview. A letter of
introduction was sent to the MDs and FBMs to introduce the study and seek audience
with them (See Appendices A and B). Once consent was obtained, I took steps to book
appointments and set up the interviews. Because of the busy schedule of some members,
the electronic media was considered in contacting respondents and confirming the
appointments. I vigorously pursued the option of conducting the face-to-face interview
outside of busy days to guarantee a high concentration of participants.
Role of the Researcher
The researcher is fully involved in collecting data in a qualitative study. To be
able to build the idea needed to understand the impact of governing boards in Nigerian
RTOs, I needed to be able to leverage the rich information made available through the
data collection process. The qualitative research process involves designing the data
collection instrument, data gathering, transcribing data, data analysis, verifying, and
making of inferences (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Kvale, 2006) and I was fully involved
in all these stages. There was, therefore, a tendency for researcher bias to taint the
outcome of these stages.
To be able to draw useful conclusions from the study, I was objective in analyzing
the data that was collected through the various sources earlier identified, such as
interviews and other secondary data. Gathering the data for this study posed a problem
for the objectivity and trustworthiness of the research findings because I am an employee
of one of the public RTOs and could thus be considered an insider researcher. There was,
therefore, the possibility of researcher bias owing to familiarity with the research
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environment and drawing conclusions based on my previous knowledge. But, I
specifically refrained from interfering with the data right from the point of constructing
interview questions. I was also very committed to keeping records and journals so that
the data collection and analysis process could be very transparent. My being an insider
researcher was an advantage to this research. According to Holliday (2007),
interpretivism recognized that researchers’ involvement in data collection enhanced data
quality because the researcher would be able to probe deep into meanings that
participants ascribe to the phenomenon being studied. Being an insider researcher
assisted me in gaining access to the study environment in a way that outsiders could not
have. This status also assured me of the cooperation of participants, especially when they
understood the benefits of the study to the wellbeing of the organization. I, however,
recognized the possibility of ethical considerations that had to do with anonymity and
sensitive information and I countered this by promising anonymity and just listening
instead of agreeing with or proffering solutions to identified issues.
According to Babbie (2010), researchers must avoid leading questions because
the response of respondents would be influenced by the way the questions were posed.
Therefore, from the point of drafting the questions, I eliminated the tendency to guide
respondents’ responses towards the desired outcome. I also took a dispassionate stance
while conducting the interview. I filtered the view of respondents through mine in order
to understand meanings brought into the research environment and interpret these
meanings as objectively as possible. According to Smyth and Holian (2008), researcher
bias could be eliminated with evidence and themes in the data collected. Thus, I explored
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multiple data sources, maintained a journal, sought respondents’ validation of the study’s
initial results, and was dispassionate about the outcome of the survey. These hopefully
eliminated some of the biases and ethical dilemmas.
Data Collection Procedures
According to Merriam (1998), case studies require vigorous data collection
processes to get in-depth information from participants. I obtained data for this research
from multiple sources such as personal interviews, government gazettes, annual reports,
and other records such as my journal notes obtained from observations and interviews.
Using multiple sources enhance the credibility of qualitative data (Yin, 2003). Board
members were chosen using the Homogeneous Sampling method (a type of purposeful
sampling technique) to ensure similarity in most of the situations faced by the sample.
Other records, such as the gazettes, were obtained from the Office of the Head of Service
of the Federation in Nigeria after due authorization was obtained. Annual reports were
accessed from the library and websites of the RTOs that made up the sample. These are
legal documents that were digitized at the time of the occurrence of the event they
described. They are thus verifiable and dependable sources of data.
Interview Technique
According to Punch and Oancea (2014), interviewing participants enables the
researcher more access to data than using any other tool. Creswell (2007) and Petty,
Thomson, and Stew (2012) considered interviews as being most effective in qualitative
research. To secure consent for the interview, I sent letters to the MDs and the board
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members to be interviewed. This was a follow up to the letter of approval obtained from
the Minister (FMST), giving background information about the research.
To ensure that the techniques used for the interviews achieved their purpose, a
mock interview schedule was conducted. This eliminated any possible extraneous factor
that could have hindered the clarity of the interview and also ensured that the interview
adequately answered the research questions. An interview guide, which was developed
by the researcher, was used in the collection of data for this study. According to Patton
(2002), an interview guide comprises possible questions and focal points that could be
asked participants and which will ensure the interviewer stayed within the limit of the
research. With this interview guide, I maintained control of the interview process (See
Appendix C: Interview Guide). I, however, refrained from consulting this guide
obtrusively during the interviews so that the session could flow naturally and not follow a
preconceived order.
The actual personal interviews of the six MDs selected were held in their offices
while the interview of the board members was at a convenient time determined by the
participants so that they would not be in haste to leave or be too tired to give valuable
information. This timing made the respondents relaxed, being in their natural
environment, and the office was free from unnecessary distractions. They were thus more
responsive. An audio recorder, as well as the recording software on my phones, laptop,
and iPad were used to record the interview sessions. These measures were taken to obtain
verbatim report of the actual words used by participants, thereby aiding the development
of themes needed for the data analysis. My journal was used to identify subtle nuances in
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the tone or mood of the participants as well as my observations of the interview process,
environment, attitude, posture, and answers of participants.
The interviews lasted for an hour per participant and there was no repeat of the
interview sessions for any MD. Given the cost implication and the time available to
gather the needed data since the organizations were not located in the same area, the
participants were well briefed about what to expect in the course of the interview. I
explained to the participants the possibility of their remaining anonymous if they so
desired, and that their information and participation would be held in strict confidence.
As recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008), I also assured participants of the
replacement of their actual names with pseudonyms if their data were to be published so
that their anonymity would be assured. The signed informed consent form was obtained
from participants to seal this agreement.
I commenced the interview sessions with questions, which put the participants in
relaxed states before questions requiring confidentiality were asked. A qualitative
researcher must be endowed with good skills that will elicit trust from the participants
and make them more willing to part with information (Qu & Dumay, 2011). Therefore, I
established a link with the MDs and board members interviewed and kept up with them
through text messages, calls, and emails such that they were more relaxed and familiar
with me by the time the interview commenced. Another skill that I employed was the art
of listening and avoiding the use of leading questions. This enriched my journal entries
and helped to achieve data saturation. A follow-up interview was required to enable data
saturation, and one of the participants was contacted on the telephone to clarify some
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points earlier raised. I used member checks by allowing participants to read the scripts of
my interviews with them and the conclusions reached from my interview session with
them.
Interview Questions
Interview questions must be well structured to obtain the appropriate responses,
which would effectively answer the research questions. I used semi-structured, openended questions for the interview so that respondents would be free with their opinions
and comments and I was thus able to obtain rich data for my study. The semi-structured
nature of the questions enabled me to design questions that were tailored towards the
research questions and the ultimate goal of the study. The semi-structured questions also
guided the interviews towards a consistent structure for uniformity purposes. However, in
the course of the interview, some unplanned points cropped up which needed to be
further explored because they were considered important to the participant and the study.
Probing and follow-up questions were employed in this instance.
Gaining the Confidence of the Participants
Some participants were worried about remaining anonymous so that their
participation and opinions would not count against them while some felt the interview
may not be worth their time since similar studies had not had any impact on the observed
phenomenon. A lot of effort and patience were employed to gain the trust of participants
because the absence of trust and confidence from participants could have marred the data
quality as some people could have deliberately withheld vital information. I assured the
participants of the confidentiality of their contributions and their anonymity as well as
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their right to withdraw their participation whenever they ceased to feel comfortable with
the proceeding, as prescribed by Qu and Dumay (2011). Additionally, the interviews
were held in the participants’ offices, an environment over which they exercised absolute
control. They were also allowed to determine the time and date for the interviews.
Document Examination
Documents are important evidence for inquiry in a case study (Yin, 2003). I
examined some documents as a secondary data source to confirm or complement the data
obtained from the interviews. I also reviewed the mandates of the RTOs as presented by
the acts that established them, as well as annual reports that revealed their strategic goals,
decisions and accomplishments. These documents were obtained from the organizations
since they were public documents. A formal request was however made for them.
Data Security and Storage
Participants sometimes need assurance of anonymity. Apart from this, data
obtained from interviews need to be well stored so that they would not be damaged, lost,
or fall into the wrong hands. To assure the anonymity of participants, I assigned numeric
numbers or pseudonyms to them. To secure the data, I paid serious attention to its storage
and back up. I saved the raw data in my computer and external hard drive and I passworded the files. These documents were also kept in my iCloud account in the event of a
problem with the computer’s hard drive. The external drive was put away until and would
be kept for at least five years after the study has been published. The copy with the
researcher was stored away in a safe and these would be destroyed after a minimum of
five years, in conformity with Walden University policy. In the unlikely event that a
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participant reports a case of abuse or infringement of rights during the interview however,
the researcher is obligated by law to release the interview data and transcripts to the
necessary authorities for verification of claims.
The same procedure was followed after the data had been transcribed. My journal
was securely locked away in my bedroom safe and would be consulted as needed. Since I
do not intend to discuss my personal views and opinions on the interview with anyone,
except if required by my chair and advisors, safety of the contents is assured.
Strategy for Data Analysis and Interpretation
The essence of gathering data is to obtain needed information that would shed
light on current inquiries, and multiple data sources strengthen qualitative studies (Corbin
& Strauss, 2008). However, the best use of the data can only be obtained when the data
is analyzed correctly. Data analysis, when it is properly done, makes data to be orderly
and easier to interpret, thereby enhancing the meaning derivable from the data (Fossey,
Harvey, McDermott, & Davidson, 2002; McNabb, 2008). I first transcribed the
interviews from the recorder and sorted them into some form of meaningful order. Yin
(2003) recommended searching for patterns in qualitative data so I looked out for
emerging trends that could suggest links to the research questions in the participants’
responses. According to Yin (2003), when similar patterns emerge in case studies, they
confirm or refute researchers’ propositions. Once discovered, these patterns were
categorized and compared to one another for deeper insight and to search for themes and
important meanings. The identified themes were grouped and coded with nodes. Thereby,
the data was reduced to a more manageable framework that answered the research
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questions. Yin (2011) said that the five stages of data analysis should include
compilation, dissection, reassembly, interpretation of data, and the drawing of
conclusions.
In view of the large volume of information available through multiple qualitative
data, different techniques and software are available to sort, reduce, and group data
(Hanson, Balmer, & Giardino, 2011). The NVivo 10 software is often used to analyze
themes and patterns because the software makes the qualitative analysis more thorough
and rewarding (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011). I could not however access the software.
After transcribing the interview into the Microsoft word format, I manually coded it as
appropriate under the nodes to analyze the interview extracts. The other process outlined
by Yin (2011) was followed until the data interpretation was done. The constant
comparative method (Merriam, 2009) was used to analyze the government gazettes and
annual records of the RTOs. All data were triangulated at every point, as recommended
by Yin (2009) and Yin (2011), in order to assure data validity. According to Patton
(2002), when data is triangulated, it affords researchers the opportunity to confirm that
the data used corroborates well and this validates research findings thereby making them
trustworthy (Creswell, 2007). The method of triangulation, I used, was to compare the
data obtained from interviewing the MDs with written documents and annual reports and
also compare these with the perception of board members. Adegbite (2012) said that the
use of triangulation of multiple data enhances the validity of studies on CG
Researchers must be wary of using secondary data because they may be too many
to sort and may not be relevant to the questions in focus by the study. Trochim and
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Donnelly (2008) therefore recommended that these data may be broken into units and
coded into themes that would make usable patterns recognizable. Leveraging on my
position as an insider in the RTO sector, I only analyzed records that were of relevance to
the inquiry, so that time wasted on sorting irrelevant data was minimized.
Coding Strategy
Coding helps to group data into meaningful patterns (McNabb, 2008), which can
then be categorized into themes according to their similarities and characteristics. The
coding strategy which I used in this study was the thematic analysis strategy. This
strategy is useful in analyzing qualitative data by grouping and categorizing them
(Creswell, 2007). I listened to the audio recording of the interview repeatedly to confirm
that I have the right and accurate themes needed for the development of initial codes,
especially when they relate to the research questions, which I answered in this study.
According to Creswell (2007), codes that occurred frequently indicated strong
participants’ opinions. These commonly occurring ideas, words, or elements were
organized according to their characteristics and were assigned codes for easy
identification. These initial codes were then compared for similarities, merged or
separated as main categories, and developed into themes that metamorphosed into
coherent meanings. Discrepant cases are those elements, which seem to contradict
emerging patterns during data analysis. I analyzed these discrepant cases thoroughly until
I obtained an explanation for their emergence. This strengthened the trustworthiness of
the study because it could either confirm or alter the patterns that emerged from the data.
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Data Interpretation
Qualitative data are often induced rather than deduced. The intent is to explore
patterns that are predominant in the data, which can enhance understanding of the studied
phenomenon. As soon as data is collected, Patton (2002) suggested that it should be
grouped into storytelling, case study, or analytical framework. For this study, the case
study framework was used to interpret the qualitative data obtained.
The answers obtained from the interviews were different from one another in
construction but usually, similar ideas and observations could be detected with diligent
scrutiny. To achieve this, the content or thematic analysis approach was used to analyze
the qualitative data obtained in this study. According to Patton (2002), the data content
analysis enables access to speech and written content and also reduces data to sizable
parts that make analysis easier. The texts used in the data were sorted and analyzed
according to their syntax and semantic meanings but more attention was paid to the
semantic expressions used by participants because these would show the realities and
meanings that participants ascribed to public board impacts in Nigeria. Thereafter, codes
were apportioned to the data as themes were identified. The a priori coding approach was
applied to the emerging themes in the data.
Quality Issue
According to Christensen and Carlile (2009), qualitative case study data are
mostly subjective. Their relevance and quality could however be determined by how well
they brought meaning to our search and assisted in categorizing issues, thereby
simplifying predictions and the building of theories. Research studies are adjudged to
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have quality when they have internal validity and when their data and their findings are
also reliable (Creswell, 2007). Interviews provide reliable information and when they are
obtained and analyzed through rigorous and strategic procedures, they add to a study’s
credibility (Patton, 2002). I listened to the interview over and over before transcribing the
responses. After that, I listened again to the recorded audio, while checking my
transcriptions to assure that the transcribed notes are consistent with what was heard in
the audio recording. These steps enhanced the accuracy and dependability of the data.
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) recommended the use of triangulation, feedback from
colleagues, and validation by participants in qualitative studies to enhance its quality.
According to Yin (2011), triangulation eliminates the tendency of qualitative researchers
to use inaccurate data thereby reducing the inaccuracy of findings. I thus obtained data
from multiple sources so that I could triangulate the data and enhance validity. The
multiple sources also assisted me to develop rich and thick descriptions of the perception
of respondents on public board impact. Rich data makes it easy to confirm similar
perceptions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and guarantees transferability. I also checked back
with interviewees to validate my findings and confirm that they adequately represent the
perceptions of participants (Fossey et al., 2002; Tracy 2010). I presented the transcribed
notes of interviews held to interviewees to obtain this validation and confirm the report’s
accuracy (Creswell, 2009). Tong, Chapman, Israni, Gordon, and Craig (2013) called this
member checking. Member checking will serve as a means of verifying the accuracy of
data used, anonymity of participants, and according to Petty, Thomson, and Stew (2012),
it helps to identify researcher bias. Yin (2003), recommended peer debriefing to
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strengthen data quality. I, therefore, sought the input of colleagues and few notable
scholars in the field of public governance in Nigeria to assess the data collected and their
opinions were noted in the final analysis.
IRB Approval
Walden university has a board that must be convinced that the researcher is taking
the ethical and globally acceptable steps in research that concern human subjects. This
must be done so that the rights and wellbeing of these human projects are guaranteed in
any study. According to Szanron, Taylor, and Terhaar (2013), IRB guarantees the
protection of human participants from unethical practices. They thus needed to certify the
data collection processes and give necessary approval before data collection could
commence. I was patient to obtain IRB approval, which certified my proposed methods
and protocol as safe for human participants before starting data collection and analysis.
Obtaining this approval required convincing the IRB that the appropriate ethical
practices, such as the principles of anonymity and benevolence, would be incorporated
into the process of obtaining and reporting data. I adhered strictly to these ethical
guidelines and ensured that participants were aware of the process, as well as their role
and rights, throughout the data collection period.
Ethical Issues
In qualitative research, it is assumed that the researcher may have some biases,
which could taint the outcome of the study. In order to obtain participants’ trust and
assure of researchers’ integrity, ethical issues must be dealt with decisively before
undertaking any research (Kisely & Kendall, 2011). This opinion informed the
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suggestion by Lincoln and Guba (1985) that the researcher must openly discuss these
“biases, motivations, interests or perspectives” (p. 290). Once these are discussed openly,
they will assist the researcher in minimizing their effects at every level of the study,
particularly during data collection and analysis. According to Babbie (2010), researchers
must understand proper and improper conducts while researching. Ethical issues that
were expected to be raised in the course of this study included (a) not respecting the
space, rights, anonymity, and expectations of participants (b) withholding vital
information from participants on what to expect from the study and the risks they may be
exposed to, before contact, and (c) culture clashes.
To ensure that I acted within strict ethical guidelines, I ensured that I signed
informed consent forms with the participants. According to Cook and Hoas (2011), this
step will simplify the interview process. Qu and Dumay (2011) said that such forms will
contain information that explained the purpose for the interview, the expected role to be
played by participants, and their right to withdraw anytime they felt at risk in the course
of the interview, since participation was voluntary. I also assured participants that no
information given by them could be traced to or used against them because all
characteristics or names that could reveal their identity would be removed before the
study was published. The recorded audio would also be well kept from the public. These
steps eliminated the fear of harm or risk of life/job by the participants. It also gave them
ample time to decide whether to participate in the study or not. The informed consent
form was left with the respondents to study and sign before the interview date was set.
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Cultural consideration was not an issue with this research because I am an insider
researcher and I am thus familiar with the culture and values of the RTO environment.
Summary
This chapter established the research design for this study and the rationale for its
choice. The qualitative case study design enabled me to gain deeper insight into the
impact of public boards in Nigerian RTOs by exploring the perceptions of board
members and MDs of RTOs. My role in eliciting this information was also discussed here
as well as the population and sampling techniques and size.
The purposeful sampling method was used to select participants from Nigerian
public RTOs. The data collection and analysis methods were highlighted in this section.
Data were collected after obtaining IRB approval using the interview method and other
sources such as questionnaires, public records, and my personal notes. Interviews were
semi-structured with open-ended questions to allow for richer information from
participants. The data were then analyzed and categorized into patterns. Issues involving
data quality, data protection, and general strategy for conducting the investigation into the
phenomenon in focus in this study were extensively discussed in this chapter. The data
collection and analysis processes were discussed in this chapter. Particular attention was
paid to my role as a researcher, research ethics that pertained to participants, and the use
of computer software in the analysis of data.
In Chapter 4, findings of this research were logically outlined. The chapter was
concluded with an analysis of themes that were obtained from the interview data. This
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will lead to conclusions regarding what MDs and public boards perceive to be the actual
impact of boards on RTO development and performance in Nigeria.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This qualitative interpretive case study was carried out to explore CG practices
that will be best for public RTOs in Nigeria so that they can be more effective. This study
became necessary due to the need of the Nigerian government to make public
organizations more effective in the face of dwindling economic fortunes in the country. I
tried to understand governance practices of FBMs and CEOs in terms of promoting the
effectiveness of their organizations by interviewing relevant persons who had been
involved in the governance of public RTOs. The conceptual framework was the agency
theory and was appropriately selected to suit the governance practices of Nigerian public
RTOs.
This research answered the following questions:
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D
sector?
RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these
organizations?
This chapter discusses how data for the study were obtained and the process to
generate themes and meanings from the data. Information was obtained from participants
to support emerging themes and results. The chapter concludes with a summary of
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emerging themes obtained from responses of participants. These themes will be further
discussed and interpreted in specific terms in Chapter 5.
Research Setting
Participants were selected purposively because they were authorities in their fields
of specialization. The research setting was free from government influence and
interference because participants were contacted personally and not through
organizations or political leaders. There were therefore no personal or organizational
changes that could have affected the study’s results. Participants were not paid and most
were not working for the government at the time of interviews.
Ten open-ended questions were designed for the semistructured interviews.
Consent for participation was obtained from eligible participants through phone calls and
mails. Participants in this study were contacted personally so that they would not be
under any influence that could distort their responses. I had the option of getting approval
from FMST to contact the participants but this action could have compromised the
anonymity of the participants. Contact with participants was established after the
approval of the IRB of Walden University. The common characteristic shared by
participants in this study was their experience in governing public RTOs in Nigeria. I
determined the sample that shared this characteristic by grouping the 17 parastatals in the
FMST according to their functions. Six parastatals which engaged in core R&D activities
were identified from this population. Participants in this study were selected from these
six parastatals so that it would be easy to determine their governance strategies and the
effect of these on the performance of their organizations. Each of the six parastatals had
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at least one participant and none had more than three. The research questions were
designed to elicit adequate information regarding the governance practices of boards in
public RTOs, and what these practices should be. Adequate care was thus taken to
formulate questions that would probe the intellect and experiences of the participants. All
participants understood that they were under no obligation to participate in the study.
I expected that all eligible participants that were to be contacted would be willing
to participate in the interview but a few eligible participants, who were mostly PCEOs
opted not to participate after the purpose of the study was revealed. This refusal could
have been out of fear of job loss. The decisions were respected. One of the FBMs and an
FCEO had to be interviewed on the phone. Participants who were willing to contribute to
the study were too busy to be confined to one location.
The interview duration varied as some participants had more to say than others.
The two interview methods employed were conducted face to face and on phone. These
methods were determined by necessity because of the schedule of two of the participants.
All interviews were recorded. Time spent on interviews was between 35 and 88 minutes.
Demographics
This study was conducted to explore the impact of good governance practices on
RTOs’ effectiveness in the Nigerian public sector, and this information was obtained
from interviews conducted with PCEOs/FCEOs of selected public RTOs as well as
FBMs. The interviews were intended to help understand the motivations for board
activities such as decision making and strategic planning, as well as perceptions of CEOs
regarding board performance and impact. Participants in this study were purposively
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selected from the FMST and were contacted based on their positions as PCEOs/ FCEOs
or FBMs of RTOs involved purely in R&D to ensure data quality and generalizability of
findings. As outlined in Table 1, 16 participants were interviewed from six RTOs in the
FMST. This sample was made up of seven former CEOs who had worked with boards in
their organizations, four present CEOs who had also worked with boards, and five FBMs.
The FCEOs constituted 43.7% of the total participants, PCEOs represented 25%, and
FBMs were 31.3%.
Table 1
Summary of Participants’ Demographic Characteristics
Frequency (%)
Age Group of Participants

PCEOs

FCEOs

FBMs

Total

46-50

2 (50)

1 (14.3)

2 (40)

5 (31.2)

51 & above

2 (50)

6 (85.7)

3 (60)

11 (68.8)

Total

4 (100)

7 (100)

5 (100)

16 (100)

Note. PCEOs - Present CEOs, FCEOs - Former CEOs, FBMs - Former Board Members

Participants in this study were 46 and above. While 68.8% of respondents were 51
years and above, 31.2% were between 46 and 50 years. This result implies that there are
more FCEOs, PCEOs, and FBMs in their late forties and fifties than in their early forties.
This may have been due to the selection criteria for appointment into such positions. The
average Nigerian obtains the first degree at 25 years of age and it may take another 15
years to get a PhD. According to the selection process, all intending CEOs of public
RTOs in Nigeria must have PhDs, be registered with appropriate professional bodies,
have published papers in peer-reviewed journals, and also have work experience at
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management levels. It was difficult getting any board chairman to participate in this study
probably because of busy schedules. All participants had at least 2 years of working
experience with or as board members and could thus securely comment on board
activities.
I had to traverse the northern and southwestern parts of the country to obtain data.
Most of the prospective participants were living in various states across the country and
this increased the period for data collection. Only 16 of the 22 persons that I contacted for
the interview, were actually interviewed.
Table 2
Summary of Respondents’ Ethnic Characteristics
Frequency (%)
Participants

N.E.Z

N.W.Z

N.C.Z

S.E.Z

S.S.Z

S.W.Z

Total

PCEOs

(0)

1 (25)

1 (25)

(0)

(0)

2 (50)

4 (100)

FCEOs

(0)

1 (14.3)

1 (14.3)

2 (28.5)

(0)

3 (42.9)

7 (100)

FBMs

1 (20)

(0)

1 (20)

1 (20)

1 (20)

1 (20)

5 (100)

Total

1 (6.25)

2 (12.5)

3 (18.75)

3 (18.75)

1(6.25)

6 (37.5)

16 (100)

Note. PCEOs - Present CEOs, FCEOs - Former CEOs, FBMs - Former Board Members, N.E. Z - NorthEast Zone, N.W. Z - North-West Zone, N.C. Z - North-Central Zone, S.E.Z - South-East Zone, S.S.Z South-South Zone, S.W.Z - South-West Zone.

Table 2 indicates that the South West Zone had the highest number of respondents
and this zone had representatives in all the three categories of respondents. Additionally,
the North Central and the South West had representatives in all three categories while the
North East Zone only had one participant each in the FBM category. Figure 1 shows the
bar chart indicating the spread of respondents. Of the 16 respondents who participated in
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this study, 75% were Christians, 25% were Muslims, and there were no traditionalists
represented.
Table 3
Summary of Respondents’ Religious Characteristics
Participants

Christianity

Islam

Total

(%)

(%)

(%)

PCEOs

3 (75)

1 (25)

4 (100)

FCEOs

6 (85.7)

1 (14.3)

7 (100)

FBMs

3 (60)

2 (40)

5 (100)

Total

12 (75)

4 (25)

16 (100)

Ethnic Spread of Respondents
4
NE Zone
3

NW Zone

2

NC Zone
SE Zone

1
SS Zone
0

SW Zone
PCEOs

FCEOs

FBMs

Figure 1. Ethnic spread of respondents.
Table 4 shows disparities in gender distribution amongst the participants. While
87.5% of respondents were male, 12.5% were female. The two female respondents fell
into the FBM and PCEOs categories.
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Table 4
Summary of Participants’ Gender Distribution
Participants

Male (%)

Female (%)

PCEOs

3 (18.75)

1 (6.25)

FCEOs

7 (43.75)

-

FBMs

4 (25)

1 (6.25)

Total

14 (87.5)

2 (12.5)

The incidence of occurrence of fewer females in the distribution may have been
attributable to the fact that in the whole of the 19 RTOs in FMST which formed the
population from which samples were selected, there have been only 3 female CEOs since
in the history of the FMST, and the females that were appointed into RTO boards were
privileged to be there because of the political positions they occupied such as ministers of
finance and other positions. Based on this gender disparity, it is presumed that there are
fewer female CEOS in the RTOs of the FMST in Nigeria than males.
Data Collection
The data collection process commenced after obtaining approval from Walden’s
IRB to commence data collection (see Appendix C). I then contacted all the participants
by phone and also through the booking of appointments to determine the convenient time
for the participants. I obtained the phone numbers of these contacted through phones
from contacts (mostly present CEOs) who had already spoken to them and obtained their
verbal consent to be interviewed. The participants were selected based on their positions
or former positions as CEOs or board members in RTOs under the FMST. The
participants contacted were 22 in number but 16 showed interest in participating by
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actually giving the researcher appointments. Individual interviews were collected from
seven former CEOs, four serving CEOs, and five former board members to obtain deeper
insight into what motivated board governance policies and activities in Nigerian public
RTOs.
The respondents were located in Abuja, Lagos, Ile-Ife, and Akure, which are
major cities in Nigeria, and they were all interviewed in their offices, except for one
former board member and one former CEO who could not be reached because of their
busy schedule but the questions were sent to their email addresses and the interviews
were conducted on the phone. Other interviews were contacted face to face. Before
conducting the interviews, all participants were informed of the purpose of the study and
they were also informed of their rights as participants, which included the right to
withdraw their participation any time they wanted to. Thereafter, the participants signed
the informed consent forms. Two of the participants wanted to know if it was necessary
to put their names on the informed consent form, given the earlier assurance that their
responses would be treated with the utmost confidentiality. I responded that they could
choose not to write their names and these two participants just signed the form. I was
quick to reassure the participant again of the confidentiality of the forms and other data
obtained in the course of the study. Once the informed consent forms had been signed,
the respondents all decided for privacy with their secretaries, since the interviews were
held in the offices of 14 respondents, so that there would be no undue interruptions
during the interviews. I then confirmed that none of the participants were under any
influence or condition, such as the presence of other people, lack of time or interest, or
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noise from the interview environment, which could have influenced their responses
during the interview and interfered with the findings of this study. I thereafter sought and
obtained permission to commence the interview and record the process with my mobile
phone recording software, my MacBook Voice Recorder, and also my Apple iPad.
Having obtained this permission, I began the interview by following the prepared
questions in the interview protocol list. I personally conducted the interviews face-toface in the offices of the participants to guarantee confidentiality and reduce unnecessary
distractions and interruptions. Notes were taken as supporting documents during the
interview, with the permission of the participants. Since there was no replacement of
participants during the data collection process, there was no need to repeat any interview
session for any respondent, although some of them offered to be available for any
clarification or additional information, which may be needed. I, however, encountered
some difficulties with the phone interviews because the calls kept dropping as a result of
the poor network from the mobile service providers. This elongated the time spent on the
interviews conducted by telephone by a few minutes. I was able to complete the
interview after about three attempts per participant and there was no loss of data or
information because of the truncated calls as we picked up from where we left off as soon
as the connections were reestablished.
The interviews conducted through the phone were also recorded on my phone and
iPad. This was made possible because the participants were put on speaker and the
recording software was able to record their voices with much clarity. During the breaks, I
paused the recorder and continued as soon as connections were restored. After the data
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had been analyzed, the voice data, transcripts, and other notes were taken during the
interview were locked in a secure locker in my bedroom while a password known only by
me protects the other documents on my personal computer. Table 5 and Figure 2
summarizes the link between research questions and the interview questions.
Table 5
Summary of Research Questions and Associated Interview Questions
Research Questions
(RQ)

Relevant Interview
Questions (IQ)

RQ1: What governance problems
exist in public organizations in
Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector?

IQ 1: What do you understand by Research and
Technology Organization and do you think they are
meeting up with the purpose for which they were set up in
Nigeria?
IQ 2: Are there structures in place to determine the
effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria?
IQ 5: What, in your opinion, can hinder the effectiveness
of public RTO boards?
IQ 6: Was there a governance framework or corporate
governance code that regulated the activities of your board
or monitored their performance like we have the
Companies Act 2006 in UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2002 in the USA?

RQ2: What do Board members
and Managing Directors of public
organizations in Nigeria’s
Research and Development Sector
believe are the impact of boards on
organizational effectiveness?

IQ 3: Do you subscribe to the claim that public governing
boards are important in enhancing RTO performance in
Nigeria?
IQ 4: What do you believe are the impact of public boards
on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria?
IQ 5: What, in your opinion, can hinder the effectiveness
of public RTO boards?
IQ 6: Was there a governance framework or corporate
governance code that regulated the activities of your board
or monitored their performance like we have the
Companies Act 2006 in UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2002 in the USA?
IQ 7: What do you need from government to be effective
as CEO in Nigerian RTO?

RQ3: How do these perceptions of
Board members and Executive
Directors about impact of boards

IQ 1: What do you understand by Research and
Technology Organization and do you think they are
meeting up with the purpose for which they were set up in
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of Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector affect the
performance of these
organizations?

Nigeria?
IQ 2: Are there structures in place to determine the
effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria?
IQ 3: Do you subscribe to the claim that public governing
boards are important in enhancing RTO performance in
Nigeria?
IQ 8: What, in your own opinion, can make public RTO
boards in Nigeria more effective?

Figure 2. Distribution of study’s research questions and associated interview questions
Data Analysis
I commenced the analysis of data obtained from the interviews after personally
transcribing the interviews. This enabled me to know the data intimately and helped
during the process of coding. According to Roulston and Choi (2018), when the
qualitative researcher is conducting exploratory research, it is best to examine, transcribe,
and code the data personally. By doing this, I become more familiar with the data and the
viewpoints of participants and this helped the analysis process. I manually transcribed the
data using the audio recording modifier on my phone, which slowed the voices and made
it easier to follow the voices and pronunciations. After the initial transcriptions, I read
through the transcripts while listening to the recording again to be sure that I did not omit
anything. In view of the difficulty I encountered in accessing the QRS NVivo 10
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software, which I had earlier proposed to use for the management, sorting, and analysis
of my interview data, I had to resort to manual analysis. These data software only assists
with sorting and categorization of data but the task of coding and identifying patterns and
meanings from the data still rests with the researcher.
Data analysis is a means of sorting through the information in the unstructured
data obtained, with the view of reducing it into usable units by thoroughly examining the
data and categorizing it into themes and patterns (Beaudry & Miller, 2016). I continued
the data analysis process by grouping the respondents into three natural categories and
assigning pseudonyms to the groups and respondents. The Former Board Members were
identified as FBMs, Present CEOs as PCEOs and Former CEOs as FCEOs. All the five
FBMs were thus identified as FBM 1, FBM 2, FBM 3 and so on as well as other
categories. Having immersed myself in the data, I thereafter began searching for
commonalities, relationships, and differences in the responses of participants and
categorized them under codes, which were eventually grouped as themes.
The most critical stage of qualitative data analysis is the coding stage and it is
advisable to keep the research question in mind while coding (Stuckey, 2015). I
employed the deductive coding style which involves having preset codes a priori and also
adopted the thematic content analysis method in analyzing this data (Miles & Huberman,
1994; Stuckey, 2015). Having gone through the data several times, I was able to
intuitively understand the relationship between the interview questions and the three
research questions, which I initially set out to answer through the study. This step
provided a direction for my data analysis. I had three sets of data obtained from former
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CEOs, present CEOs, and former board members. I read through all the answers and
highlighted relevant and striking comments with the use of my computer’s highlight pen,
using the same highlight pen color for similar answers. I thereafter sorted the answers
according to color and categorized them into themes that emerged as a central idea from
the grouped codes.
After the important responses had been categorized under themes, I commenced
the next stage of the analysis by looking for relationships and similarities among the
themes. The earlier classification simplified the process of comparing opinions and
perceptions of participants about the theme and through the similarities in the responses,
conceptual relationships were established, duplications were removed, and similar
categories were merged in order to connect interrelated theoretical data and this led to the
development of further themes. The next stage involved grouping the thematic categories
according to colors. Since each category had color allocated to it, I went through the
transcribed interviews again and extracted more data that fit the identified categories and
they were colored accordingly. This helped me to organize the data for interpretation and
ensured consistency in the coding process. The emergent themes were then grouped
along with thematic constructions that answered the three research questions and
addressed the framework for the study (Callary, Rathwell, & Young, 2015).
The PCEOs’ interviews revealed 54 issues; the FCEOs’ interviews yielded 126
issues, and the FBMs’ interviews revealed 73 issues. From these opinions, related and
divergent themes were identified and this led to the formation of 81 categories. Because
these categories were too many and too broad, I immersed myself in the data again to
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understand what these data were saying and I discovered that some of the codes were
related to one another and they were thus further reduced to nine. The nine categories
were: Funding, Ability to Perform, Formal and Governance Structure, Supervision,
Impact of Boards, Importance of Boards, RTO Boards’ Structure, Developing RTOs, and
Monitoring RTOs. The categories were thereafter linked to the three research questions
developed in this study. Figures 3, 4, and 5 are a spider representation of the nine
categories and codes developed.

* Equipment
* Advertisement
* Monitoring
* Budgetary Challenges
* Remuneration

* Training
* Agency Cost
* Availability
* Infrastructure

* Operations
* Innovations
* Duality
* Board Funding

* Incompetent Board
* Capacity
* S & T Innovation
* Assessing RTOs
* Proliferation
* Weak Technology Base
* Infrastructure Development

RQ1
* Organization
* Boards Characteristics
* Bureaucracy and Patronage
* Informal Structure
* Informal Selection Criteria
* Weak Regulatory Framework
* Unclear Laws & Deliverables
* No Unitary System
* Informal Evaluation Structure * No Monitoring Structure
* Wrong Appointments
* Government Neglect
* Ignorance of Government Codes

* Checks
* Monitoring
* No Follow-up
* Drive

* Measurement
* Measuring Deliverables
* Reporting
* Authority

* Supervising
* Visits
* Implementation

RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s Research and Development
Sector?

Figure 3. Summary of linkage of RQ1 to coding categories.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Quick Decision
Linkages
Strategic Plans
Influence
Performance
Political Connections
Personnel Motivation
Checks

•
•
•

Intermediaries
Value Addition
Important

* Oversight
* Redundant
* No Impact
* Non-
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* Staff Welfare
* Policy Direction

RQ2
* Diversity
* Liaison
* Necessary

RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D sector
believe are the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?

Figure 4. Summary of linkage of RQ2 to coding categories.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Activate M & E
Annual Reports
Monitoring Mechanism
Board Oversight
Periodic Monitoring
Independent Assessment

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

RQ3

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Not Autonomous
No Challenge
Politicized
Un-Categorized
Professionalism
Diverse Membership
Composition
Knowledge-Driven
Size
Relevant Affiliations

Funding
Research Results
Capacity Development
Research Orientation
Remuneration
Grants
Attractive Salary Structure

RQ3: How do these perceptions of Board members and Executive Directors about the impact of boards of
Nigeria’s Research and Development Sector affect the performance of these organizations?

Figure 5. Summary of linkage of RQ3 3 to coding categories.
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After a further perusal of the categories, I established some additional links and
the nine themes were finally condensed to six with new headings to capture the contents.
The final six themes were: Working relationship with board, Importance, and Functions
of boards, Arguments against boards, Hindrances of Public RTO effectiveness,
Improving Board Performance, Improving RTO Effectiveness. Table 6 shows how the
research questions produced the themes that were used to answer the three research
questions in this study.
Table 6
Summary of Research Movement to Final Coding Categories
Research
Question (RQ)

RQ1
What governance
problems exist in
public organizations in
Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector?

Final Coding
Categories

Initial Coding Categories

1. Working
relationship with
Public RTO
Boards in
Nigeria

*FCEO2 - Not particularly cordial.
*FCEO 3 - Immediate hostility
*FCEO5- I reported to the board on all activities
*FCEO 7- the political powers are more concerned
about constituency projects
*PCEO1- Respect authority; attitude and approach
matter.
*FBM 5- Intuitively the CEO utilizes them

2. Arguments
against Boards’
Performance

*FCEO 1- Lack of monitoring mechanisms; agency
issues; self-interest
*FCEO 2- no enabling law; no formal selection
criteria; political interference; lack of accountability
*FCEO 3- faulty composition; political interference;
unwieldy board size.
*FCEO4- bureaucracy, political interference.
*FCEO5- political interference; lopsided composition;
absence of regulatory body.
*FCEO6- inadequate monitoring of RTOs
*FCEO 7- boards not empowered; political
interference; unclear terms of reference; undefined
reporting lines; unclear role; non-existent
measurement of impact; absence of a formal code for

(table continues)
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public boards.
*PCEO 1- board size; unethical practices;
bureaucracy.
*PCEO 3- political interference; absence of board
evaluation processes.
*PCEO 4- political interference; improper
composition; bureaucracy; absence of unified code of
governance;
*FBM 1- board composition; political interference;
self- interests; unclear role; lack of proper monitoring
system for RTOs; inappropriate board evaluation
mechanisms; funding for board activities;
bureaucracy.
*FBM 3- incongruous composition; chairmanship
position; inadequate funding.
*FBM 4- improper board composition; unstructured
monitoring process; political interference; vacuum in
board leadership where President is chairman;
bureaucracy.
*FBM 5- compromises in evaluating CEOs; absence
of code of governance for public boards; unclear role;
lack of board evaluation.
RQ 2
What do Board
members and
Managing Directors of
public organizations in
Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector
believe are the impact
of boards on
organizational
effectiveness?

3. Importance
and functions of
boards

*FCEO1- policy direction, strategic plans
*FCEO2- administration and governance; influence
*FCEO3- monitor CEOs; influence
*FCEO4- add value; administer and form policies
*FCEO5- monitor CEOs and usage of funds
*FCEO6- Monitor CEOs; enhance performance
*FCEO 7- policy direction
*PCEO1- help take quick decisions, monitor
activities, advocacy
*PCEO 2- composition; monitor CEOs; intermediary;
reduce bureaucracy of the Civil service; attract
funding; advocacy;
*PCEO 3- influence management; provide linkages;
attract funding and goodwill; push proposals.
*PCEO 4 - remove autocracy; composition
*FBM 1- influence; promote partnership with private
sector; policy direction; monitor policies
*FBM 2- capital development; attract funds, advocacy
*FBM 3- political influence; monitors CEO.
*FBM 4- The bridge.
*FBM 5- selecting CEOs; composition; policy making

4. Hindrances of
Public RTO
effectiveness

*FCEO 1- bureaucracy of the public service system.
*FCEO2- improper oversight functions by relevant
agencies; absence of board evaluation

(table continues)
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*FCEO3- absence of strong framework; there is no
continuity in government; inconsistent government
policies; personalization of projects.
*FCEO4- absence of standard governance codes
*FCEO5- political focus not social outcomes;
haphazard funding of RTOs; inadequate funding;
*FCEO6- lack of focus of government on outcomes;
absence of assessment of RTOs technical
performance.
*FCEO 7- poor funding; absence of CEO evaluation;
inconsistent policies.
*PCEO 1- inadequate fund release and funds
management.
*PCEO 3- political interference; bureaucratic
bottlenecks; lack of funds for operational matters.
*PCEO 4- inadequate RTO advertisement; political
interference; poor funding.
*FBM 1- unfriendly government policies.
*FBM 2- funding
*FBM 3- poor funding; bureaucracy
*FBM 4- political interference; absence of patronage
of products; poor funding.
RQ 3
How do these
perceptions of Board
members and
Executive Directors
about impact of boards
of Nigeria’s Research
and Development
Sector affect the
performance of these
organizations?

5. Improving
Board
Performance

*FCEO 1- monitor; diversify composition; right
appointments; good funding; improved Boards’
remuneration; establish formal structures and
regulatory codes of conduct; establish performancebased remuneration system
*FCEO 2- right appointments; reduce political
appointments; encourage oversight and evaluation of
board members; give boards guidelines; organize
retreats
*FCEO 3- have clear separation of powers; appoint
influential and brilliant board chairmen;
*FCEO4- good remuneration; training; private sector
partnership; use Technical Advisory Committees; give
targets; demand for annual and aggregate reports;
peer-review RTO boards; boards should review one
another; standardize board practices across RTOs;
enact specific guiding laws; RTOs shouldn’t have the
same omnibus boards.
*FCEO5- external oversight body; boards to set
targets for themselves; develop scorecard for boards to
monitor their own performance.
*FCEO6- monitor process of delivering the outcome;
develop an Act for board activities; use boards to
monitor effective budgeting by the CEO and his
management team; have many professionals on the

(table continues)
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board.
*FCEO 7- monitor boards; appropriate composition;
appoint influential Chairmen; develop governance
impact assessments for all public boards in Nigeria;
standardize board-monitoring mechanisms;
standardize realistic codes of governance and
operations for boards; set up regulatory committees in
Ministries; give incentives to boards; appoint
regulatory committees with professional members;
empower the boards.
*PCEO1- Appoint professionals; give boards power;
don’t make one omnibus rule for all boards; boards
should be professional in composition; don’t appoint
on the basis of political affiliation; avoid lopsided
composition.
*PCEO 2- Have diverse boards; empower them;
follow global standards; challenge boards and fund
organizations;
*PCEO 3- properly constitute boards; evaluate them;
train boards;
*PCEO 4- National assembly oversight functions;
reduce bureaucracy; fund RTOs; remove political
patronage;
*FBM 1- well-composed boards; establish strict
selection process for RTO boards; monitor and
measure performance of boards; train boards; offer
good remuneration; fund RTOs with clear-cut budgets
for board operations; establish reporting mechanisms;
*FBM 2- have diverse board; appoint influential
chairmen; establish monitoring frameworks; funding;
make government policies favorable; use committees;
assess boards; spell out role of boards; train board
members.
*FBM 3- composition; use committees; train boards;
assess boards’ performance and activities; remove
bureaucracy in the governance system; fund RTOs for
board functions.
*FBM 4- right composition; train board members;
supervise boards.
*FBM 5- standard remuneration for boards; right
composition; avoid political patronage; fund RTOs;
train boards; develop a unified governance code for
public boards; develop a formal structure of reporting
and evaluation.
6. Improving
RTO
Effectiveness

*FCEO1- categorize RTOs; review public service
bureaucracy for RTOs
*FCEO2- group RTOs; develop impact assessment

(table continues)
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indicators; have M&E which would streamline
governance practices; improve oversight function;
make boards accountable; rank public RTOs;
*FCEO3- training and retraining
*FCEO4- have a National Perspective Plan; there
should be orientation for all CEOs
*FCEO5- fund the RTOs; boards should advocate
acceptance and commercialization of RTO products.
*FCEO6- monitor financial and technical outcomes;
the CEO should be appointed on merit
*FCEO 7- fund RTOs reasonably and consistently;
appoint understanding and knowledgeable board;
deploy monitoring mechanisms; ensure stability of the
political structure; guarantee continuity of projects;
have more flexible budgets and stable strategic plans.
*PCEO 1- develop evaluation standards and enforce
compliance with governance codes.
*PCEO 2- remove bureaucracy; challenge CEOs; fund
RTOs; develop technology foresight programme for
the country.
*PCEO 3- improve funding of RTOs; approve
percentage of the earnings of government for RTOs as
a statutory rule.
*PCEO 4- patronize and advertise RTO products;
reduce political interference; remove
*FBM 1- enact laws meant for RTOs
*FBM 2- combine RTOs efforts with institutions
which have complementary competences, resources,
and skills such as private sector actors and the
universities
*FBM 3- shorten bureaucracy
*FBM 4- improve funding; improve stakeholder
participation; improve interaction between the R&D
institutes and the tertiary institutions.

The six main thematic categories, which emerged in the analysis were applied to
the established research questions to enable an understanding of the influence of public
boards on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. Table 7 summarizes the overview of how the
themes were linked to the three research questions in this study. The research process was
completely unaffected by discrepant cases but one event worthy of note is that in the
process of analyzing the data obtained in this study, the government of Nigeria
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inaugurated new public boards for RTOs and they have since resumed duties. This
incident does not affect this research because the purpose of the study was to discover,
from the opinion of leaders who have administered the RTOs at one point or the other,
how public boards could be used to advantage in Nigerian RTOs. Therefore, the new
boards are coming in at the right time as they will benefit from the findings of this
research.
Table 7
Overview of Themes and their Links to the Study’s Research Questions
Research Questions (RQ)

Themes

RQ 1
What governance problems exist in public
organizations in Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector?

Arguments against Boards,
Hindrances of Public RTO
effectiveness

RQ 2
What do Board members and Managing
Directors of public organizations in
Nigeria’s Research and Development
Sector believe are the impact of boards on
organizational effectiveness?
RQ 3
How do these perceptions of Board
members and Executive Directors about
impact of boards of Nigeria’s Research and
Development Sector affect the performance
of these organizations?

Working relationship with
board, Importance and
functions of boards

Improving Board
Performance, Improving
RTO Effectiveness

Evidence of Trustworthiness
According to Kornbluh (2015), having adequate knowledge of the population and
utilizing appropriate procedures to guarantee that the research findings can be trusted
assures the trustworthiness of a study. I carefully and rigorously applied the qualitative
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elements of trustworthiness such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability to enhance the neutrality and reliability of the study (Cope, 2014).
According to Lincoln and Guba (2007), these trustworthiness criteria guarantee rigor of
studies that adopt the qualitative method.
Credibility
Though it is difficult to ascertain trustworthiness in a qualitative study because of
researcher and other biases, internal validity can make such qualitative studies
trustworthy. When the meanings supplied by participants are authentically engaged in the
description of the research findings, such studies are adjudged trustworthy and credible
(Morse, 2015). Based on this premise, I set about ensuring the trustworthiness of this
study’s findings by employing member checks to guarantee that the data analyzed was
free from researcher bias and were indeed the views and opinions of the participants. The
words of some participants were sometimes unclear and I contacted the persons
concerned to authenticate that what I had interpreted or transcribed was accurate. Besides
this, member checking afforded me the opportunity of getting answers to some questions
that arose from my transcriptions and those which I omitted to ask during the interview.
Data saturation was thus satisfactorily reached. To further enhance the credibility of the
data gathered in this study, I also conferred with peers in the governance field in Nigeria
who went through the findings critically to ensure that my interpretations were free from
biases. Despite the relatively small sample size, which ordinarily may hinder the
generalization of the findings, the study’s strength and credibility lay in the rich and
unhindered accounts of participants with multiple and diverse experiences and
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perceptions about board impact. The use of triangulation of data further strengthened the
validity of the data analyzed because of the multiple sources from which data were
obtained (Yin, 2011).
Transferability
Transferability is achieved in a qualitative study if the findings and contexts of a
particular study can fit into similar contexts using other participants (Morse, 2015).
I ensured the transferability of this study’s findings by first selecting my participants
purposively to guarantee that the key persons with needed data were reached, and I set
out to obtain deep and thick descriptions from them. Through these thick descriptions,
Guba (1981) opines that it is possible to compare the current research context to similar
ones to which the findings could be transferred. Although the small sample size may limit
the generalization of the findings of this research, the knowledge demonstrated by the
participants was borne out of their experience while they served as CEOs or board
members and this will remain unchanged even if they were questioned about it
repeatedly.
Dependability
A dependable study assures that nothing is missed in the research conducted,
which could compromise the accuracy of the findings. Achieving dependability requires
guaranteeing that the data obtained from participants is consistent with the findings and
recommendations given by a qualitative study such that time does not erode the truths in
the results (Kornbluh, 2015). I set about establishing the dependability of this study by
hiring a fellow researcher to trail and audit the data collection and analysis process to
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assure that both processes were valid and consistent with laid-down procedures (De
Massis & Kotlar, 2014). This was done by assessing the raw interview data, the coding
process, my interview notes, and a few of the documents used to triangulate the data.
Two researchers independently assessed these documents and their comments showed
their satisfaction with the procedure employed. I equally engaged one of the researchers
to recode the data I obtained and I discovered that the themes and codes generated agreed
with my earlier codes. This discovery suggested that my earlier codes were supported by
the data I collected. According to Ary et al. (2010), if the separate analysis of two or
more researchers is consistent with one another, such a study is dependable.
Confirmability
Researcher bias is often one of the things that researchers have to address to
convince and generate confidence in the study’s findings. I, therefore, set out to establish
that my personal biases or interests did not influence this study’s results. I also sought to
establish that I arrived at the conclusions reached, in this study, from the information
supplied by the participants during the interviews. This I did by declaring and isolating,
from the onset, my biases which could raise neutrality concerns from the data or results
(Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). I equally employed the audit trail recommended by Guba
and Lincoln (1982). The researchers, who conducted the audit, carefully analyzed the
transcriptions and voice recordings. The researchers confirmed that the themes, which
were generated, came from the data obtained. They also confirmed that the interpretations
were not the fabrications of the researcher. According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007),
the researcher’s prolonged engagement in the research sites will elicit trust from the
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participants and they would be more trusting enough to release deep and sensitive
information to the researcher. Being a participant researcher, I was able to enjoy rapport
with the participants and thus had access to enough quality data to guarantee the
trustworthiness of the findings.
Study Results
This interpretive case study set out to explore board activities and governance
practices in Nigerian public RTOs, with a view to determining best practices for public
RTO boards in Nigeria. The study, therefore, explored the opinion of relevant persons
who had been involved in decision-making in public RTOs as CEOs or board members,
in order to understand how good CG can promote effectiveness in these organizations. I
purposively selected 20 participants who had served or were still serving in the six
parastatals that had core R&D functions in the Nigerian FMST, for this study. Only16
respondents participated in this study and data saturation was reached from the
participants. There were three research questions for this study and the ten interview
questions were tailored towards answering the research questions. I analyzed and coded
the interview scripts according to the conceptual framework and other patterns that
emerged from data and in all, six main themes emerged in the analysis of my interview
data.
Thematic Categories
Thematic Category 1: Working Relationship with Public RTO Boards in Nigeria
The respondents were able to describe their working relationship with the boards
they served, through their responses, although no specific interview question addressed
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this. However, in response to questions 2, 3, 4, and 5, respondents hinted at the
importance of good working relationship and synergy between the board and the CEO as
this could influence organizational effectiveness. While PCEO 2 observed that “if the
boards do their jobs very well, and they monitor the RTOs very well, we should expect
good results from RTOs,” FBM 5 said, “I reported to the board on all activities.” FBM 3
mentioned that “The members were always willing to assist the agency in any way they
could,” but according to PCEO 1, this willingness is dependent upon the disposition of
CEOs. According to her, the attitude of the CEOs and how they treat board members will
determine the support which they would receive from these boards. This seems to
corroborate the importance of mindfulness to a good and positive working relationship
which, according to Hyland, Lee, and Mills (2015), aids the effective performance of
organizations.
FCEO 3 hinted that the frosty relationship between some boards and CEOs could
be because of the lack of understanding of each other’s roles and competences.
According to FCO 3, these roles were often mixed up because most boards chairs either
did not understand their boundaries or they failed to respect them. FCEO 2 also observed
that his relationship with the board he worked with was not cordial because he often
refused to yield to their demands. To PCEO 1 however, her good name and integrity were
important to her and as such, she was always careful about dealing with these boards,
who were mostly politicians. She however cautioned that CEOs would enjoy better
working relationship with boards if they considered the criticisms of board members as
being necessary for improved performance. FCEO 7 however felt that most of the
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criticisms and pressure received from board members were borne out of their concern for
their personal and constituency projects.
According to Goodman (2017), positive workplace culture will enhance the
effectiveness of organizations. Out of the seven FCEOs interviewed in this study, three
revealed tenseness in their relationships with their boards, while one saw the board’s
activities as being complementary to the CEO’s efforts. Other FCEOs were silent on the
working relationship. However, of the four PCEOs interviewed, the two who hinted at the
relationship they had with boards revealed that it was cordial. These responses are
significant in that 43% of FCEOs in this study believed that their working relationship
with their boards was not smooth enough and this may have had some consequences on
their performance while 50% of PCEOs in this study acknowledged that their working
relationship with their boards was okay and rewarding.
A good working relationship between the boards and CEOs is a critical factor in
considering the effectiveness of public RTOs. According to Okiro et al. (2015), there is a
significant interaction between good CG and organizational performance because the
internal structures of organizations are enhanced through good CG. Considerable
empirical studies have also proven that agency conflicts between CEO’s and owners or
shareholders have a direct influence on governance and organizational effectiveness. For
instance, Odainkey and Simpson (2012) argued that agency issues are rare in
organizations which are high performing while Tidor, Gelmereanu, Baru, and Morar
(2012) said that a properly-structured governance system is very effective in eliminating
agency problems in public organizations. Agency costs often increase in organizations as

109
a consequence of accumulated monitoring expenses and other residual costs, which arise
from trying to resolve agency problems. But a well-formulated governance structure will
eliminate or reduce agency issues and costs to the barest minimum. These suggest that a
good working relationship between boards and managers will result in good CG decisions
thereby making such organizations effective.
Thematic Category 2: Importance of Public RTO Boards in Nigeria
CG is the strategy employed by governments to guarantee the stability and
profitability of their businesses (Sheifer & Vishny, 1997). The organ of governance of
these government enterprises is the board (Harris et al., 2010) and they are often
appointed to represent the interests of the owners (Bain & Band, 2016). Boards are
important to firm performance (Okiro, 2015) and this may be the reason many owners
favor their use as they are considered a vital part of organizational success. I designed
interview questions three, four, and eight to discover the impression of FBMs, PCEOs
and FCEOs about the role of public boards and also their importance to public
organizations. This answers RQ2 which states: What do board members and managing
directors of public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards
on organizational effectiveness? From their responses, all participants perceived that
boards are necessary to Public RTO effectiveness in Nigeria, although they differed on
the extent of their impact.
Except for FCEO4, who had what was called an advisory committee instead of a
board, and was thus only able to speak from the perspective of what he had observed
about board activities, all but one of the FCEOs and PCEOs agreed that public boards are
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important to RTOs. This represents 68.75% of the respondents. The rest are FBMs, and
they all supported the need for RTO boards. From the responses of participants, four
codes were generated to answer research question two namely: board role, board impact,
board influence, board composition and size, and these codes reveal more information
about the perceived importance of public RTO boards in Nigeria.
Board role. The role that boards play will determine their effectiveness
(Nordberg & Booth, 2017). According to PCEO 1, boards make the decision makingmaking process quicker and more effective because they understand the needs of
organizations and help to reduce official bottlenecks that could hinder the implementation
of those decisions. PEO 1 further explained that boards can give certain approvals
pending the final approval so that the intended projects would not suffer costly delays.
FCEO 2 said that board role is in administration and governance and unless they
understood this role, it may be difficult to attain organizational effectiveness. FBM 5 also
mentioned that boards ought to guide organizations towards mandate achievement.
According to him, this role should help check the excesses of some CEOs. PCEO 4
equally expressed his belief that boards were necessary to keep ambitious CEOs from
taking decisions that could harm the organization. PCEO 4’s opinion corroborated the
position of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managers’ interests may not always be
aligned with that of owners and they thus needed to be monitored. FCEO 3 stated that
because some CEOs tended to ignore the core mandates of their organizations and rather
pursued personal goals, boards were needed to call them to order. These comments
indicated the belief of participants that RTO boards are expected to oversee the activities
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of the organization by monitoring the CEOs. According to Williamson (1988), a good
and effective governance structure will prevent managers from pursuing their selfish
agenda and interests. Boateng (2016) said that when good governance structures are in
place in organizations, shareholders are assured that their interests and the objectives of
the organizations would be protected. FCEO 5 commented that boards monitor execution
of funded projects on behalf of government and if this was properly done, CEOs should
have no excuse for sub-standard performance.
PCEO 2 established another role of RTO boards as intermediaries working to
eliminate the bureaucracy of the Civil service. FCEO 2, FBM 4, and FBM 5 also agreed
that boards should serve as intermediaries because they will be able to help organizations
overcome the cumbersome governance structure in place in Nigeria. According to FBM
4, “The management cannot be running to the presidency and the minister always. The
board is the bridge.” FBM 5 also believed that public boards act as middlemen between
organizations and the legislature.
FCEO 1 further explained that public RTO boards ought to provide policy
direction and also oversight functions in those organizations. According to him, when
public governing boards are empowered, they will be able to develop and execute
strategic plans which will ultimately lead to RTO effectiveness. FCEO 5 concurred by
asserting that effective governing boards could be identified by their commitment to
pursuing the delivery of government’s policies. Effective boards do this, according to
FCEO 5, by monitoring the activities of organizations and ensuring that they are geared
towards national goals. FCEO 7, agreed with this assertion and commented that the
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effectiveness of any board would be determined by how effectively their organizations
are able to deliver the promises of government to the citizenry.
Board influence. The influence of boards can determine their impact. Influential
boards get results. This code is explained in two parts.
RTO Boards’ operational influence. Most public RTO boards in Nigeria are
independent and even though they perform management duties, in the opinion of some of
the participants, they are not expected to be involved in the day-to-day administration of
their organizations. According to FCEO 3, boards must understand that their role is
complementary to the efforts of the CEO and there should be separation of powers in
order to avoid conflict. He further explained, “… if you go to one federal university of
Petroleum Resources, the Pro Chancellor of that university has an office that is bigger
than that of the Vice Chancellor and he is there on a daily basis.”
In the opinion of other participants, RTO boards’ usefulness lies in their influence
with external parties, and their ability to get things done for their organizations. A former
board member, FBM 1, agreed that positive board influence was important to the
operations of RTOs because they could liaise with higher authorities. FBM 3 equally
observed that the political influence of some board members can give their organizations
the financial boost required, thereby stimulating more inventions and competences.,
FCEO 3 said, “after the budgeting is the beginning of the real work. If we had had a
properly constituted board, this would have been easier for me because there would have
been some influential persons on board.”
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PCEO3 submitted that if the board were active and well-constituted, they would
move round to source for needed assistance for the organizations. This suggested that
board members’ influence can affect organizational effectiveness. According to PCEO 1,
boards can also influence their organizations through advocacy. Another important area
of influence identified was through the personality of the Chairmen of RTO boards.
PCEO1 confirmed that the chairman of the board he worked with greatly assisted to
publicize the organization’s activities. PCEO 3 believed that advocacy was easier for
board chairmen who had political and international connections. According to FBM 1,
when board members belonged to the ruling party, they could easily influence budgetary
appropriations so that their institutions could operate better.
RTO Boards’ managerial influence. Another area of board influence, touched by
participants, was their belief that boards influence management by monitoring their
performance. According to the Public Sector Commission (2017), boards are expected to
represent their owners by performing oversight functions on their behalf. With the
exception of a few participants, most believed that by monitoring CEOs, boards can
exercise influence. FCEO 6 said that “Government actually needs to monitor through the
boards” while PCEO 1 confirmed that: “Boards are there to check you and if they try to
do this, you should not feel threatened when they do because outsiders cannot check you.
Every criticism should be taken as guidance towards better performance.” According to
FBM 5, RTO boards should guide these organizations towards mandate achievement so
that the excesses and personal interests of CEOs are not allowed to override national
interests.
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FCEO 6 commented that, “RTOs are on technology research and the boards are
supposed to monitor what the outcome of the operations are and how they have
transferred these results to private sector or public manufacturing sector.” FCEO 5 said
that RTO boards can ensure delivery of demand-driven products to target communities if
they are committed to their supervisory functions and are also periodically assessed.
The monitoring function of RTO boards was established by PCEO 3 who
confirmed that the board supervised his organization’s activities. However, Rowley,
Shipilov, & Greve (2017) suggested that although boards are supposed to manage
performance in organizations, their impact is, at times, remote. This was further
corroborated by some of the participants. FCEO 2 said that, “Within the period that I
interfaced with the boards; I really didn’t see any productive impact they had on the
system while I was still on that seat.” and PCEO 4 said that, “Some go there just to sleep;
they don’t even contribute meaningfully to the running of the board. So, the impact of
boards is not as it should be in RTOs”.
According to FCEO 6, instead of monitoring performance, the boards only
monitored financial operations and performed staff review. Some FCEOs also proffered
reasons for the inability of RTO boards to perform their oversight functions. While FCEO
4 identified bureaucracy and political considerations for the slow response of RTO boards
to organizational needs, FCEO 5 believed that personal interests of political leaders,
rather than the needs of the people, made public RTO boards unresponsive to the general
goals of the organizations.
CG is a tool for monitoring RTO performance outcomes but it has been
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challenging to establish solid governance structures in RTOs (European Commission,
2005). FCEO 7 confirmed that there was no formal code for public governing boards in
Nigeria. Wilson (2006) concluded that organizational failures are an indication of poor
governance structures. As a consequence, it may be challenging for ill-equipped boards to
successfully monitor public RTOs, especially in view of the specialized nature of RTO
functions. This is further exacerbated by the unstable nature of the Nigerian economy,
which has worsened business culture in the country (Ujunwa, 2012).
Board composition and size. Aina (2013) suggested that a diverse board would
possess different skills and varying levels of experience, which Jhunjhunwala (2012)
observed could be a consequence of their being drawn from different walks of life. FCEO
4 concurred that public board diversity added value to their organizations and improved
the quality of governance. According to PCEO 3, a diverse public board will be difficult
for the CEO to manipulate. FBM 2 also believed that the right mix of professionals on
public boards would promote free flow of relevant information. This, according to FBM
2, would make it easy to reach consensus in real time, thereby reducing the time it would
take to deliver organizational outcomes. Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) found that there
was no relationship between organizational performance and board composition or board
size. However, Lasisi (2017) commented that even though board size and composition
may not have a direct influence on organizational effectiveness, large board sizes have
their advantages, such as high skills and competencies that are needed for strategic
decisions in organizations.
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FBM 1 observed that if RTO boards are not well composed or in the right size,
the organization would likely be negatively affected. FBM 1 further revealed that except
public boards were well composed, lack of control over board members and power-play
among powerful board members could make consensus difficult to attain during board
meetings. FCEO 5, defined wrong composition in terms of having more of politicians
than professionals on RTO boards. According to him, a public board that is composed of
more politicians than technocrats would not be effective because the politicians would
have pressure from their constituencies and parties. This could constitute serious
challenges to good governance.
Board impact. Participants in this study believed that the importance of public
boards could be deciphered from the impact which these boards had on their
organizations. According to PCEO 3, the impact of the boards assigned to his
organization was measurable in terms of the linkages they provided for the organization.
The PCEO 3 confirmed that the board secured approval for better conditions of service
for staff and also successfully pushed their funding proposals through the National House
of Assembly. According to FBM 2, the board’s impact was felt in their approval of a new
management structure for his agency and its institutes, which made them more focused
and autonomous. FBM 3, while speaking from the point of view of board members,
believed that board impact could be measured by the influence they exert in getting
things done for their organizations. PCEO 2 corroborated this point, saying that boards
could obtain approvals faster than CEOs due to the influence they wield in government
circles. FBM 5 however perceived that the impact of public RTO boards could best be
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felt during the selection of candidates for the position of CEO. According to FBM 5,
selection of the wrong candidates as CEOs could hinder the effectiveness of their
organizations.
Table 8
Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Responses Regarding the Importance of
Public RTO Boards in Nigeria
Participants who commented
Codes

PCEOs
N=4

FCEOs
N=7

FBMs
N=5

Total
N = 16

Boards Supervise and Assist
CEOs

3 (75%)

2 (28.5%)

2(40%)

7(43.7%)

Boards Provide Policy Direction

2 (50%)

3 (42.8%)

2(40%)

7 (43.7%)

Boards Influence Organization’s
Effectiveness

3 (75%)

2 (28.5%)

4 (80%)

9 (56.2%)

Boards Serve as
Intermediary/Advocates

4 (100%)

3 (42.8%)

3 (60%)

10 (62.5%)

As can be deduced from Table 8, seven out of 16 respondents believe that RTO
boards are supposed to supervise CEOs and assist them to be more effective. Out of these
seven, there are three PCEOs, two FCEOs, and two FBMs. One of the duties that
respondents identified that makes boards important to public RTOs in Nigeria is that they
provide policy direction. The word, policy, was used by 7 out of 16 respondents, which
translated to 43.7% of the total respondents. 56.2% of the respondents also believe that
public RTO boards do exercise some influence upon their organizations’ effectiveness.
Perhaps the most significant opinion of respondents on the importance of public RTO
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boards is what they perceive as a major role of boards, which is serving as advocates for
the organizations by using their political and professional influence. 62.5% of the total
respondents recognized the role of their boards in attracting funds, better working
conditions, and patronage for the organizations. This overwhelming percentage indicates
that this is one of the most important roles of public RTO boards in Nigeria. There were
however respondents who did not agree that RTO boards were important or necessary but
rather retrogressive. PCEO 4 said that boards are mere appendages and are used as
compensation schemes for political loyalists in Nigeria. FCEO 2 added that over time,
their role and relevance were becoming more retrogressive rather than progressive. FCEO
6 also observed that public RTOs could fare better without boards.
Table 9
Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Response Regarding the Importance of
Public RTO Boards in Nigeria
Participants

Public Boards are
Necessary for RTOs
(%)

Public Boards are
Necessary for RTOs
(%)

Total
(%)

FCEOs

5 (38.5)

2 (66.7)

7(43.8)

PCEOs

3 (23)

1 (33.3)

4 (25)

FBMs

5 (38.5)

(0)

5(31.2)

Total

13 (100)

3 (100)

16 (100)

Thematic Category 3: Criticisms Against Boards’ Performance
One of the purposes of boards is to monitor adherence to organizational objectives
and ensure improved performance of organizations through the building of tested
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performance-enabling structures such as CG (OECD, 2015). There should thus be codes
and procedures that govern corporate decisions. The focus of this study was on RTO
boards in Nigeria and it is imperative to understand the activities of these public boards
and which aspects of their structures posed threats to RTO effectiveness. There are
distinct expectations about how boards should act, but opinions about how they act in
reality differ from the theories. I, therefore, designed interview questions two, five, six,
and seven to elicit the opinions of FBMs, PCEOs and FCEOs about the activities of RTO
boards in Nigeria and how they perceive their structures and performance. The responses
obtained answered t RQ1. Four natural codes emerged from the responses of participants
and these provided answers to RQ1. The codes that emerged include the absence of
evaluation structures for boards, political interference, board composition, board
performance, operational hindrances, and executive compensation.
Absence of evaluation structures for boards. CG assists policymakers in
guaranteeing accountability by focusing on organizational goals and objectives so that
conflicts of interest could be reduced amongst the principals and agents and organizations
could be made to be more accountable to shareholders and stakeholders (Keasey &
Wright, 1993; Keay & Loughrey, 2015). Following the global financial crisis of 2002,
which resulted in numerous collapse of corporate companies, boards are being constantly
monitored and most governments make it a priority to make them more accountable by
insisting on the entrenchment of CG systems (Keay & Loughrey, 2015). According to
Herman (2010), when boards are accountable, abuse of office is prevented, optimal
performance is encouraged in organizations, and the organizations are healthy and
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efficient.
In spite of the critical importance placed on CG and accountability (Keay &
Loughrey, 2015; Moore, 2015); the majority of the participants in this study found the
public boards in Nigeria to be lacking in accountability and ethical practices, and
engaging in practices which promote agency issues. According to the agency theory,
managers have their personal interests, which are often separate from the objectives of
the organizations, and the pursuit of these often result in agency issues. Participants
observed these incidences in the governance structure of Nigerian public RTOs.
According to FCEO1, political appointees on boards come there to make money for
themselves and CEOs find it difficult to keep them in check. FBM1 supported this claim
by citing an example of how politicians on the board he served were always more
inclined to push for constituency projects rather than pursuit of the organization’s
mandate. According to FBM 1, CEOs who tried to resist such requests often suffered
backlash from the politicians. PCEO1 remarked that the pursuit of personal interests was
not limited to politicians alone but some professionals on the board sometimes acted
unethically.
Most of these issues of self-interests were traced to a lack of proper evaluation
procedures. According to FCEO 2, boards do not seem to be accountable to anyone.
FCEO 7 alluded to the fact that there did not seem to be any code of governance for
public boards and that this seemed to suggest that the Nigerian government did not expect
any serious impact from the boards. PCEO 3 corroborated this assertion by indicating that
the activities of public boards were never monitored and as such, they could do whatever
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they liked. FBM 4 also confirmed that there was no monitoring system for boards. FBM
5 stated that though boards monitored CEOs perfectly, their activities were not
monitored.
According to Koenig-Archibugi (2004), boards’ powers are derived from
shareholders and the boards should be held accountable for how they deploy these
powers. Accountability in CG is a requirement for accessing grants (Keay & Loughrey,
2015). Some participants also observed that some of the RTO boards do not really have
terms of reference or centralized governance codes and as such, they give personal
interpretation to their roles. FCEO 4 said that “their deliverables are also not clearly spelt
out and there are too many extant laws that public boards must adhere to.” FCEO 5,
added that though there ought to be a regulatory body for public boards, nothing as such
existed in Nigeria. FCEO 7 mentioned that board members often relied on the
information obtained during their induction to guide them during their tenure. FBM 5
confirmed that the board he served on relied on the manuals developed by the
organization, and their interactions with the CEOs, to form governance codes for their
activities.
Political interference. According to the Cadbury report, the best practices of CG
are hinged on the principles of openness, integrity, and accountability (Cadbury, 1992).
This suggests a measure of independence and flexibility for public boards. Beqiraj and
Bregasi (2015) said that board activities were characterized by nonspecific governance
structures and constant state interference. Boards that were not composed of professionals
are often susceptible to political interference and this affects their impact in their
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organizations. While not suggesting that boards should be left to themselves without
supervision such that they would be encouraged to pursue self-interests instead of
shareholders’ interests, Keay and Loughrey (2015) suggested that the power and
discretion given to boards should be balanced so that they are liable to account for the
way they exercise the authority given them. This would encourage accountability,
corporate stability, and innovation as well as give them some form of leverage and
flexibility to perform their duties.
At the core of this study’s participants’ concerns were their observations of the
high degree of political interference in board activities and decisions, which, to them,
made the role of boards unclear and unstable. This often resulted in conflicts of interest
and setting aside of the principles of good governance. FCEO 5 stated that public boards
in Nigeria are under ‘political control’ because their activities are being determined by
the people in government with a political agenda. According to FCEO 2, boards were
appointed for his organization despite the fact that the organization’s establishment was
not enabled by any act of government. FCEO 2 further commented that this proved his
observation that board appointments were just “job for the boys”. PCEO 4 added that
boards were not intended as serious appointments but compensations for political allies.
This, according to FCEO 3, accounted for the reason public board activities are not being
monitored in Nigeria. FBM 5 also decried the fact that the board system was not a
performance-based system.
Board composition. Effective CG in public organizations is often determined by
the composition of the boards of these organizations (Beqiraj & Bregasi, 2015). Beqiraj
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and Bregasi (2015) said that where political interference is high, the incidences of having
inexperienced and unqualified members of political groups on the boards would be high
and this would weaken CG in public organizations. Some participants in this study
queried the contributions of individuals on the boards, suggesting that the type of people
offered appointments on RTO boards in the past had hindered their performance and
effectiveness.
According to FCEO 5 and PCEO 1, boards that are not well composed will be
unethical and unappreciative of the needs of the organization. FBM 1 confirmed that
public RTO boards that were chaired by politicians found it difficult to exert control over
other members while FBM 3 observed that such boards were mostly ignorant of the
operations of their organizations and needed to be enlightened about technical proposals.
Often, according to FCEO 1, such situations increased agency costs. FBM 3 remarked
from his experience that politicians had no business being on RTO boards because they
often did not understand the direction the organizations should face and they were thus
bound to make many mistakes. Although public boards are often made up of
representatives from various constituencies of the ruling parties (Jhunjhunwala, 2012;
Leisner, 2005), Aina (2013) suggested that a good board must embrace diversity in its
composition. If such is done, Aina believed that the right skills, experience, and
connections, which are needed to perform, would be available in the right mix and the
pressures from those who appointed them would be minimized.
Board performance. Public boards are expected to apply good CG in achieving
organizational objectives (Aina, 2013). According to the SEC Code (SEC, 2016), public

124
boards in Nigeria are also responsible for the performance of their organizations and
monitoring of the management of the organizations. To effectively play these roles,
boards are supposed to fully understand their oversight responsibilities and adhere strictly
to best governance practices.
Public boards in Nigeria gained prominence with the transition into democratic
governance in the country in 1999 (Adegbite, 2015). For 20 years, therefore, Nigeria has
been experimenting with boards in its public organizations. According to Okiro et al.
(2015), performance indicators are necessary to determine performance and they must
meet certain criteria such as measurability, relevance, and contributions to the
organization. Some of the participants were able to measure the contributions of RTO
boards in their organizations. PCEO 3 mentioned that the board of his organization
attracted more funding for his organization and this empowered the organization to do
more research and make more impact. FBM 2 added that the intervention of boards
facilitated infrastructural development in RTOs.
Critical assessments of RTO boards performance were also obtained. FCEO 6
said that boards were more interested in the financial performance of their organizations
than they were in their achievement of set goals and mandates. This observation,
according to FCEO 6, was further strengthened by the fact that measurement of
organizational impact on the citizenry was not covered by the Nigerian Companies Act
(CAMA). This seemed to him like government was not really committed to meeting her
citizens’ needs. The assessment of FCEO2 was also that boards had repeatedly failed to
properly conduct oversight functions on RTOs. FCEO 2 specifically observed that his
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performance was only assessed once in the almost 9 years he spent as a CEO. FCEO 6
also said that the structure of public RTO boards in Nigeria did not encourage
effectiveness. However, FBM 4 observed that the impact of public boards was not being
felt because the government, which set them up, did not encourage their growth and
survival. According to FBM 4, the government of Nigeria did not fund the RTOs or
patronize their products and this led FCEO 7 to conclude that these public boards were
not designed to have any significant impact.
Operational hindrances. The most identified hindrance in this study was
inadequate funding. PCEO 3 observed that operational matters hindered the performance
of the board appointed for his organization. FBM 1 corroborated this and stated that
despite the budgetary allocations to RTOs, the funds are rarely released and in the
required amount. Consequently, FBM 1 observed that this situation often stalled
innovation and board members could not hold CEOs responsible in such instances. The
funding challenge also hindered remuneration for board members, servicing of board
meetings, accommodating members and paying transportation costs (FBM 3). According
to FCEO 1, an outstanding board could influence the performance of their organizations
but their impact could also be hindered by unfavorable working conditions and lack of
adequate funds to deliver expected results. FBM 1 shared the same opinion, and also
noted that public boards did not administer the funds that were allocated to their
organizations. FBM 1 further clarified the operational bottlenecks faced by public RTO
boards. According to him, public boards could not take certain risks to assist their
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organizations, like their counterparts in the private sector, without obtaining approval
from authorities. Most often, FBM 1 observed, these approvals may be delayed or denied.
The federal government funds R&D activities in the FMST through yearly
budgetary allocations to the public institutions and because these funds have not been
regular and sufficient, most Nigerian RTOs are limited in their activities (Onuoha, 2012).
According to Porter (2009), the limited funding of the FMST reflects the lack of priority
placed by government on R&D and the perceived lack of importance of RTOs to national
development. This study’s participants expressed their concerns about the inadequate
funding of the RTOs. Other codes generated included board size, bureaucracy, and
executive compensation.
Board size. According to PCEO 1, large boards are problematic and they increase
agency issues. He recommended an average size of seven to nine members in a public
RTO board. FBM 1 commented that over-sized boards were often out of control while
PCEO 3 argued that large boards were usually too expensive to maintain in terms of
remuneration, coverage of meetings, and gathering of board members from different parts
of the country.
Bureaucracy. According to PCEO 4, board impact is hindered by bureaucracy
which elongates the process of decision making and implementation. Similarly, FMB 1
observed that public sector rules made it impossible for public boards to act fast and take
some urgent decisions because the laws did not permit them to operate beyond what it
allowed. FCEO 4 believed that this situation slowed down board activities. This led FBM
4 to conclude that placing public RTOs, and their boards, under the supervision of federal

127
ministries limited their impact because the RTOs had specialized operations and would
not benefit from an omnibus administrative structure.
Some participants also observed that the type of board leadership in place could
constitute a hindrance to board performance. For example, FBM 3 mentioned that the
Chairman of his board was the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that this
posed some very fundamental challenges. For instance, FBM 4 noted that the President
hardly had time to chair board meetings and the supervising ministries did not really
understand the needs of the RTOs. FBM 4 further mentioned that the President’s
performance could also not be monitored and thus, the boards he chaired were not really
effective especially since FCEO 1 confirmed that the Vice Chairman of his board could
not take decisions without recourse to the president.
Not only are board chair roles very critical to success, leadership gaps could result
in lackluster performance of RTO boards in Nigeria. Some other boards devised
administrative solutions to the problems of bureaucracy and leadership which hinders
board performance. For instance, FBM 3 noted that the board which he served on would
break out into committees to increase response time and also reduce cost of calling for
board meetings too frequently. FBM 2 confirmed that the strategy devised by his board
then, in a similar situation, was to reach a consensus informally, when a matter was
urgent, and then the Vice Chairman would present this to the President for ratification.
Some other participants however believed that the personal abilities of board
members could limit board impact. According to FCEO 2, his board was composed of
persons without any tangible record of achievements and fields of specialization. This
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limitation, according to FCEO 2, limited the profiling and technical engagement of the
board members that were assigned to his organization. FCEO 3 however asserted that the
dynamism or weaknesses of the CEOs determined the performance of board members.
FBM 4 thus advised on the selection of professionals who would be technically at par
with the CEO.
Lack of governance structures. Major Nigerian public corporations have
suffered significant setbacks, which resulted in the collapse of their structures or
organizations as a consequence of agency issues and poor governance structures
(Ogujiuba & Obiechina, 2011). As a consequence of this, the mandate for good
governance is increasing in importance as the media, the public, local and state
governments, the business community, consumers, and the federal government are
closely scrutinizing boards across the country. The obvious place to focus on would
obviously be the governance structures in place because without this, it would be difficult
to determine how boards have fared.
The participants in this study complained about structural defects in the
governance of public RTOs in Nigeria. FBM 1 and FCEO 5 claimed ignorance of the
existence of a code of governance for public boards while PCEO 3 confirmed that though
there were some service codes, no specific codes guided public board operations in
Nigeria. FCEO 6 however observed that the Acts of every RTO encapsulated the
expected role of their boards although he also suggested that a separate Act should be
enacted for public board activities. FCEO 7 added that most public RTO boards
developed their own governance procedures. This remark was corroborated by PCEO 4
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who observed that though not codified, the board he worked with was guided by some
principles such as tenure, and functions, in line with the Act establishing the organization.
FBM 3 observed that the governance practices in his organization had become so
entrenched in the system that it had taken care of potential administrative bottlenecks.
FCEO 4 therefore advised RTO boards to search for these codes, work with them, and
also learn to govern from experience. Public boards must therefore clearly understand
and embrace their vital governance responsibilities in order to avoid the type of highprofile governance failures that have occurred in some R&D organizations.
Executive compensation. Aduda and Musyoka (2011) said that the relationship
between executive compensation and board performance was negative because the
influence of principals reduced as the banks’ sizes increased. He arrived at this
conclusion after examining the impact of executive compensation on the effectiveness of
Kenyan banks between 2004 and 2008. This suggests that executive compensation has
little or no effect on their performance. Eluyela et al. (2018) discovered a positive
relationship between the frequent meetings of boards and improved performance of
organizations because there was improved communication between boards and
management and this eliminated agency issues. Creed et al. (2011) argued that
institutional and cultural issues can influence the practice of good CG in developing
countries.
The immature state of the Nigerian public sector has been attributed to an obvious
absence of governance standards and this has promoted corruption in most public
organizations (Adegbite et al. (2012), weakened governance institutions, thereby
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resulting in corporate failures (Kaufmann et al., 2008 in Adegbite, 2015). Participants in
this study believe that executive compensation is necessary in the governance of Nigerian
RTOs, to prevent failure. According to FBM 5, there are divergent views about serving
on public boards. While government viewed appointment on boards as public service,
most board members believed it was a means of being enriched and once the needs of
board members were not met, their commitment to service would wane or they would
begin to seek satisfaction through unethical means. FBM 1, FBM 3, and FCEO 6 also
implied that board members viewed their appointments as a means to an end and did not
really offer value to their organizations. Another participant, FCEO 5 observed that
public board remuneration was very poor and the costs which government was trying to
cur would on the long run be unnoticeable because of rise in agency costs. FBM 5 then
cautioned that poor remuneration could influence the effectiveness of public RTO boards.
Another consequence of poor public board remuneration, according to FBM 5, was that
sometimes, CEO evaluation was seldomly objective because the boards were oftentimes
receiving unapproved favors from such CEOs.
FBM 1 corroborated the point:
Sometimes also, there have been situations where some board members
mount pressures on the CEO on issues of employment of staff and even
award of contracts, and where the CEO tries to resist, it causes some kind
of conflicts between the CEOs and some board members.
FCEO 2 also complained:
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For all I know, these people are talking about appointments they have to
make, how much money they want to be receiving per sitting, contracts to
be awarded, and never talk about anything having to do with mandate of
the Institute. Though they didn’t have powers to fix their remuneration,
they want to do it anyway and they came up with a fake memo. I could not
authenticate the document and so didn’t pay what they were requesting
because we even didn’t have the money to pay.
The implication, therefore, is that if the remuneration of board members were not
met, this could affect their performance and prompt them to take bad risks (Cybinski &
Windsor, 2013). Based on the responses, the challenges that hinder the effectiveness of
public RTO boards are not imaginary and they could hinder their impact in RTO
organizations. FBM 1 thus advised that the remuneration of public boards should be more
attractive so that its members would not be tempted to continually seek unorthodox and
unethical means of extracting money out of the system.
Thematic Category 4: Improving Board Performance
Governance is a means of controlling organizational output, and good governance
is the strategy governments use to ensure the stability and profitability of their businesses
(Bardach, 2012; Cooper & Edgett, 2012). Boards are assumed to be determinants of good
governance in organizations (Tricker, 2015; Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Carney,
2012). Many owners thus favor their use as they are considered a vital part of the good
governance strategy which is needed to overcome agency issues. According to Okiro
(2015), in order for governments to obtain the best results from organizations, boards
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processes and governance practices must be improved. This prompted me to design
interview questions 5, 7, and 8 to answer RQ3 and also enable respondents offer
suggestions on how public RTO boards in Nigeria could be more effective.
This thematic category answered RQ3. All the participants believed that Nigerian
RTO boards could perform better than they presently did. The number of codes derived
from this category was seven, and they included adherence to governance standards,
goal-orientation, monitoring and evaluation, funding, training, composition, autonomy,
and improved remuneration.
Adherence to governance standards. PCEO 2 noted that since the world had
now become linked through technology, public RTO boards must adhere to global
governance standards in order to remain relevant. PCEO 2 however acknowledged that
cultural differences could necessitate the modification of global governance best practices
to suit Nigeria’s culture. In order to be more efficient and accountable, FBM 5 suggested
a unified governance code for public boards with room for adjustment to suit individual
sectors. FCEO 4 however suggested that training would solve governance problems in
public RTOs in Nigeria.
The principle of accountability is one of the globally-acceptable governance
standards (Bovens, Schillemans & Goodin, 2014; Keay, 2015; OECD, 2001). FBM 1
therefore suggested that the Nigerian government could make boards accountable by
creating a feedback structure which managements could fall back on to report
intimidation or infringements by board members without backlash. This step, according

133
to FBM 1, would help keep public boards on track instead of dissolving the boards
whenever problems arose.
Goal orientation. According to Bernstein et al. (2016), the governance
perceptions of CEOs and boards (chairs) must overlap with that of the organization to
achieve effectiveness. FCEO 5 said that public RTO boards ought to adequately monitor
that their organizations are developing demand-driven products aimed at positively
influencing their communities. PCEO 1 suggested that boards should conduct periodic
needs assessment for the society and focus on what the society needed rather than what
the boards thinks they need. The same opinion was echoed by PCEO 2 who observed that
boards should drive organizations towards the eradication of national challenges instead
of trying to solve every problem in the society. In order to achieve this, PCEO 3
suggested that board members should have a change in their orientation and see their time
on the boards as opportunities to serve their country. FCEO 3 recommended that public
boards be indoctrinated into this mindset right from the time of their inauguration and
induction. These perceptions indicate that good governance is achieved when board
members pay due diligence to their processes and activities.
Monitoring and evaluation. Since boards are the tools of good governance, and
since good governance is the desired state at all levels of public business management
systems, efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness of boards. Evaluation of
boards is a critical public policy tool aimed at improving the performance of boards
(Nordberg & Booth, 2017). This is ultimately geared towards overall improvement in the
provision of government services. It would also encourage board accountability and
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eliminate incidences of preventable failures (Bain & Band, 2017; Nordberg & Booth,
2017).
Boards in the Nigerian public sector do not undergo vigorous evaluation
(Adegbite, 2015). The opinion of some of the respondents also corroborated the fact that
boards in Nigerian RTOs had not been properly monitored. Participants also averred that
evaluation of their activities and practices was almost non-existent. For instance, FCEO 2
said that the National Assembly had failed in its oversight duties over public RTOs and
their boards in Nigeria thus encouraging complacency. FCEO 7 also remarked that the
interest being paid by government to board activities should be increased as this would
challenge public boards to pay more attention to their assignments. FBM 1 thus suggested
a form of standardized evaluation system to improve board impact. According to FBM 1,
reinforcement of board supervision will restore ethical practices and help organizational
growth. PCEO 3 suggested that board members should be made to fill APER like other
public employees and this should be used to determine their re-appointment. PCEO 3
remarked that boards would be more effective if they understood that they would be
evaluated. FCEO 2 recommended that standardized measurement and evaluation
processes should be activated for public RTO boards and it should be continuous in order
to have the desired impact.
According to Bain and Band (2017), boards performance evaluation standards
should be measurable, achievable, and regular. FCEO 4 said that if boards were given
targets for the period they were expected to serve, their impact would be easy to measure.
He also suggested that public RTO boards should submit annual reports on their activities
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and they should be peer-reviewed to evaluate impact made. According to FCEO 4, the
peer review will teach other boards what they did not know thereby resulting in the
development of governance best practices in public RTOs in Nigeria.
Board evaluations are said to be more thorough when they are conducted using
external and professional teams because their feedback would be objective (Bain & Band,
2017). This recommendation was echoed by FCEO 5 who suggested that since there was
no monitoring structure in place for public RTOs in Nigeria, boards should be structured
to report to an external body of oversight which could hold the boards to account for the
delivery of the public service for which they were set up.
Funding. PCEO 3 confirmed that inadequate funding incapacitated the board
assigned to his organization. FBM 1 corroborated the impact of dearth of funding on the
performance of boards and its effect on the organization. According to him, lack of funds
will stall activities in the organization and encourage conflicts between the CEOs and
their boards. FCEO 4 also observed that organizations fared better when they could bring
boards together but lack of sufficient funds made that impossible. FCEO 2 however
suggested that beyond the call for proper funding, the use to which the released funds are
put and their impact should be monitored also.
Training. According to Bain and Band (2017), boards are more likely to be more
effective when they have formal training to strengthen CG practices. Some of the
respondents agreed that board members needed the training in order to be equipped with
the knowledge required to develop appropriate policies and processes. FBM 1 confirmed
that he had received some form of training before taking up his position as a board
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member. He then recommended that such trainings should be systematic; as soon as the
boards are appointed, midway in their appointments, jointly, or together with the
management of the organizations.
PCEO 3 advised that induction training could be arranged for board members
after their inauguration so that these codes of governance and their roles would be well
spelt out to them. FCEO 2 also noted that the roles of boards should be well spelt out to
them during their inauguration. FCEO 7 suggested that the training could be
performance-related training to raise the competence of public boards and teach them
what they needed to know in order to effectively deploy their knowledge and powers.
Composition. According to FCEO 2, boards must be well composed in order for
them to record any meaningful impact. This position was supported by PCEO 1 who said
that public boards should be small and professional. PCEO 3 pointed out that large
boards consume much funds and hardly achieved anything. FBM 1 therefore pointed out
that the selection process for public RTO boards in Nigeria ought to be stricter and based
on merit rather than on political patronage. FBM 3 also cautioned on appointing the
wrong people into public RTO boards as it could hinder the effectiveness of their
organizations. FBM 4 suggested that institutional heads, such as presidents of
professional bodies, would offer the best value if appointed on boards.
FBM 1, FBM 5, and FCEO 4 suggested the ideal composition of RTO boards.
While FBM 1 and PCEO 1 suggested that public RTO boards be limited to 10 members
and should comprise of retired professionals who had either been in government or in the
industries, FBM 5 recommended that politicians should not exceed 20% of the board
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size. FCEO 4 also recommended that professionals from the private sector could be
invited to serve on public RTO boards because of their wealth of experience.
Autonomy. According to FBM 3, the lack of full autonomy for public RTOs in
Nigeria made their governance behavior unpredictable and unstable thus hindering their
performance. PCEO 1 confirmed that public RTO boards did not have sufficient powers
to carry out their assignments. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) however, when
boards are too independent, it could reduce the performance of the organization.
Improved remuneration. Adegbite (2015) said that Nigeria did not have a wellestablished compensation culture for executives. According to Adegbite, this could
hinder good governance practices because the poor remuneration could prompt
executives to engage in sharp practices. Participants commented on the need for
improved remuneration for public RTO boards in order to improve their performance.
FBM 5 mentioned that improved remuneration for public RTO boards would also reduce
conflicts in the work environment. Adegbite (2015) recommended that to achieve good
governance in Nigerian public organizations, executives should be well compensated
according to their performance. This reward system should be well defined enough to
clarify what every board member should expect for their services.
Thematic Category 5: Hindrances of Public RTO Effectiveness
Berle and Means (1991) revealed that public enterprises offer the most plausible
avenue to arrange for and distribute goods and services for the populace. According to
FCEO 1, “RTOs are organizations of government created specifically for economic and
developmental purposes”. They are different from the universities because they are
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involved in research for the transformation of the way of life and infrastructural
development of the country. PCEO 3 also observed that RTOs were very important to
governments because they delivered governments’ promises of social and physical
infrastructure to the people. FBM 5 added that the research of Nigerian RTOs were of
national importance because they represented government’s response mechanism to the
failures of the nation in all spheres of life.
Public RTO boards in Nigeria were appointed to increase the efficiency and
performance of the organizations. However, responses from the participants in this study
indicated that these RTOs were grappling with certain challenges which may be affecting
their performance. Some of the identified challenges were discovered to be sometimes
beyond the scope or intervention of boards. I designed RQ1 and RQ2 to elicit information
on the challenges faced by RTOs, apart those that could be ascribed to boards’ activities.
Four codes were generated from this category and they included: Lack of State Support
for R&D, Weak Operational Framework, Inadequate Infrastructural Facilities, and
Inadequate Funding.
The effectiveness of RTOs is a key ingredient for sustainable national growth in
developed economies (Giannopoulou, 2016). These advanced economies have placed a
high premium upon supporting R&D activities in order to stimulate innovations and
infrastructural development (Giannopoulou, 2016; Martínez-Vela, 2016). Some
participants, however, asserted that public RTOs in Nigeria did not enjoy such support
from their government. FBM 4 stated, for instance, that government did not properly fund
the RTOs neither did she patronize their products. FCEO6 mentioned that when the
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RTOs were eventually funded, they were given “envelopes”, arbitrarily calculated or
estimated budgets, without really considering what the organizations needed.
FCEO 5 and FCEO 6 added that the government was more particular about the
revenue generated by the RTOs and how they could execute projects for their
constituencies than they were about the impact of the RTOs on the society. These selfinterests, according to FCEO 5, caused leaders in government to fund some organizations
more than others yet these organizations were not meeting the needs they were set up for.
PCEO 4 also observed that the Nigerian government sometimes funded research but
refused to acknowledge or advertise the products resulting from the research but rather
preferred to import these products. The consequence of this posture by the government of
Nigeria, according to PCEO 4, was the killing of innovation and development.
This lack of state support was also responsible for government’s lack of interest in
monitoring the performance of CEOs and their impact, as long as budget performance
was met. FCEO 7 observed that CEOs were rarely formally evaluated on their
performance or achievements until the end of their tenure, and only if they were being
considered for reappointments, or if there was a need for an inquiry. FCEO 6 recalled that
his organization’s technical performance was only assessed twice while he was a CEO.
FCEO 6 therefore hinted that R&D was not really a priority for the Nigerian government
based on government’s posture towards R&D outcomes.
Weak operational framework. In the opinion of FCEO 3, public RTOs in
Nigeria lacked a strong operational framework. According to FCEO 4, many CEOs
behaved as they deemed fit, especially since no one was really asking them questions.
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The absence of a strong operational framework in Nigerian RTOs is possibly responsible
for the lack of continuity of projects and processes, as observed by some participants.
FCEO 7 stated that, “We have seen instances where all the achievements made during a
certain tenure will be stalled because the present leader is more interested in agriculture
and thus, we have a lot of abandoned projects and massive wastage of funds.” FCEO 3
confirmed the lack of continuity in governance in Nigeria. He lamented the loss of a
promising international partnership for his organization because of the issue of
personalization of projects which made all his efforts to go to waste as soon as he left the
seat.
Bureaucracy was also identified as a major weakening force against the successful
implementation of R& D activities in Nigeria. PCEO 1, FBM 3, and FBM 4 condemned
the fact that government continues to foist the public service mentality on public RTOs.
This, in the opinion of participants, was responsible for the non-performance and slow
response of these organizations.
Inadequate infrastructural facilities. Inadequate and obsolete infrastructure in
Nigeria has escalated the cost of the transaction of businesses thereby weakening the
competitiveness of the nation’s economy. According to Akintoye et al. (2015), the
economic efficiency of any nation is boosted by the presence of some basic
infrastructural facilities, which enhances their access and dominance in local, regional
and foreign markets. Some of the participants however observed that RTOs in Nigeria
were under-utilized and under-producing because of the myriad of infrastructural
problems hindering research activities in the country. According to FBM 2,
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infrastructural development for RTOs was costly to attain, but they were needed for the
development and promotion of basic infrastructures, such as energy, water, good road
network and technical and financial support services to industries and wider communities
of users. FCEO 5 also observed that the cost of acquiring these infrastructural facilities
were responsible for their limited number in Nigerian RTOs. This, according to FCEO 5,
was one of the performance-related challenges being faced by public RTOs in Nigeria.
Inadequate funding. FCEO 5 revealed that most public RTOs in Nigeria were
underfunded and this situation hindered innovation, research, and developmental
activities. According to PCEO 3, the release of funds to many public RTOs was
haphazard and biased because the releases were dependent upon the whims and interests
of the persons at the helms of affairs. According to FBM 2 noted that funding of public
RTOs was largely dependent upon the decisions of relevant committees at the National
Assembly and that most often, the approvals were unfavorable. FBM 3 added that past
trends had revealed that government did not really understand the need to fund public
RTOs and they thus allocated what was deemed fit for their operations. According to
FBM 3, this was the major challenge confronting public RTOs in Nigeria.
Thematic Category 6: Improving RTO Effectiveness
RTOs are important to national development and this is the reason European
nations and regions invest much in their development and sustenance (Giannopoulou,
2016). From the earlier identified codes, we understood that though RTOs were very
important to nations, they were not well developed in Nigeria. The global environment
where RTOs operate today is rapidly changing and competitive, and to ensure that these
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organizations effectively play their assigned role, careful thought must be given to
positioning them well. Without this, boards may be unable to achieve much result. Four
codes were generated from the responses of participants to interview question 7, which
helped to explain their opinions on how public RTOs in Nigeria could be improved. The
codes included Funding, Structural Re-alignment of RTOs, Enabling Environment,
Periodic Monitoring and Evaluation, Strategic Plan and Government Patronage,
Management of RTOs, and Stakeholder Engagement.
Funding. FCEO 5 advised that public RTOs should be well funded in order to
increase their efficiency and impact. According to PCEO 3, CEOs were well-equipped
with sufficient knowledge and competences to achieve their organizations’ goals.
Government must however demonstrate its sincerity to support the efforts of these CEOs
by providing all that public RTOs required and also removing all bureaucratic structures
that hindered public RTOs.
Structural realignment of RTOs. According to FCEO 1, the operations of RTOs
demands that they be treated different from other public organizations in the public
service. FCEO 1 also suggested the categorization of RTOs according to their functions.
FCEO 2 aligned with this suggestion and recommended that if public RTOs in Nigeria
were grouped according to their mandates, it would be easier to determine their impact.
FCEO 2 further suggested that the existing public RTOs in Nigeria could be grouped into
three categories: Institutes which provided consumer goods, feeder research Institutes,
and research regulatory/training Institutes.
Enabling environment. According to PCEO 3, the creation of an enabling
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operating environment would transform public RTOs in Nigeria. PCEO 4 expatiated on
the right environment for public RTOs in Nigeria. According to PCEO 4, these
organizations would thrive in an environment devoid of politicking scarcity of funds to
carry out research. FCEO 7 submitted that the budgets for RTOs should be different from
that of the typical Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) while PCEO 4 called
for a shortening of the bureaucracies that hindered RTO operations. FBM 1
recommended a review of the laws that established RTOs so that the challenges being
currently faced could be taken care of.
Periodic monitoring and evaluation. The opinion of FCEO 2 was that regular
monitoring and evaluation of RTOs would make them more accountable. FCEO 6
insisted that the monitoring plan should be extended to technical performance of these
organizations so that the funds being released annually would not be wasted.
Strategic plan and government patronage. PCEO 2 demanded that the federal
government should give challenges to MDAs and back these up with the resources
needed to deliver as expected. He further recommended the establishment of a
technology foresight programme that would encapsulate and codify the priorities and
needs of everyone in the society, for successive governments to pursue.
Management of RTOs. FBM 4 reiterated the importance of effective
management strategies for public RTOs. According to FBM 4, the effectiveness of public
RTOs could be determined by how outgoing the management of such organizations were.
Stakeholder engagement. FBM 4 recommended stakeholder engagement to
garner information and establish the collaborations that were needed to improve
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organizational outcomes. FBM 4 further identified the stakeholders to the RTO sector to
include other R&D institutes, relevant private sector industries, and tertiary institutions.
He recommended the need to create public awareness of the services and activities of the
RTOs through participation in fairs and exhibitions. and organize regular exhibitions and
trade fairs.
Summary of Findings
With the aid of data obtained from semi-structured interviews, the journal entries,
which were kept by me during the interviews, as well as public documents obtained from
the organizations sampled, I was able to enact the governance process in Nigerian RTOs
and the effect of RTO boards on the performance of public RTOs in Nigeria. The
interview questions were focused on the perception of FBMs, PCEOs, and FCEOs about
the relevance and performance of RTO boards in Nigeria. The questions were designed
to focus on: (a) the structure of RTOs in Nigeria, (b) the nature of governance of RTO
Boards in Nigeria, and (c) impact of boards on the effectiveness of RTOs. The data
obtained from the interviews reached saturation point and this simplified the process as
enough data was made available to enable the presentation of different views and
opinions about board impact and these ideas were grouped under six major themes,
namely: Working relationship with Public RTO Boards in Nigeria, Importance of Public
RTO Boards in Nigeria, Criticisms against Boards’ Performance, Improving Board
Performance, Hindrances of Public RTO Effectiveness, and Improving RTO
Effectiveness. The findings obtained from the answers provided by participants to the
research questions revealed an overarching overview of multiple opinions and
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perceptions about the phenomenon under inquiry. The many perspectives, obtained from
the rich data, highlighted the importance of good governance structures and enabling the
environment for boards and RTOs to achieve set goals.
Summary
The purpose of this research was to understand the impact of governance practices
of FBMs and CEOs on the effectiveness of public RTOs, leaning upon the perceptions of
interviewed participants who had experience governance of public RTOs. The interview
questions were developed along with the conceptual framework of the agency theory.
The insights provided by participants revealed the state of governance practices in
Nigerian public RTOs. The findings of the research questions for this study are presented:
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D
sector?
I designed interview questions 1, 2, 5, and 6 to answer this research question. Two
main themes were constructed from the participants’ responses namely working
relationships and criticisms against board performance. Participants largely
acknowledged that the effectiveness of boards would be largely dependent upon the
cordiality between them and CEOs. Secondly, participants observed that bureaucracy,
political intrusions, and unclear governance structures and systems hinder board
performance and these essentially place effective governance beyond the reach of RTO
boards. Specifically, participants established that conflicts of interest and systemic
failures, which have economic and political causes, have exacerbated governance of
public RTOs in Nigeria.
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RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?
I designed interview questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to answer this research question.
The data obtained from participants revealed their concerns about what the role of public
RTO boards should be and what they are in reality. Of great concern were (a) the
lopsided composition of RTO boards (b) the apparent lack of interest of government on
board outcomes, and (c) inadequate funding; all of which, the data suggests, have greatly
and negatively affected the impact of governing boards on Nigerian public RTOs.
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these
organizations?
I designed interview questions 1, 2, 3, and 8 to answer this research question.
From the data, participants acknowledged that when deliberate actions that can improve
RTO performance, such as (a) effective board selection and engagement (b)
categorization and ranking of RTOs (c) adequate funding; and (d) unified governance
codes; are pursued, RTO effectiveness would be achieved and become sustainable.
Secondly, participants believed that RTO performance could be improved if CEOs and
boards were sufficiently monitored and evaluated.
In this chapter, I described the interview process, demographics of the participants
involved in the study, how they were selected, and my role in the process. This chapter
also described the data analysis process and how codes and patterns emerged. I discussed
how I used codes and patterns which emerged from the data to generate themes that were
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used to answer the research questions. I presented the evidence of research rigor to
guarantee the trustworthiness of this study’s results and a summary of the findings. In
Chapter 5, I discussed the research results, limitations of the study, recommendations that
arise from the findings, as well as implications for social change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
This study was conducted with the purpose of establishing the impact of good CG
on RTOs in Nigeria. This study also sought to discover suitable governance codes and
structures for public RTOs in Nigeria. Additionally, the study considered the ancillary
impact of RTO structures on their performance and attainment of competitive edge in the
economy. According to Díaz and Garrigós (2017), growth and economic advantage can
be obtained by adhering to international best practices in CG.
The study was conducted using the qualitative interpretive case study approach
while the qualitative approach informed the interview procedure. The qualitative method
of inquiry enables researchers to gain deep insight into the human experience (Erlingsson
& Brysiewicz, 2017). Data for this study were obtained from interviews, government
records, and my journal notes. Participants were made up of former and present MDs and
FBMs of these public RTOs. Participants were purposively selected from different
research organs of the FMST to access their diverse experiences. The documents used for
this study included annual reports of three RTOs and other secondary documents such as
relevant web pages of organizations. This study adds to the body of knowledge regarding
the governance of public RTOs, with special emphasis on Nigeria. In this chapter, I
discuss the research findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications for
social change, and conclusion.
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Interpretation of Findings
This study was focused on how to make public RTO boards in Nigeria more
effective. Effective boards will produce effective organizations which will make goods
and services available and accessible to citizens in the country. The findings were
interpreted using data obtained from the interviews. Additional information was obtained
from the mandates of these RTOs, as specified in the enabling laws that established the
organizations.
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ1
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D
sector?
Findings from the data gathered in this study revealed that governance in public
RTOs in Nigeria was uncoordinated, lacked consistent patterns, and was decentralized in
most organizations. It is thus safe to conclude that governance in public RTOs in Nigeria
does not have a particular structure. According to Fudin and Rahayu (2019), CG is
effective in balancing the interests of stakeholders in a corporation because it provides
the platform for effective utilization of resources in the organization thereby promoting
good outcomes. Any developing country which desires to attract foreign investments and
achieve global relevance must create good governance structures (Robertson et al. 2013).
Such developing countries also need to promote policies and practices that would
enhance their global acceptance as competitive economies. This acceptance will help the
countries to grow their economy. This understanding of the strategic importance of R&D
to economic development and national growth, coupled with the acceptance of the need

150
to practice good CG, prompted the Nigerian government to establish the NCST in 1970.
The NCST was specifically established to promote S&T and coordinate basic and applied
research in the country. The NCST was further decentralized into manageable units with
the establishment of the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the Industrial
Research Council (IRC) in 1971 and between 1972 and 1973, the Medical Research
Council and Natural Science Research Council. The NCST was later changed to the
National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) in 1977 and given a
specific mandate to initiate S&T policies and promote its development. However, in
1980, the NSTDA transformed into the FMST and was rebranded in 1993 to promote
science, research, and technology and develop policies to guide the activities of all RTOs
in Nigeria. Over the period between 1970 and 1993, the regulatory body was changed
three times and merged with other agencies twice before it finally achieved autonomous
status in 1993. This inconsistency in operations of the main ministry charged with the
coordination of RTOs in Nigeria may have partly contributed to perceptions of
participants that not enough attention is being paid to the activities of RTOs.
The FMST deployed boards to the public RTOs to supervise them, in line with
extant acts and decrees of the federal government such as Decree 33. Decree 33 approved
the establishment of the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure
(NASENI) and also a governing board to conduct the agency’s business. Participants,
however, identified some defects in the current governance structure of Nigeria’s public
RTOs, and these included lack of formal codes of conduct and standardized best practices
to regulate board activities, absence of constitutionally-entrenched evaluation processes
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for boards, weak oversight functions, undue political interference, inadequate funding to
support board activities and processes, and nonprofessional boards.
Lack of Formal and Distinct Governance Codes for RTOs
Public services are often inaccessible in developing countries (Hove, Ngwerume,
& Muchemwa, 2013) and this situation could be linked to poor governance behaviors
(Kwon & Kim, 2014). Participants in this study believed that a customized governance
system, which would be suitable for the RTO environment in Nigeria, is required for
RTOs for them to achieve desired results. Abor (2007) said that the performance and
growth of firms are relative to the existence of governance structures in those
organizations. According to PCEO1, you have to find out some things for yourself”. The
consequence of this type of situation is that board members in these RTOs act according
to their personal interpretation of what CG should be.
Responses to RQ1 helped to identify restrictions faced by public RTOs in Nigeria
as a result of bureaucracy in the public sector. Bureaucracy often slowed down
operations. These restrictions also limited boards while performing their supervisory
functions. The opinion of participants in this study was that since RTOs are parastatals of
government, they should not be treated like ministries, which have to operate under the
ambit of public service rules because this ranking hindered their effectiveness. The
consensus was that CG structures should be different in public RTOs because of the
nonstatic and unpredictable nature of their operations. According to Choi and Chandler
(2015), public organizations undertake specialized activities. The structure of RTOs is
different from other organizations in Nigeria. While other public organizations provide
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services to the public as a means of delivering public programs and generating income for
government, public RTOs undertake basic research which should result in products,
processes, and systems. Consequently, participants believe there should not be one
omnibus governance code for public organizations, but RTOs should have distinct
governance codes that would aid their operations. Findings from this study revealed that
such governance codes did not exist. The main regulatory act which governs corporate
behavior in Nigeria is the CAMA of 1990. This act was directly formulated from the
1948 UK Companies Act and covered public quoted firms and financial institutions
(Guobadia, 2000). It is therefore limited in its ability to address and moderate issues that
arise in the S&T sector. Other CG acts in Nigeria include the Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act of 1991, the Investment and Securities Act of 2007, and the Financial
Reporting Council of Nigeria Act of 2011. According to Okike (2007), these CG
structures, such as the CAC and the FRC are not empowered to monitor CG compliance.
Other available CG codes include the Code of Best Practices for Public Companies in
Nigeria, which was developed in 2003 by the SEC and was reviewed in 2011 to become
the Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria; the Code of
Corporate Governance for Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria which regulates CG of
banks, microfinance institutions and bureau de changes, Codes of Business Ethics and
Principles of Corporate Governance of 2019 for the Insurance Industry (NAICOM code),
as well as the PENCOM Code of 2008 for licensed pensions operators. Other attempts at
regulating governance in Nigeria include the establishment of the Center for Good
Governance, which was championed by the Institute of Directors in Nigeria to improve
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CG practices, and 2006 CG guidelines which were developed by the Central Bank of
Nigeria for best practices in the banking sector. According to Ogbechie and Adeleye
(2015), some other public agencies and ministries in Nigeria, like the Ministry of Trade
and Investment, have developed codes to regulate CG practice in the sector. These codes
were specifically designed to regulate public quoted companies. The public RTOs do not
have regulatory codes specifically tailored towards CG in the sector.
Lack of Standardized Best Practices to Regulate Board Activities
Findings from this study revealed that no specified guidelines were regulating the
activities of RTO boards in Nigeria. This was except one of the organizations sampled,
which personally drafted a pamphlet to guide board-CEO interactions within its agency.
As a consequence of this loophole, most RTOs pursued their mandates and operations as
they interpreted it, and this action polarized operations of RTOs within the FMST as
there were no standard best practices to which boards and CEOs could be pinned.
Additionally, participants identified the fact that though boards monitored RTOs, there
are no clear monitoring procedures in place for RTO boards in Nigeria. There are also no
laws to guide the functions of RTO boards and review their performance after the
expiration of their tenure. Findings revealed the belief of participants that the lack of
defined reporting lines and impact assessment have negatively affected board
effectiveness. Larker and Tayan (2015) said that clear and reliable reporting systems
were important to good governance in corporations. CG principles are relatively new to
Nigeria (Afolabi, 2015). There is, however, considerable pressure on developing
economies by entities such as the IMF and OECD, to embrace internationally-acceptable
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governance principles to attract the much-needed foreign investments for economic
growth (Adegbite et al., 2013).
The OECD governance codes state that compliance is required in six distinct
areas (OECD, 2015). It is expected that full compliance by developing nations will attract
much-needed foreign investments for their economic growth (Adegbite et al., 2013;
Okike, 2007). Larcker and Tayan (2011) said that having regulatory governance codes in
place does not translate to good governance, especially if leaders fail to adhere to them.
Larcker and Tayan attributed the collapse of Enron to unethical handling of the
organization’s accounts rather than the absence of governance codes. My findings in this
study reveal that although public RTOs in Nigeria do not have standardized best
governance practices, the problem of governance in Nigerian RTOs may not be the lack
of the best governance strategy but the lack of will to adhere to best governance
strategies. Despite the many codes of CG available for public and private companies in
Nigeria, many of the codes only exist in theory and not in practice (Ogbechie & Adeleye,
2015). The revised Code of Corporate Governance for Nigeria 2018, made a passing
provision on board self-evaluation but was silent on external evaluation (FGN, 2018,
p.20). This study found out that RTOs and boards were rarely evaluated. As the boards
completed their tenures, they were thanked for their services or re-appointed, depending
on their political connections. This structure was not designed for boards to have an
impact and this situation makes organizational impact challenging to measure (Ford &
Ihrke, 2016; Hassain & Abdo, 2016).
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The role of monitoring board performance rests on the legislative arm of
government in Nigeria (Arowolo, 2010). This function is, however, neglected. This
neglected role has encouraged agency issues in many of the organizations sampled. My
findings revealed that CEOs in Nigerian public RTOs desire a standardized board
monitoring process which would be continuous and measurable. According to Keehley,
Medlin, Longmire, and MacBride (1997) and Bardach (2012), good governance best
practices are achieved when the practice is effective over time and is measurable.
Although Olubukunola (2013) posited that governance structures would reduce
agency issues, Larcker and Tayan (2011) observed that having regulatory governance
codes in place does not translate to good governance, especially if leaders failed to adhere
to them. Larcker and Tayan (2011) further attributed the collapse of Enron to unethical
handling of the organization’s accounts rather than the absence of governance codes.
Findings from this study revealed the agitation of participants for regulatory bodies to
monitor boards to prevent corporate recklessness and lukewarm performance. This
finding corroborates Haxhi and Aguilera’s (2015) observation that although the SOX Act
of 2002 did not totally avoid failures of governance, it checked the excesses of corporate
leaders, through the imposition of penalties on unethical corporate leaders.
Political Interference
Findings from this research revealed that government policies are inconsistent and
unfavorable to RTOs in Nigeria. I discovered from participants’ responses that there is a
lack of continuity in government and this negatively affected governance and RTO
effectiveness. Findings from this study has revealed that the principals in Nigerian RTOs

156
sometimes pursued opportunistic paths by taking steps which would yield maximum
benefits to a few elites, rather than the common good or stakeholders’ satisfaction.
Participating CEOs confirmed that politicians are often more interested in their
constituency projects than the performance of these RTOs. FCEO 3 explained this trend
as “personalization of projects”. This study also confirmed that often, these self-interests
affect innovation and performance because RTOs are funded according to the interests of
the political class. Adegbite (2015) said that international governance best practices may
not be applicable to the African context.
Inadequate Funding to Support Board Activities and Processes
The annual reports of the public RTOs in Nigeria that were sampled in this study
revealed that they are funded from public resources to provide public services. This study
also discovered that there was a form of operational autonomy in the Nigerian public
RTOs. My findings in this study showed that despite their semi-autonomous positions,
these public RTOs lacked the financial strength to execute their projects and adapt to the
constantly-changing research environment. Because they were not governed as profitoriented businesses, they thus rely on the funds released from the federal government to
operate. This study also discovered that these funds were often grossly inadequate for the
operations of the RTOs and this affected their effectiveness and boards’ operations.
FBM5 said government should fund these organizations adequately in order to be able to
monitor and evaluate their activities. I discovered that some boards could not hold their
statutory meetings because the government did not make financial provisions for such
meetings and CEOs often covered the meeting expenses from their meager overhead
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grants. When boards eventually met, they were poorly remunerated to an extent that some
board members had to personally cater for their lodging expenses. As a consequence,
board meetings were irregular. This study therefore discovered that effective governance
of public RTO boards in Nigeria was greatly influenced by the ability of boards to meet
regularly and take necessary decisions that affect their organizations. This finding aligns
with the observations of Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) that board powers are
exercised through board meetings. Eluyela et al. (2018) discovered a positive link
between frequent board meetings and organizational effectiveness while Mishra and
Mohanty (2014) discovered that the frequency of board meetings, though positive, did
not significantly influence organizational performance. My findings aligned with the
positions of Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016), Jermias and Gani (2014), and Eluyela et
al. (2018) regarding the fact that the inability of boards to meet frequently posed a threat
to effective governance. This study discovered that the poor treatment of board members
eventually reduced the commitment of some of them. This may have been because many
board members in Nigerian public RTOs had viewed their appointments as a means to
affluence and their experiences were far below expectations. Basory, Gleason and
Kannan (2014) discovered that executive compensation affects board performance but the
study conducted by Alves et al. (2016) revealed a negative relationship between
executive compensation and governance effectiveness. I thus concluded that inadequate
funding of Nigerian public RTOs affects effective governance and organizational
performance.
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Nonprofessional Boards
Though the impact of board size on performance emerged in the responses of
participants, the findings from this research revealed that the size of the organization
determines the size of a public board. Ch`en and Al-Najjar (2012) corroborated this
finding in a study they conducted on Chinese firms between 1999 and 2003. They
discovered that board size is determined by governance and organizational structure.
Dabor et al. (2015) also discovered, through their study of the governance practice of 248
companies quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange, that board size does not have any
significant impact on organizational performance. The present study discovered that
irrespective of size, board quality is desirable for high performance in public RTOs. This
finding is consistent with the position of Aina (2013) that the diversity of boards should
add value to their organizations. Oxelheim et al. (2013) said that well-constituted boards
will be effective. I discovered from this study, however, that though the boards of some
RTOs in Nigeria, during the period covered by this study, were professional and diverse
in composition, many of them were not effective. PCEO4 said that “some go there to
sleep; they don’t even contribute meaningfully to the running of the board. So, the impact
of boards is not as it should be in RTOs. This finding suggests that factors, other than
diverse composition, may be responsible for public board effectiveness. My results
aligned with the conclusions of Aduda and Musyoka (2011) in a study which they
conducted on the impact of executive compensation on the effectiveness of Kenyan banks
between 2004 and 2008. They discovered that bank size determined the influence of
principals because as the banks became bigger, principals’ influence diminished. The
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diminishing influence of principals could often be ascribed to the skills and strong
personalities of some CEOs (Busenbark et al., 2016). Intelligent CEOs greatly influence
organizational effectiveness (Hermann & Nadkarni, 2014; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015).
My findings in this research revealed that some of the RTOs were practically positioned
by the CEOs to run by themselves either because there were no boards in place or they
were not professional enough to make a difference.
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ2
RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?
Agency board models are the most suitable governance model for RTOs (European
Commission, 2005). Public RTO boards ensure that their organizations are responsible to
the public when they adhere to governance best practices (Larker & Tayan, 2015). Since
CG is relatively new to Nigeria, it is the responsibility of the government to strengthen
the quality of good governance in Nigeria. Participants in this study identified some
importance of boards and their impact. Some of the identified board roles included policy
formulation and strategic planning, influence, monitoring and evaluation.
Policy Formulation and Strategic Planning
This study discovered that the appointment of RTO boards is necessary and
should be continued. Participants in this study confirmed that public RTO boards are
necessary to provide policy directions and develop strategic plans that would enable
RTOs focus on their mandates and increase their effectiveness. This position aligns
with the conclusion of Aina (2013) that effective boards can be identified by their
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strategic way of thinking and their deliberate actions. The agency theory also supports
that principals should take responsible actions that would result in long-term
organizational progress and survival. When governing boards act in the interest of
shareholders, the organization’s responsibility to the society and individuals would be
limited to that which is required for the long-term growth of the organization. Participants
in this study did not believe that boards should be involved in the day-to-day
administration of RTOs. Instances of board chairs who decidedly undertook such
responsibilities, and the hostilities which resulted from these, were cited by participants.
According to the Public Sector Commission (2014), boards should govern organizations
and not run them. Unless boards understand their roles, they will continue to exhibit poor
governance behaviors. The consequence of this is that agency issues will be unavoidable
in public RTOs and the effectiveness of these organizations will be compromised.
Influence
Participants in this study acknowledged the importance of boards because of their
capacity to influence favors for their organizations. Participants also revealed their
perception that the educational and professional diversity of boards can add value to
organizations. This position aligns with the conclusion of Oxelheim et al. (2013), who
discovered from their study of 346 non-financial listed Nordic firms in 2001-2008, that
boards that are composed of experts are generally effective. Ujunwa (2012) said that
board quality is determined by the knowledge which members possess and how they
employ these competencies in the discharge of their duties. Participants in this study
agreed that influential board chairs are very important to RTOs because their political
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weights and connections could attract funding to their organizations and encourage
patronage of their services. This finding corroborates the assertion of Withers and Fitza
(2017), who sampled 1,828 board chairs from 308 industries in the U.S. and discovered
that the influential board chair can contribute to organizational effectiveness. This study
also revealed that there is a separation of powers on RTOs boards and CEOs only
represent their organizations on the boards and this arrangement has been working for
RTOs. According to Krause and Semadeni (2013), the separation of the position of board
chairs from that of CEOs will encourage effectiveness. Mishra and Mohanty (2014)
examined the relationship between CG and financial performance in 141companies listed
in the Mumbai stock exchange in India and discovered that separation of the powers of
boards from the CEO will make CEOs more committed to outcomes since their priorities
will be solely on implementation of policies.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Boards are the representatives of their principals in organizations. According to
Verhoest et al. (2012), the role of the principals is performed by the parent ministries of
such organizations. The oversight functions of the board include monitoring of the
activities of their organizations and conducting periodic evaluations of their performances
(Conyon & He, 2016). Participants acknowledged that the presence of boards in RTOs
would push CEOs to pursue courses of action that will aid the delivery of the policies of
the Nigerian government. Participants also believed that boards act as middle-men
between organizations and the government and that this structure eliminates bureaucracy,
thereby enabling organizations to respond in real-time to issues. Findings from this study

162
revealed that although boards ought to monitor the use of deployed resources in
organizations to determine mandate achievement, this responsibility of boards sometimes
resulted in controlling behaviors that stifled initiatives and encouraged agency issues.
This study discovered that in instances where CEOs had governing boards, there was
mistrust and frosty relationships between the boards and their CEOs. The consequence
was that much time was spent on managing relationships than in pursuing organizational
outcomes. This study, therefore, discovered that if boards performed their oversight
functions properly without being controlling, the performance of organizations would be
ultimately enhanced. This finding agrees with the position of the stewardship theory
which affirms that managers can be trusted to act responsibly if they are not under
control. According to Cornforth (2003), controlling boards will de-motivate CEOs.
Cornforth (2003) said that boards should collaborate with CEOs and synergize efforts to
achieve organizational goals.
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ3
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these
organizations?
Findings from the data in this study revealed the beliefs of participants that RTOs
could have been more effective if the public RTO boards had performed their statutory
role. I also discovered from this study that though CEOs (former and present) and board
members believed that public RTO boards in Nigeria were necessary and should add
value to their organizations, the impact of these boards on organizational effectiveness
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was not significant enough. This finding is based on issues raised by participants against
boards’ activities, such as unclear roles, political interference, and lack of accountability.
Unclear Roles of Boards
Although CG involves regulation of the practices and activities of organizations,
the organs of CG must also be regulated. Their powers and governing roles need to be
well spelt out so that they do not overstep their boundaries and cause conflicts. According
to Ogbechie and Adeleye (2015), boards should have governance procedures, backed by
law. These rules and procedures should guide their behavior and become standards of
operations. My findings from this research revealed that most of the boards developed
their procedures because there was no formal code of governance for RTO boards in
Nigeria. FBMs who participated in this study confessed that they only picked extant
government laws and booklets about governance and thereon fashioned out ground rules
for their boards. Some also relied on the expectations communicated to them by the
government during their inauguration. Most often, these expectations were not well
communicated. According to some of the participants, the retreats organized for some
boards after their appointments were like jamborees and vacations. Governance of public
RTO Boards, therefore, differed according to the interpretation of boards of the rules and
Acts of their organizations. I discovered that there were extreme cases where the CEO
was too powerful and the board too ignorant and the CEO ended up taking over the job of
the board. That board recorded no meaningful achievement during its tenure. This study
also discovered that most RTO boards were more interested in the financial performance
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of their organizations rather than the fulfillment of their mandates to solve national
challenges. This finding was repeatedly evident in the data obtained.
Political Interference
Public organizations were established by governments to deliver outcomes that
would serve public interests (Verhoest et al., 2012). They are therefore indirectly
accountable to the citizens. To make them more efficient and effective, governments
appoint boards to run these public organizations but the boards are accountable to
governments and not directly to the citizens. According to Ogbechie and Adeleye (2015),
public organizations are only accountable to citizens through the politicians in power.
Participants in this study believed that public boards have had an insignificant impact
because their appointments were politically motivated and not done in the interest of the
public. Many participants believed that many of the RTO boards were not designed to
function because of the way they were structured. Oxelheim et al. (2013) said that when
public boards are well constituted, they govern well. Participants in this study expressed
their opinion that public organizations can not affect the lives of citizens as long as board
selection continued to be politically motivated. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) said that
independent boards are very effective in their activities. Sanda et al. (2011) said that
countries without good business practices encourage their public boards to act with
impunity and self-interests. My study discovered that self-interests are difficult to pursue
in Nigerian RTOs because the enlightened and professional CEOs who were in charge,
were only interested in outcomes. They thus boldly resisted self-seeking boards.
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Board Accountability
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) asserted that accountable boards follow good
governance principles. Tricker (2015) said that organizations controlled by boards which
adhere to governance principles yield consistently positive outcomes over time.
Participants in this study observed that the nonregulation of board activities was one of
the problems of RTOs effectiveness in Nigeria. To corroborate this, my findings revealed
the absence of clearly defined reporting lines for RTO boards in Nigeria. As a
consequence of this, boards acted as determined during their meetings, and some board
chairs acted with impunity and overstepped their boundaries.
This study also discovered that the absence of supervision and control of board
activities encouraged the emergence of super CEOs who become very powerful. Some of
the boards left the whole job to some CEOs and they only reported their activities to the
boards. The data obtained in this study also revealed that most boards rarely engaged in
advocacy for their organizations. Consequently, CEOs had to lobby for funds for their
organizations to operate. Since the funds were not usually adequate, some of the projects
embarked upon became abandoned before completion while the completed research
suffered from lack of patronage. These consequences are traceable to CG collapse. Poor
governance practices have negatively impacted RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. One of the
disadvantages of such a situation is that greedy CEOs can capitalize on the loopholes to
obtain personal benefits and pursue self- interests (Nkundabanyanga, 2016). Another
finding of this study was that lack of RTO board supervision and accountability promoted
wastage of resources. Many board meetings were found to be unnecessary and where
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they were held, participants observed that no concrete decisions were taken. Yet, the
board meetings would have cost the organization millions of naira, which could have
been put to better use by the organization. Muller (2009), after his investigation of the
impact of governance approaches of project managers on project structures, explained
that the absence of proper governance structures would promote avoidable mistakes.
Muller said that these mistakes have costly consequences on organizational effectiveness.
Limitations of the Study
There are limitations associated with using opinions and perceptions in research
studies as in all other studies and as such, I cannot ignore that there are certain issues that
limit this study. This study examined the impact of public governing boards on public
RTO effectiveness in Nigeria and so the findings in this study cannot be generalized to
private RTOs in Nigeria. Some of the other limitations in this study include (a) issues of
representativeness (b) use of secondary data, and (c) uncertainty about the genuineness of
participants’ perceptions and their reasons for participating in the study. The criteria for
selection of participants may have limited the data available for the study because the
participants were purposefully selected based on their characteristics and availability. As
such, the selected participants may not have been fully representative of the population
sampled. Secondary data are effective for data triangulation (Rohrbeck & Gemünden,
2011). However, if adequate information had been available to me, I would have been
able to personally verify the performance of the sampled RTOs to determine their
effectiveness. In the absence of this information, I had to make do with the annual reports
of the organizations as presented. This study is also limited by my difficulty in knowing
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if the positions of participants may have been borne out of their dissatisfaction with the
treatment they had or were being given, their disenchantment with the whole system, or
even fear of reprisal. Participants in this research may have therefore expressed opinions
that were based on assumptions and since these perceptions could not be verified within
the timeframe for this study, it may have inadvertently increased the probability of
respondents’ bias. I addressed some of these concerns of the participants by assuring
them of the confidentiality of their data during the interview and taking steps to secure
these data. I addressed their fears of reprisals, which could have been felt by some of the
participants by eliminating any way that responses could be identified through names and
positions. I also explained the importance of the study to them so that they would be
committed to saying things as they were.
I was unable to interview serving board members because the present
administration of President Muhammadu Buhari sacked former boards of public RTOs
during his first term in office and the new boards that have been inaugurated are yet to
settle down to their duties fully. The population’s characteristics could, therefore, be a
limitation since there was no way of balancing the opinions of serving board members
with that of FBMs. Although this did not affect the quality of the data obtained since the
operating environment of public RTOs has not changed. Further research that considers
the opinions of serving RTO boards may be required to understand governance and
organizational effectiveness in Nigerian public RTOs fully. The research design and data
collection methods are reliable and can be applied to research in the same sector in
Nigeria with similar results.
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Ethical biases that could have affected this study were personal especially because
I work with a public RTO and of course, had some personal opinions about governance in
the organizations. This possibility of personal bias however aided my reflexive thinking
and extreme carefulness in observing standard and ethical research procedures in the data
collection and analysis process. The member checking procedure also aided the validity
of the study.
Recommendations
Nigeria has 17 organizations in the FMST, which are tasked with growing wealth
for the country. However, good governance has always been an issue with Nigerian
public organizations and the evidence is apparent in the decaying infrastructure in Nigeria
and the many failed businesses. Although much of the causes are attributable to
corruption and political interference (Barton & Wiseman, 2015), public boards also have
a share in the blame for governance limitations in Nigeria (Ogbechie, 2016). Public
boards, in theory, are expected to reduce incidences of governance failures in
organizations but there is a gap between theory and practice in this regard (Verhoest et
al., 2012). Boards are an integral part of public organizations in Nigeria, as statutorily
required by the Nigerian Constitution and laws that set up the organizations, but their
impact does not seem to be so significant. Participants in this study have considered
public RTO boards in Nigeria to be unwanted appendages and wasteful ventures. But
over the years, successive research studies have recommended what boards should do to
remain relevant. Through this study, we have been able to discover that public boards are
necessary for RTOs and that if certain solid structures are built, CG can be enhanced in
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Nigeria.
Absence of structures weaken any system and if the government of Nigeria
desires to meet its goals through public enterprises, good CG structures and codes must
be established and sustained, irrespective of the party or individual in government. This
study recommends that there should be a benchmark and procedures for measuring
adherence to CG standards. There are current structures in public organizations such as
the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTU) in organizations. But these organs
are ineffective to measure the adherence of CEOs and boards because these desks are
manned by employees of the organizations who could easily be compromised or subdued
for fear of reprisals or loss of their jobs.
This study, therefore, recommends that independent assessors assess governance
performance of organizations half yearly with technical bias. Organizations that score
above the performance benchmark should be rewarded and promoted while underperformers should be penalized as appropriate. Such assessments will motivate CEOs and
boards to establish good CG policies in their organizations. This study also discovered
that public RTOs, under the FMST in Nigeria, could be grouped into three; according to
their mandates and ease of impact assessment. Some RTOs were established to provide
consumer goods like NASENI, Federal Institute of Industrial Research, Oshodi (FIIRO),
Project Development Institute (PRODA), Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute
(NBBRI), and also the National Research Institute for Chemical Technology (NARICT).
The second group includes feeder research institutes that learn to do certain things like
RMRDC and NBTI (with about 33 incubators in the country aimed at tapping resources
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or technology from states). The third category of public RTOs includes knowledgecreating entities such as the National Centre For Technology Management (NACETEM),
National Biotechnology Development Agency (NABDA), National Office for
Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP), which exist to regulate the conduct of
research in public RTOs. Clearly, within FMST itself, there are diverse operational
structures. Adegbite (2015) recommended that developing countries may fashion out a
workable governance structure. This study, therefore, recommends that governance codes
should be developed by the Nigerian government, specifically for public RTOs. These
codes should be adapted to public RTO operations and also address their governance
problems. The CAMA should also be revised as it is outdated and irrelevant to public
RTO operations. This study recommends the development of a Science, Engineering, and
Allied Matters Act (SEAM) which would codify governance in Nigerian public RTOs.
According to Barton and Wiseman (2015), the functions of boards in the
management of organizations have not been clearly defined despite their overwhelming
presence. Arnwine (2002) explained that boards have three main roles: policy making,
decision making, and oversight functions. Boards that understand their roles and are built
upon proper governance structures will behave appropriately and strategically. The
organizations under the control of such boards will be focused and consistently impact
their societies. Effective leaders must necessarily possess governance skills and a sense
of direction that will make them focused. Findings from this study revealed that public
RTO boards in Nigeria do not possess formal training on governance skills neither were
they equipped with information about their employers’ expectations after their tenure.
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The consequence of this is that the governance structure of public RTOs in Nigeria is not
standardized and it is difficult to pinpoint a standard governance pattern across the
organizations. This study, therefore, recommends training for boards of public RTOs as
soon as they are inaugurated. During this training, board members should be equipped
with measurable skills that would enable the government to regulate board activities.
According to Bass (1999), training and educational improvements promote
transformational leadership. Training is strategic for leaders. The need for training of
boards can therefore not be overemphasized. This will help boards understand and
internalize their roles so that they can be well positioned to improve their organizations’
effectiveness.
This study recommends that board members should sign commitment letters after
the retreat. This letter would contain expectations from them and clarify what boards are
to expect from their employers. The letter would also specify the rights and
responsibilities of board members, including when the president of the board can remove
them from the board for non-compliance and non-performance. As a follow-up, this study
recommends that M&E processes should be established to standardize best practices on
public boards in Nigeria. M&E will surely stimulate innovation and healthy competition
among public boards. This will, in turn, improve productivity and organizational
outcomes.
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•

T.A.C.: Technical Advisory Committee

Figure 6. Proposed monitoring and evaluation/oversight structure for public RTOs in
Nigeria (Developed from participants’ recommendations).
My findings from this research suggest that public RTO boards must be well
composed to be effective. Many of the sampled participants confirmed lopsided board
appointments which favored politicians and made it difficult for technocrats to operate.
This study, therefore, recommends a ratio of 50:30:20; that is, 50% of the board of public
RTOs should be made up of persons with technical, academic, and professional
qualifications so that they can act as the think-tank for the boards. They will easily
understand proposals from CEOs and offer technical support to nurture such ideas to
maturity. The other 30% should comprise of industrialists and professionals in private
practice, and the remaining 20% should accommodate politicians and persons in positions
of authority. These three groups have their roles defined on the board. Group A should
bring up proposals and conduct technical foresight; Group B should link up the RTOs
with the private sector for needed funds and collaborations, while Group C should be
saddled with advocacy for the organization by pushing the proposals and policies of the
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RTOs to the government for funding and patronage. Every group should be assessed
yearly by the Special Advisory Council (SAC) which should be composed of technocrats
and professionals. The role of the SAC would be to determine the progress and
achievements of public RTO boards in line with the letter of commitment signed at the
beginning of their tenure. Members of different groups should also peer-review their
colleagues. These reviews will be part of discussions at board meetings and would push
boards to be more committed to their assignments. Regular M&E will stimulate positive
governance practices in Nigerian RTOs. The performance of boards should, therefore, be
regularly measured against the mandate and vision of their organizations towards meeting
national challenges. I recommend that the effectiveness of public RTO boards on their
organizations can be determined by a set of logical sequences that are shown in Figure 7.
This study found that funding is critical to RTO and RTO boards’ performance. It
is recommended that public boards’ remuneration be improved so that they would be
motivated to serve their organizations. Remuneration should, however, be tied to
performance so that appointments onto public boards would no longer be compensations
but transactional contracts. The funding of RTOs also needs to be improved for them to
have any measurable impact on their society. Low funding is indicative of little attention
being paid to R&D in Nigeria. The support needed for R&D in Nigerian RTOs is
obtained more from foreign grants, fellowships and investments than from the federal
government of Nigeria. The funds allocated to the FMST to support research has
dwindled over the years. Between 2007 and 2012, it plummeted from 1.04% of the
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nation’s budget in 2007 to 0.64% of the national budget in 2012. Figure 7 explains the
decline.

Figure 7. RTO impact assessment chart.
The highest budgetary allocation to FMST since 2012 was in 2017 when the
ministry receives 0.97% of the nation’s budget. The situation has not improved in 2019 as
the FMST received N66,823,303,434 in the appropriated budget for 2019. This is less
than 1% (0.757%) of the national budget. This allocation for the FMST is the least given
to any ministry in the 2019 national budget. Sadly, the components in the allocation
indicate that the funds were mainly distributed to run the organizations, not for basic
R&D.
For instance, out of the N66,823,303,434 appropriated budget for 2019, N35,
020,953,172 was allocated for recurrent expenditure and for capital development, N31,
802,350,262 was allocated. This apparent shortage of funds for R&D and deliberate
neglect of R&D has hindered Nigeria’s Vision 2020 from crystallizing into reality
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because science and technology are the catalysts for the economic transformation of any
country. Although the federal government of Nigeria tried to intervene in the sector by
establishing the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2006 to manage the proposed
$5billion endowment fund for R&D, the money was never released to the foundation
(Muanya, 2019). Additionally, two other initiatives like the Education Tax Fund (ETF)
and the Science and Technology Education Post-Basic (STEP-B) project, targeted at
capacity building and infrastructural development in RTOs and higher institutions, made
a little impact until declining, and eventual zero allocation of funds sent these initiatives
into redundancy.

Figure 8. Percentage budgetary allocation for S&T Ministry in Nigeria budget between
2007 and 2012 (Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Nigeria).
Political interests, as well as mismanagement of resources and projects, further
sealed the fate of these initiatives (Muanya, 2019). Another initiative has been developed
and is being championed by the FMST - the National Science, Technology Innovation
Roadmap 2030 (NASTIR 2030). The goal of this initiative is to increase the
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competitiveness of Nigeria’s economy. This study recommends therefore that public
RTO boards in Nigeria should be empowered and tasked to achieve the FMST strategic
roadmap plan. When due attention is paid to R&D by any nation, the infrastructural and
growth challenges being faced by such nations would easily be overcome. This study also
recommends that a minimum of 1% of the overall annual budget of Nigeria should be
allocated to support R&D alone in the FMST, aside from allocations for recurrent and
capital expenditures. RTOs should then be tasked to guide their organizations towards the
eradication of these specific national challenges.
This study also recommends the replication of this research by conducting
interviews to elicit perceptions from research officers in the public sector regarding the
impact of boards on their effectiveness as researchers. This will give other perspectives
instead of relying on the opinion of board members and CEOs alone. Further research can
also be conducted using a quantitative approach, to compare the impact of boards of
public and private RTOs on the performance of these organizations.
Implications for Positive Social Change
A study that explores the perceptions of participants to discover the impact of
good governance on organizational outcomes has potential benefits. These benefits can
be felt by political leaders, chief executives of public organizations, the academic
community, the nation, and the individual in the country. These benefits have been made
possible through the insights obtained in this study.
Nigeria needs an effective research sector to solve its problems with
infrastructural development. Until basic and essential infrastructure like power and good
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roads network are available, Nigeria will continue to remain in the category of
developing nations. Findings from this study revealed that the quality of public RTO
boards in Nigeria and the adherence of the boards to good governance behaviors will
have positive influence on the effectiveness of the RTOs. If the findings of this research
are implemented, public RTOs in Nigeria will undergo regulatory reforms which will
make them more effective and responsive to the needs of the citizens in the country. This
will result in social changes in the RTOs and the lives of the citizens.
The findings of this study will provide useful information to policymakers in
Nigeria about the actual operations of public boards. Through these findings,
policymakers in the country will understand how some extant laws, financial procedures,
and bureaucratic processes hinder good governance in public RTOs. The findings in this
study will also assist new public RTO boards in Nigeria to become aware of how they
can embrace strong CG cultures and run their organizations more professionally.
Generally speaking, the positive social changes that could arise from this study, if
the recommendations are implemented, include reforms of the governance structure and
institutional frameworks of all boards in the public sector in Nigeria. It is expected that
this will improve good governance practices across all public RTOs in Nigeria and
increase confidence in them. When there is a commitment to ethical and strategic
behavior in organizations, organizational effectiveness and positive outcomes are to be
expected. Such outcomes include cost-effectiveness and lowered risk of collapse.
The importance of good governance is not only felt by the organization that
practices it but by the society which that organization serves. When public boards engage
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in good governance practices, organizational outcomes are easier to predict and sustain
(Rowley, Shipilov, & Greve, 2017). With the involvement of participants in this study,
the seed of social change has already been sown. For many of the participants, it was the
first time they had such a platform to express their opinions on the topic. The fact that
searchlight was being beamed on the issue made them hopeful that the government would
discover their plights and take necessary actions to address the issue of good governance
in Nigerian RTOs.
If the recommendations of this study are imbibed, appropriate good governance
principles would be established in public RTOs in Nigeria. This will improve the
effectiveness of public organizations. The implication of good governance is a
commitment to mandate achievement, and transparency in the conduct of business. This
will foster mutual trust and cooperation. Improved governance of public RTOs will
exponentially increase the competitiveness of these organizations and their propensity to
meet public needs. Public RTOs will thus be positioned to be socially responsible to their
communities.
Specifically, if the recommendations of this study are implemented, positive
organizational culture in public RTOs will emerge and grow strong. Good corporate
culture instills confidence in the minds of potential investors because they assure the
investors that their investments are protected from unwholesome practices, such as nondisclosure and arbitrary risk-taking. Since R&D is very costly to implement, public RTOs
in Nigeria will benefit from foreign investments, which can only be assured if the sector
adheres to international governance best practices. Apart from investments, RTOs can
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also access grants that would aid their research activities. The RTOs that are almost idle
due to lack of funds will be able to return to their research to develop processes and
machines that can help Nigeria to eliminate the infrastructural deficits in the country.
When the researchers and scientists are fully engaged, the public RTOs will increase in
efficiency and effectiveness thus making these organizations more profitable and wellpositioned to meet their mandates. Due to the potential profitability of these organizations
as a consequence of good governance corporate culture, there will be job satisfaction, job
security, and improved remunerations for the employees.
Adherence to good governance practices also has social change implications for
public RTO boards. In the first instance, the profitability and effectiveness of their
organizations will strengthen the theory of good governance and serve as a reference
point for other sectors to emulate. Since it has been established that strong corporate
cultures enhance access to funds, public RTO boards will also benefit from the growth
and successes of their organizations through improved emoluments. There will thus be
less pressure from board members on the CEO. Consequently, the CEO will be able to
perform his duties without undue interference and demands from boards.
Another positive social change that can arise from this study is that the
government of Nigeria will have less to worry about the survival of public RTOs. This is
because the organizations will be self-sustaining and rely less on funding from their
government. Findings from this study reveal that over 95% of public RTOs in the FMST
currently rely on the government to run their organizations and perform their research
activities. This puts a heavy burden upon the government, especially because these
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organizations are unable to meet their mandates and open up new sources of income for
the government. If the recommendations of this study are implemented, most public
RTOs in Nigeria will become importers of technology and Nigeria can join the league of
nations who earn foreign currencies through their competencies. This will reduce the
nations over-dependence on crude oil as a major source of income for the nation.
Another implication for social change that could be obtained from this study is in
its addition to the body of knowledge. The approach of the investigation into the issue of
governance has primarily been through the use of survey instruments and questionnaires,
using a quantitative approach. Through the findings of this research, there is the
possibility of adding another perspective through the perception of participants, using the
qualitative approach. The findings of this study have implications for further studies. I
discovered that some other factors, other than public boards, could influence public RTO
performance in Nigeria. The issue of the impact of the use of Advisory Committees in
RTOs also came up in the course of my findings. These issues are however questions for
further research. More investigations could be carried out on other public organizations in
Nigeria to determine the impact of their boards on organizational performance. The
perception of participants could also be obtained through another data collection
instrument, other than face to face interviews. The results of such studies could reveal
further insight into how good governance practices could be diffused to assist public
RTOs to achieve positive outcomes.
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Conclusion
Legitimacy for public RTO boards in Nigeria was derived from the enabling laws
and decrees which established the RTOs. This study relied on the experiences and
opinions of participants to determine the impact of good governance on public RTO
effectiveness in Nigeria. Major themes were derived from the examination of the problem
identified in this study and these themes were analyzed using the research questions
generated in the study. Findings from the qualitative data were majorly consistent with
the findings of other literature on boards’ impact which stress the fundamental
importance of good governance. This study found out that even though public RTO
boards were necessary and could have a positive impact on their organizations, their
influence was not felt. The findings suggest that the Nigerian government needs to reform
the governance structure of Nigerian public RTO boards to make it more functional and
accountable. This study also recommends that the focus of governance in public RTOs
should be on strategic performance to strengthen the future of these RTOs and address
critical national issues. Future research could focus on strengthening public board
structure to achieve organizational effectiveness, using different research methods.
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Appendix A: Introductory Letter 1

TO: (The Managing Director/CEO)
Dear ________________,
I am a member of staff of the Engineering Materials Development Institute, Akure (a
parastatal of NASENI, which is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Science
and Technology) and I have been an employee of this Institute for the past 16 years. I am
now a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Walden
University and I am researching the role played by public governing boards in the
effectiveness of public Research and Technological Organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria. In
view of the current economic quagmire being faced by Nigeria, the current interest of
most Nigerians is on how government will deliver their promises of infrastructural and
economic development. Science and Technology is one of the backbones of any economy
and I am thus interested in contributing to knowledge on how the public RTOs can
become more efficient and effective, through a more effective governance system, so as
to improve the fortunes of the country.
Your organization is well noted for its giant strides in the field of research & technology
and in a bid to accomplish the purpose of this research; your organization has been
chosen, among others, to participate in this research. I therefore humbly request a private
interview with you for 40-60 minutes in order to gain more insight into the governance
structure of your organization. Your participation is a very simple process and the
opinions you shall offer during this interview shall be confidential and all the measures to
be taken to guarantee your privacy are contained in the attached Informed Consent Form
as required by Walden University. I request that you kindly fill the form and mail by
(date), using the enclosed stamped envelope. A script of the interview shall be made
available to you, as well as a copy of the study’s findings after the conclusion.
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I therefore hope that you will feel comfortable with this request and provide useful and
frank information that will be invaluable to this study. I will call to book an appointment
for the interview but you can contact me should you be willing to get more clarifications
about this study.
Thank you for your cooperation and I look forward to meeting with and learning from
you.
Yours Sincerely,

Olayinka Komolafe
Doctoral Candidate
Public Policy and Admin, Walden University
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Appendix B: Introductory Letter 2

TO: (Former Board Member’s Name)
Dear ________________,
I am a member of staff of the Engineering Materials Development Institute, Akure (a
parastatal of NASENI, which is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Science
and Technology) and I have been an employee of this Institute for the past 16 years. I am
now a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Walden
University and I am researching the role played by public governing boards in the
effectiveness of public Research and Technological Organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria. In
view of the current economic quagmire being faced by Nigeria, the current interest of
most Nigerians is on how government will deliver their promises of infrastructural and
economic development. Science and Technology is one of the backbones of any economy
and I am thus interested in contributing to knowledge on how the public RTOs can
become more efficient and effective, through a more effective governance system, so as
to improve the fortunes of the country.
You have been selected, among others, to participate in this research by virtue of the fact
that you were the chairman/a member of the governing board of (insert organization
here); an organization that is noted for research and technology. In a bid to accomplish
the purpose of this research, I therefore humbly request a private interview with you for
40-60 minutes in order to gain more insight into your opinion and experience of the
governance structure and performance of the board that could have influenced the
effectiveness of your organization. Your participation is a very simple process and the
opinions you shall offer during this interview shall be confidential and all the measures to
be taken to guarantee your privacy are contained in the attached Informed Consent Form
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as required by Walden University. I request that you kindly fill the form and mail by
(date), using the enclosed stamped envelope if you decide to participate in this research.
A script of the interview shall be made available to you, as well as a copy of the study’s
findings after the conclusion.
I therefore hope that you will feel comfortable with this request and provide useful and
frank information that will be invaluable to this study. I will call to book an appointment
for the interview but you can contact me should you be willing to get more clarifications
about this study.
Thank you for your cooperation and I look forward to meeting with and learning from
you.

Yours Sincerely,

Olayinka Komolafe
Doctoral Candidate
Public Policy and Admin, Walden University
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Appendix C: Interviewer Guide
A.

Interview Details

Date:

Time:

Place:

Interviewee:
Position of interviewee:
B.

Protocol and Opening Statement
•

Thank participant

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interpretive qualitative study despite
your busy schedule. My name is Olayinka Komolafe and I am a doctoral student of
Public Policy and administration in the Walden University, Baltimore, USA. I shall be
moderating this interview session.
•

Describe how research will help effective governance of public organizations in
Nigeria

This study is focused on understanding the impact of public boards on the
effectiveness of public Research and Technology Organizations (RTOs). The importance
of this research can be seen in its contribution to the effectiveness of public
organizations, especially in these days of recession where public organizations seem to be
the major backbone of government to provide needed infrastructure and basic services,
which will alleviate the suffering of the masses. This research is also a partial fulfillment
of a doctoral degree (PhD) in Public Policy and Administration (Public Management &
Leadership). I will therefore appreciate your candid opinion on what you perceive to be
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the effect of the presence of public boards in Nigerian RTOs, especially based on your
experience as a board member/chair/ CEO.
•

Explain the Interview Process

The questions are semi-structured in order to allow you to fully express your opinion
on the subject of inquiry and I want you to know, before this interview commences, that
whatever you say in the course of this interview shall be held in strict confidence and no
one can have any unauthorized access to the scripts of this interview session. The only
authorized access is that which is given to my dissertation Committee Chair in the event
that he may desire to confirm some of the emerging themes from this interview. At this
time, I will like to also inform you that this interview shall be recorded on a midget audio
recorder for easy and accurate transcription. I will like to know if you object to this
before we proceed further.
•

Other steps in the Interview Process
o Remind participant of their right to withdraw their participation if they
feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview.
o Sign Informed Consent form (if not yet signed)

C.

Questions
I will like to begin the interview now. But before then, do you have any questions

about this study or interview before we proceed?
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1.

What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s Research

and Development Sector?

Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
2.

What do Board members and Managing Directors of public organizations in

Nigeria’s Research and Development Sector believe are the impact of boards on
organizational effectiveness?
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
3.

What do you believe are the impact of public boards on organizational

effectiveness?
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________

4.

What governance strategies have worked for you in increasing your

organization’s performance and why do you think they were that effective?
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
5.

How can boards positively influence the effectiveness of their organizations?

Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
6.

What, in your opinion, can hinder public board effectiveness?

Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
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7.

What other information would you like to add relating to this research?

Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________
D.

Closing Remarks
Thank you and please remember the member checking procedures.

I wish to thank you for your participation and unrestrained comments during this
interview. Please note that you can have a copy of this study if you so desire. Kindly
contact me to state your preference.
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Appendix D: Certificate of Completion of NIH Training

Certificate of Completion

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research certifies that
Olayinka Komolafe successfully completed the NIH Web-based training course
"Protecting Human Research Participants".

Date of completion: 02/01/2017.

Certification Number: 2306511.

